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MARSHALL, JACQUELINE CAROL. Ed.D. A Quest for Personal 
Meaning and Wholeness through the Movement Experience: An 
Alternative Perspective. (1986) 
Directed by: Dr. Kate R. Barrett. 164 pp. 
The central question of this inquiry is: Does the 
movement experience facilitate personal meaning and 
wholeness? Existential-phenomenological insights are drawn 
from writers such as Merleau-Ponty, Bakan, and Kleinman. A 
major premise underlying this study is that personal 
wholeness is contingent on coming to terms with two 
symbiotic, yet paradoxical human impulses; the need for 
autonomy (agency) and the need for connection with others 
(communion). Our holistic quest is to come to terms with 
these two dimensions in ourselves, and show how movement 
facilitates their reconciliation. The major concern of this 
study is the increasing alienation experienced by students 
who feel unembodied, unfree, and unconnected in physical 
education. Alienation or depersonalization occurs when the 
inner subjective feelings and the outer observable dimensions 
of movement are split from each other. Our continued 
reliance on Newtonian and Cartesian dualistic thought as the 
theoretical base for physical education supports and 
compounds the alienation dilemma. 
Merleau-Ponty1s Body-Subject is offered as an 
alternative holistic model. The rationale and support for 
its position is based on the New Physics paradigm that the 
universe is no longer immutable and absolute but relative. 
The Body-Subject depolarizes the inner and outer split in 
movement, and helps center our paradoxical need for autonomy 
and communion. The primordial dimensions of the lived body 
guided by our preconscious and conscious intentions supports 
the holistic notion of the mind-body as one entity. The body 
actively situates itself for meaning. Wholeness exists at 
both the preconscious and conscious levels of the body. More 
specifically, wholeness occurs when the other is 
dialectically met as a subject, not an object. By meeting 
the other as a subject the subject-object dichotomy is 
dissolved, revealing universal harmony, unity, and deep 
personal meaning. 
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Now of all the acts the most complete is that of 
constructing. A work demands love, meditation, 
obedience to your finest thought, the invention of 
laws by your soul, and many other things that it 
draws miraculously from your self, which did not 
suspect that it possessed them. This work 
proceeds from the most intimate center of your 
existence, and yet it is distinct from yourself. 
Paul Valery 
The work is to master and be mastered by one1s 
idea, a passionate process ... this work has to do 
with language and metaphor, with the cosmos, and 
the figuring self in relation. It is a living, 
thinking, growing, remembering work between the 






Throughout most of recorded history, athletes and 
physical educators in the roles of paidotribes, teachers, 
trainers, and coaches, have dealt with the body as an 
object. This has been true with reference to their own 
bodies and those of others. The focus of inquiry has 
been on questions and problems associated with physical 
training and conditioning, and not on the body as a 
source of identity. (Leonard, 1975, p. 23) 
The fundamental human quest is the search for our 
personal identity and personal meaning in our lives. As 
individuals we are in search of our uniqueness, our humanity, 
and ultimately, our destiny. Self-understanding is a search 
for authenticity not found in anonymity, conformity, or 
passivity. Such understanding is not a totally rational 
process achieved by logical reasoning or problem solving 
(Macdonald, 1980). This life-long struggle of coming to 
terms with our humanity and uniqueness is not a journey that 
unfolds effortlessly, but rather as a result of incessant 
soul searching. Although our physical and mental reality are 
beyond dispute, meaning and spiritual relevance remain the 
seemingly unfathomable question which we endeavor to 
comprehend. The inherent difficulty of this task is 
illustrated by Heschel: 
The paradox is that man is an obscure text to himself. 
He knows that something is meant by what he does, but he 
remains perplexed when called upon to interpret his own 
being. (Heschel, 1965, p. 6) 
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All concrete beings occupy a place in physical space and 
can be defined in terms of objective properties. Unlike 
other entities, however, our authentic existence occurs 
within ourselves through the process of direct experience of 
action and reflection upon our actions. Humans are unique in 
this respect. We are the only species with the capacity to 
reflect on our behavior. Since actions are readily 
observable and discernable, reflection has a tendency to 
reduce an individual to what is explicitly manifest and 
observable. As humans we fail to acknowledge and comprehend 
fully the power of the inner space within ourselves, where 
this process occurs as an integral path to self-understanding 
and personal meaning. Heschel elucidates upon this point: 
It is a mistake however to equate man's essence with his 
manifestations. The power and secret of his being reside 
as much in the unsaid and unproclaimed, in the tacit and 
the ineffable, in the acts of awareness that defy 
expression as in the vessels man creates for his 
expression. (1965, p. 10) 
The Inner and Outer Split 
This fragmentation of the outer, observable self from 
our inner feelings and intuition has resulted in alienation, 
not only from ourselves but from the larger community in 
which we are integrally connected. Our humanity is being 
eclipsed in the face of technocracy's demands for increased 
productivity. For the sake of human progress, we have become 
machine-like in our thinking. Unfortunately, in the process, 
we are losing ourselves. Maybe this is what Heschel implies 
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when he states: "Man in his anxiety is a messenger, who 
forgot the message" (Heschel, 1965, p. 119). 
This alienation has shown itself in different ways. As 
humans, we no longer feel at home with ourselves and the 
world. A feeling of inertia has resulted. This inertia has 
been compounded by the tremendous technological advances 
which have induced a sense of fear and alienation from our 
environment (May, 1967). Specialization, complexity, and the 
transitory nature of things have left us feeling empty and 
powerless. We are bewildered and feel a sense of 
helplessness which leads to apathy and the inability to bring 
about change and growth, not only in ourselves, but in the 
world we occupy (Ravizza, 1977). 
Sartre (1956) and Heidegger (1962) specifically 
highlight the alienation dilemma. Although these authors 
wrote in the context of the thirties, forties, and fifties, I 
feel the problems that existed then are the same concerns of 
today. According to Heidegger, the self or the "I" (dasein) 
is lost in the mediocrity of the "THEY." It is the larger 
public eye that controls and determines the interpretation of 
the "I" and the world. To Heidegger, "everyone is the other 
and no one is himself." On a similar note, Sartre states 
that every day we deceive ourselves by playing roles expected 
of us. Our authentic self is martyred by public demand: we 
lose our unique individuality to fulfill a particular 
function. This role is not only self-deceptive but limits 
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the self. We become simply appearances, devoid of our 
authentic self. 
One way of avoiding encounters with our authentic self, 
according to Fromm (1941), is to immerse ourselves with 
somebody or something outside ourselves in order to acquire 
the strength which the self is lacking. Furthermore, others, 
when confronted with personal problems, seek solutions that 
merely gloss over the deeper, underlying cause. Avoidance of 
the self by whatever means becomes the safer, less anxious 
way to exist. 
Similarly, May (1967) acknowledges the emptiness of our 
inner selves as we quest for meaning. He illuminates the 
idea that it is not that we do not know what we want, but 
that we often do not have a clear idea of how we feel. We 
lack sensitivity and awareness of the rich textured matrix of 
our interiority. The following poem by T.S. Eliot (1934) 
illustrates our inner vacuousness. 
We are the hollow men 
We are the stuffed men 
Leaning together 
Headpiece filled with straw. Alas 1 
Shape without form, shade without color 
Paralyzed force, gesture without motion, (p. 101.) 
May draws support for the severity of our dilemma by 
referring to Nietzsche's (1927) proclamation that science in 
the late nineteenth century was becoming a factor. Nietzsche 
feared that our great advances in techniques, without a 
parallel advance in ethics and self-understanding, would lead 
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to nihilism. Nihilism denies all existing and traditional 
values on which human existence is predicated and ultimately 
leads to the demise of order and civilization. 
Heschel, Heidegger, Sartre, and May all echo a similar 
theme. They call us to rediscover our unique, inner sources 
of strength and the integrity of our authentic self. In 
doing so, we will be able to actualize our possibilities into 
realities through our freely chosen will, acutely aware that 
we are the masters of our own will and journey throughout 
life. Only when we are autonomous and critically conscious 
of ourselves as free agents can we be fully responsible for 
nurturing our personal, authentic growth, facilitating a more 
meaningful contribution to the larger community. 
The authentic self facilitates our search for personal 
meaning. Believing in and drawing on the resources of our 
authentic self, we as individuals are not only critically 
conscious of who we are but how we are. We listen and 
embrace our outer world of knowing through our senses, 
coupled with the intuitive feeling aspect of our inner 
thoughts. This process offers us the possibility for a more 
integrated mode of living. The true self emerges as a beacon 
humanizing the alienated, self-perpetuated, technological 
pit, which according to Nietzsche (1927), is precariously 
close to its full eclipse and our ultimate demise. 
Causes and Implications of the Split 
The fragmentation of humanity through our perception of 
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our inner and outer selves was started in the seventeenth 
century by Descartes (Meier, 1975). He believed that all 
nature must be subjected to scrutiny and be examined 
rationally rather than experientially. This belief evolves 
from the fact that the body and mind are viewed as separate 
entities having mutually exclusive properties. The outer and 
objective world of nature, including the physical body, are 
radically different from the inner and subjective world of 
our mind and experience. Reason becomes separated from 
emotion and will. Reason offers the answer to any problem 
confronting the physical laws of nature (Meier, 1975). The 
process, once learned, does not stop with nature. The same 
rational processes are turned back on humanity itself by 
compartmentalizing our wholeness into separate entities. 
Despite rigorous, reductionistic methods of logic and 
sophisticated techniques of data analysis, we are still no 
closer to understanding our psyche, since we need to be seen 
as an embodied entity. Only when this is fully acknowledged 
do we have any hope of living more centered and integrated 
lives. 
The scientific-reductionist method that evolved when 
reason became separated from emotion and will has brought 
about a development of our conceptual and mental capacities 
that neglects our bodily experiences and sensations 
(Kleinman, 1970). We need to recover our awareness of our 
bodies. We have lost touch with our bodies and are unaware 
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of the inner world of direct firsthand experience and the 
inherent awareness and understanding that follows. R. D. 
Laing (cited in Ravizza, 1977a) expresses this point: 
As adults we have forgotten most of our childhood, not 
only its contents but its flavor; as men of the world, we 
hardly know of the existence of the inner world ... or 
for our bodies, we retain just sufficient proprioceptive 
sensations to coordinate our movements and to ensure the 
minimal requirements for biosocial survival-beyond that, 
little or nothing, (p. 99) 
Subsequently, when confronted with a physical ailment, 
our first reaction is to reach for an external remedy to 
solve the problem (May, 1967). Rarely do we search inwardly 
for a possible cause, or assume responsibility for working 
through a problem. We have forgotten how to listen to the 
natural body rhythms that constantly inform us about our 
physical and emotional selves. This reliance on externals 
reflects the attitude that regards the body as a mechanism or 
object that must be serviced. Rollo May illustrates this 
point: 
As a result of . . . suppressing the body into an 
inanimate machine, subordinated to the purpose of modern 
industrialization, people are proud of paying no 
attention to the body. They treat it as an object for 
manipulation, as though it were a truck to be driven 
until it runs out of gas. They know how germs or viruses 
or allergies attack the body or how some other drugs cure 
them. The attitude toward disease is not that of a 
self-aware person who experiences his body as part of 
himself. (1967, p. 92) 
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The Split in Movement 
Many of the attitudes we hold about the body, and 
subsequently physical education, are shaped by the attitude 
our society has about the worth of the body in relationship 
to the worth of the mind. Fairs (1968) states that the role 
of physical education in society is determined by the 
mind-body relationship. If the mind and body are considered 
separate, then the body is viewed irreverently, since it 
confounds reason. When the mind-body are viewed as having a 
modicum of relationship, the body is viewed less favorably 
than the mind. Whereas, if the mind and body are regarded 
more holistically, the body enjoys more esteem and 
significance (Fairs, 1968). 
Ervin's (1964) study, "Education of the Physical versus 
Education through the Physical," states that the mind-body 
problem is not entirely an in-house issue; outside forces 
play a significant role not only for the perpetuation of the 
problem, but for its resolution. She states: 
From 1952 to the present day, the profession has 
oscillated indecisively from one to the other. The 
controversy thus continues . . . Not only inconsistency 
of purpose within the physical education profession, but 
a variety of outside forces retard or even prevent (sic) 
solution of the controversy. (Ervin, 1964, p. 312) 
The cultural ethos of the last fifty years has 
increasingly viewed the body as an animated machine to be 
vigorously scrutinized by scientific analysis. Since 
physical education reflects the larger, macro view, it has 
unwittingly reflected the same (Ravizza, 1977a). This 
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problem has been compounded by the larger forces shaping its 
belief system, upon which the profession predicates its 
existence as well as its direction. Ravizza (1977a) 
acknowledges this point: 
Physical educators have unintentionally contributed to 
the conception of the body as an animated machine; 
viewing it primarily as an object of scientific analysis. 
In the minds of the public, physical education is 
associated chiefly with physical fitness, the physical 
educator is the person who gets the body in good physical 
condition, just as the dentist gets one's teeth in order, 
(p. 100-101) 
Physical educators have also contributed unknowingly to 
the mover viewing himself as a duality, a mind and a body. 
The body is viewed as an object of scientific analysis, 
perpetuating society's view of the body as separate from the 
mind (Ravizza, 1977a). This is limiting since we do not live 
our lives as separate parts, but as an embodied unity. 
Kleinman (1979) reiterates this point when he states: 
We have come to regard the body as a thing to be dealt 
with, rather than as an existent presence or mode of 
being ... we have divorced the body from experience and 
we do not attempt to understand it as it operates in the 
lived world; rather we attempt to explain it as a 
physiological organism. We don't look at it as it is, 
but as we conceptualize it scientifically, (p. 177) 
The Split Related to Physical Education 
It is my belief that physical education should be 
concerned with integrating the personal "inner" meanings of 
the movement itself with the development of "outer" physical 
fitness and skills. Neither should be emphasized to the 
detriment or exclusion of the other. The former reflects an 
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intrinsic focus for the impact the movement has for other 
dimensions of personal knowing. This focus is one of 
integration and affords possibilities for transcendence to a 
more reflective or holistic position. The latter is more 
consonant with an extrinsic position about the movement 
itself, i.e., its principal objectives are efficiency and 
effectiveness for the moving body in time and space. The 
body is primarily treated as an object. 
I contend that physical education is out of balance at 
present. There appears to be an exaggeration of the 
extrinsic position where the main emphasis is on physical 
skills and fitness to the partial exclusion of the intrinsic 
position. I posit that both positions are valid and 
necessary. It is not simply one in lieu of the other. 
Opposites are only extremes of the same thing. For example, 
water has two extremes of steam and ice, but they are 
essences of the same phenomena. 
The predominant view for the last fifty years has had 
the body as increasingly separate from the mind and as an 
object to be manipulated. I feel there are two major reasons 
for this dichotomy. First, the larger cultural ethos 
determines the worth and subsequent bias of the mind-body 
relationship in physical education (Fairs, 1968). During the 
last fifty years the mind has enjoyed a more priveleged 
position than the body or mind-body, subsequently holistic 
movement took a "back seat" in physical education. Secondly, 
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the subjective elements of the movement experience are not as 
easily delineated. They appear nebulous and difficult to 
fully understand since they are concerned with emotions, 
intuitions, irrationality, and transcendence. I feel the 
ambivalence within the profession toward embracing a more 
holistic approach to movement may lie in the abstract nature 
of the literature. It is this lack of direction in the 
literature and its attendant effects on personal 
understanding that inhibits teachers in adopting and 
fostering the intrinsic position in their teaching. What is 
needed in the literature is a clear theoretical framework 
touching upon the personal possibilities for meaning and 
transcendence through the movement experience. Once such a 
framework is developed, it is hoped that it will enable us to 
better understand, embody, and teach the full continuum of 
meaning inherent in movement and sports. 
In endeavoring to understand the intrinsic and extrinsic 
dimensions of the movement experience, we must avoid the 
natural tendency of seeking a middle ground by 
overemphasizing that which has been slighted. We must not 
emphasize the intrinsic to arrive at our balance by a process 
of averaging. Our goal should be to construct a 
philosophical framework which at the outset recognizes the 
movement experience to be the integration of both the 
intrinsic and the extrinsic, a wholeness of movement. 
In professional circles, physical educators have always 
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acknowledged that physical education is more than just 
fitness and health. It has the potential for educating the 
whole person, a view espoused by Hetherington (1922), Nash 
(1930), and Williams (1927). According to Kollen (1981), 
however, the profession gives "lip-service" to education of 
the whole person, more commoningly referred to as education 
"through" the physical. It leaves to chance the affect of 
the movement experience and assumes it will take place. 
Kollen (1981), in her study on fragmentation and 
integration in physical education, indicates that none of the 
current literature on the subject matter of physical 
education considers integrated movement. Rather, the subject 
matter of physical education appears to be biomechanics, 
exercise physiology, and motor learning. Further, there 
appears to be an increasing body of literature focusing on 
laboratory measurements on body composition, body levers, and 
motor learning modes based on physiology, physics, and 
psychology. She notes that although there are few citations 
in the professional journals concerned with integrated 
movement, there appears to be a growing body of studies 
concerned with the more integrated aspects of movement, which 
she classifies into three categories. The first category 
pertains to the psychological impact of the performer in 
movement. The second category references the positive 
outcomes of integrated movement experiences. The last 
category attempts to identify the meaning of movement 
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experiences for the body-subject. 
My major concern for this study is that physical 
education appears to be alienating many persons from the joy 
and meaning of their bodies in motion. According to Kollen's 
study, physical education appears to be turning students 
"off" from movement rather than "on." Kollen asked 
graduating high school seniors to reflect on their movement 
experience. One particular finding indicated that students 
were unable to recall any examples of integrated movement 
within physical education, but they were all able to report 
such experiences outside of physical education. She 
concludes her study with the following findings: 
1. Many students shape their physical education world by 
negative withholding; many are shaped in their physical 
education world toward dependency and conformity. 
2. Movement is a means to an end and the body is the 
enabling instrument of such movement; man is not a moving 
being in physical education. 
3. Movement is given in physical education in a 
masculine, competitive, athletic, and self-conscious 
fashion. 
4. Over time, movement unfolds from mystery, newness, and 
excitement toward boredom. 
5. The movement experience in physical education is often 
one of isolation, alienation from , or unconcern for 
others; awareness, if any, centers around tension. 
I feel Kollen's study clearly illustrates the alienation 
that many students experience in their physical education 
curriculum. This is the antithesis of what we purport to be 
about. Can we face the fact that students find little joy, 
learning, or meaning through movement experiences in our 
14 
classrooms? Subsequently, this study is about the 
development of an alternative position that specifically 
fosters the subjective and integrative elements of movement. 
Method of Inquiry 
The focus of this ontological inquiry is how individuals 
find personal meaning and integration through the movement 
experience. The major premise of this study is that personal 
integration is nurtured best when we as individuals recognize 
two facets of our existence. The first is our need for 
self-hood, autonomy, and authenticity to counteract the 
collectivist pot of conformity as outlined by Heidegger, 
Sartre, and May. Bannister captures the essence of this need 
for self-hood when he states, "Breathes there a man with a 
soul so dead that he has lost the urge to impress on the 
world some indelible mark of his personality." (1955, p. 67) 
This is in direct contrast and somewhat oppositional to our 
second need, our need to feel connected with others outside 
ourselves. Individuals do not live in isolation. There is a 
strong, inherent, emotional and spiritual drive to feel a 
sense of closeness with others; our need for communion. 
Neither is singularly sufficient. Individually, we need to 
feel a sense of our own potency and autonomy affirming our 
uniqueness alongside our deep-rooted need to belong to the 
larger community which substantiates and affirms our 
humanity. Two alternative models of wholeness, namely 
professional and personal, will explore this premise as it 
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relates to wholeness in a movement context. 
These two models will provide the theoretical base for 
the alternative model. Secondly, they will provide different 
lenses to speculatively look at the two traditional 
approaches from different vantage points. We must endeavor 
to avoid the mistake our predecessors have made in accepting 
an either-or position, or biasing one model in favor of the 
other. We need to see them both as vital dynamics in the 
physical education process, for each is inherently embodied 
in each other, they are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, 
the task is to develop an alternative model that embraces and 
extends traditional thought into the context of today. 
The inquiry is guided by the central question: Does 
movement facilitate personal meaning and integration? If so, 
how? Other questions pertinent to the inquiry are: 
1) Is there something unique about meaning in movement? 
2) Is there a connection between personal meaning and 
integration? 
3) Is there holism in movement? If so, what is its 
nature? 
4) Can there be spiritual/transcendental meaning in 
movement? If so, where and how is it found? 
Of the two major approaches to philosophy, analytic and 
speculative, this paper will pursue the latter. Speculative , 
philosophy is primarily concerned with evoking new questions 
about new possibilities, once certain knowns have been 
determined. It acknowledges the validity of individual1s 
intuitive and emotional hunches. According to Thomas, 
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"speculation tends to examine potentials, what could be or 
what should be rather than focusing on actual happenings" 
(1983, p. 19). The intent is to clarify and develop new 
platforms of belief to meet our constantly changing societal 
needs, so that the behavior that evolves from those beliefs 
is not only sound but consistent. 
This paper will use existential-phemenological insights 
from writers such as Merleau-Ponty (Bannan, 1967; Edie, 1964; 
Kwant, 1963, 1966; Whitford, 1982), Kleinman (1970, 1972, 
1975, 1976, 1979, 1986), Meier, (1975, 1979), Ravizza (1977, 
1977a), and Slusher (1967). Existentialism focuses on the 
analysis of human nature and deals with the subjective and 
irrational side of humanity and our relationships. It views 
individuals as subjects, not objects, and believes that human 
beings are ends in themselves rather than a means to an end. 
Individuals are not enslaved to the larger, cultural system 
but may make choices of their own free will. It advocates 
acceptance of the irrational nature of humans, that many 
phenomena, particularly feelings, do not fit predetermined 
logical patterns. Ultimately, we need to give way to leaps 
of faith, since logical reductionism of feelings, ideas, and 
behavior does not offer adequate meanings for our existence. 
Phenomenology focuses on the study of human consciousness and 
self-awareness, and is the vehicle for the existential 
search. Existential-phemenological insights are appropriate 
for this study because they endeavor to speak to and about. 
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the subjective nature of the inner person, which is the major 
focus of this study in its relationship to wholeness. 
Outline of the Study 
This study continues with Chapter Two which explores an 
alternative theoretical platform for personal wholeness using 
Bakan's metaphors of Agency and Communion. This will 
illustrate some of the external factors in society that 
mitigate against personal wholeness. It will also provide a 
model for personal wholeness that will enable humans to 
reconcile their need for autonomy, against the impulse to 
feel connected, which embodies both the agentic and communal 
impulses. The physical education literature will then be 
explored for parallels between the agentic and communal 
modalities, since schools are a microcosm of the larger 
society. The intent is to highlight specific 
teaching-learning practices in physical education that mirror 
these two modalities. 
Chapter Three will explore the major theoretical and 
philosophical influences upon which physical education has 
predicated its existence. Two predominant philosophical 
orientations in physical education literature, education "of" 
and education "through" the physical will be used for this 
purpose. Once such a platform has been established, the 
extrinsic and intrinsic aspects of movement will be explored 
and the relationship of both philosophical orientations to 
wholeness will be discussed. 
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The second theoretical platform will be discussed in 
Chapter Four. More specifically, Merleau-Ponty's work on the 
Body-Subject will speculatively show how movement can 
integrate the two modalities agency and communion. Further, 
this chapter will attempt to explain the nature of the 
relationship between these two modalities as it pertains to 
personal wholeness and meaning.. 
The final chapter will elucidate an alternative, 
philosophical model for physical education that will 
illuminate more fully the subjective aspects of the personal 
meanings and the transcendent possibilities inherent in the 
movement experience. It will include implications and 
ramifications for the philosophical framework evolved from 
Chapters Two and Four. The main intent is to understand the 
mysterious nature of wholeness, not only for the self, but 
how this takes place in a movement environment. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL PLATFORM FOR PERSONAL WHOLENESS 
If I am not for myself 
Who will be for me? 
If I am only for myself 
What am I? 
Hillel 
The quest for personal meaning and wholeness in our 
everyday mundane liv^s is elusive. Heschel (1965) reminds us 
that as humans we believe our existence has meaning, but 
exactly what the meaning is, is unclear. The journey from our 
Genesis to our Exodus takes a different path for each 
individual. For many, it is a spiritual quest for communion 
with the eternal deity. Such a communal impulse is also sought 
on an earthly plane — the need to feel authentically connected 
and loving with others. 
This feeling of human connectedness, however, is not 
sufficient in and of itself. As humans, we also have a need to 
express our being as separate from the group and to discover 
the creative powers unique to our individual personalities. It 
is through separation that we are able to accomplish this. By 
accepting our aloneness and taking responsibility for 
ourselves, we develop competence and control in our lives, 
contrary to the conformity and dependency experienced during 
infancy. 
The individuation process is characterized by a 
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dialectical quality. On one side there is the need for a 
feeling of personal strength — physically, emotionally and 
mentally and a perception of self as competent and capable. 
Whereas, the other side of individuation is the growing 
awareness of our aloneness with its subsequent anxiety. We 
soon realize our powerlessness and insignificance, which in 
turn, precipitates the impulse to submerge ourselves and 
reconnect with the world again (Fromm, 1941). This process of 
individuation makes for a higher, more meaningful re-connection 
with the group, for it is based on free choice rather than 
conformity. The end result is a deeper level of 
self-understanding, which in turn, facilitates a higher level 
of successive contributions to the larger community. 
Consequently, community continues to evolve and is enriched 
because of this dialectical individuation process. 
Integrating these two impulses, the need to belong and the 
need to express our self-hood, forms the main premise of this 
study. Our quest is to reconcile these two dimensions in 
ourselves, and understand the symbiotic yet paradoxical 
relationship between these two modalities. Personal wholeness, 
and indeed societal wholeness of the larger culture, is 
contingent on integrating these two needs. 
Jaspers (1951) suggests that a certain tension exists 
within the individual because of these two modalities. On one 
side is the desire to safeguard our existence which manifests 
itself outward to the community. On the other, our need to 
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express our individuality and being, leading us inwards, 
towards our inner private world. This inner-outer or 
subject-object tension permeates our human existence. 
Agency and Communion 
David Bakan (1966) adopts the terms agency and communion 
to characterize these two basic modalities of human forms: 
agency for existence as an individual and communion for coming 
together with others as part of a larger organism. More 
specifically, agency manifests itself in self-protection, 
self-assertion, and self-expansion. Other characteristics 
include mastery and competition through separateness, 
isolation, alienation, aloneness, and the repression of 
feeling, impulse, and intuitive or creative thought. 
Communion, on the other hand, is manifested by a sense of 
oneness with other organisms; nurtured through contact, 
openness and union, and the removal of separations and 
repression. 
It is interesting to note that Bakan indicates a strong 
connection between the musculature of the body and the agency 
feature since this is where we first experience a sense of 
control and mastery within ourselves. Both modalities, 
however, are necessary for human survival. Agency affirms our 
individual potency and power to act on the world, thereby 
declaring our autonomy and self-hood. Communion, in contrast, 
affirms our human capacity to care and feel connected with 
others. Neither are singularly sufficient. Whereas control, 
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mastery, and separation are the major features of agency; 
intimate understanding of our connections is the major goal of 
communion. 
Bakan contends that the agency impulse dominates the 
communal impulse. Agency is preferred, considered superior, 
and enjoys the more dominant place in our society. The 
communal modality is considered adjunctive and of secondary 
worth, although necessary within society. One of Bakan's 
fundamental points, however, is that the agency impulse has 
split itself from the communal impulse, and that this split 
arises from the agency feature itself. In so doing it 
represses the communal dimension from which it has separated 
itself. It is the domination by the agency feature and its 
split from the communal feature that leads to human alienation, 
aggression, and ultimately death; either turned outward to 
others or inwards on ourselves. 
American society has emerged from Protestant 
individualism, and scientific and technological breakthroughs. 
Supported by its capitalistic environment, our society is 
perhaps the most obvious and extreme representation of a nation 
committed to an agentic orientation. Within American society, 
agency is manifested in terms of our extremes of competition, 
mastery, and achievement, and exploitation of others and our 
environment (Macdonald, 1981). It has been furthur compounded 
by our continual renewal and commitment to military and 
economic supremacy over less agentic nations. 
Our superpower status has caused us to view our relations 
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with other nations predominately in terms of self-interest and 
personal power — a vestige from the colonial era. What we 
have failed to do is realize that we are a global people and 
economy. The agency modality is no longer singularly 
sufficient or appropriate for humanity today. 
Nietzsche (1927) prophesized and warned us of the dangers 
of an exaggeration of the agency feature. He feared that our 
great advances in technology and science (agency) would lead to 
nihilism and even the demise of civilization without a parallel 
advance in ethics and self-understanding, more consonant with 
Bakan1s sense of communion. 
American society, emerging from the rugged individualism 
of its frontier days, and undergirded by a Protestant ethic 
that valued work as an expression of service to God, placed a 
high value on the agentic modality. Agency within this society 
was both the means of securing a livelihood and a higher 
morality. Physical courage and dogged perseverance ensured 
survival of the pioneer while more emotional qualities were 
often more of a hindrance. Reflecting on the early frontier 
days of this country, Ervin states the following: 
What these people failed to understand was that a new kind 
of life had taken over, a life that centered upon the 
powers and capabilities of each individual rather than upon 
the community and a group of leaders . . . For it was 
through physical strength, and physical skills that a man 
was able to achieve his independence and also, in time, 
secure a more influential place within the society. (1964, 
p. 21) [emphasis added] 
This social attitude is no longer necessary or appropriate in 
contemporary society. Our cultural and social patterns are so 
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deeply ingrained, however, that undertaking social change in 
which the agentic and communal modalities are more tolerably 
integrated within individuals, institutions, and the larger 
culture is exceedingly difficult. An exploration of this 
significant issue, its causes and perpetuation will be 
discussed shortly, using the work of Chodorow (1978) and 
Gilligan (1982). 
Koestler (1979) labels the two modalities of Bakan as the 
self-assertive tendency (agency) and the integrative tendency 
(communion). His main concern is not an exaggeration of the 
self-assertive or agency feature, but rather an excess of the 
integrative or communal impulse. Koestler feels the agency 
feature is kept in check by the integrative feature of the 
larger collective. For instance, if an individual is 
excessively aggressive to the extent he/she threatens community 
the larger collective will restrain him/her. Whereas, Koestler 
contends that there is little societal recall of the excessive 
integrative or communal inpulses characterized by fanatical 
devotion. History testifies to the many religious cults that 
have capitalized on the deep human need to belong. The Jim 
Jones tragedy in Guyana stands as an awesome reminder of this 
human tendency. Koestler reminds us that some of the most evil 
events in history have been committed under the guise of 
unselfish love. When the need to belong is stunted, 
individuals feel a sense of frustration and have a tendency to 
lose their critical faculties, surrendering their autonomy and 
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identity in blind worship or fanatical following of some cause. 
The critical point is that once ensconced into the group, the 
integrative tendency or the communal energy takes over, leaving 
little recall or societal check on this runaway impulse 
(Koestler, 1979). 
Koestler maintains that the origin of this need is related 
to the long gestation and dependency period during infancy. He 
maintains this long period of dependency upon authority 
conditions and sensitizes us to obedience to a higher 
authority. Being thrust out of the nest to face our aloneness 
is very threatening for many of us. This aloneness causes many 
individuals to sacrifice and subsume their own identity into 
the collective in order to feel the sense of connection, 
security, and bonding they felt during infancy. Koestler 
believes control is the only remedy to offset this malaise in 
our society. 
The significance of Koestler's position is that it 
illuminates three key points. First, it acknowledges the 
dangers inherent in an exaggeration of the integrative or 
communal tendency. Secondly, it sensitizes us to the lack of 
societal influence for controlling this type of fanatical 
devotion, and lastly, it reinforces the positive elements of 
the agency or the self-assertive modality, such as control and 
the development of autonomy as a means to counteract excessive 
integrative or communal impulses. 
Tillich's (1952) statement that one should neither be 
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solely for or against society supports Bakan's and Koestler's 
position of the dangers inherent in an excess polar position of 
either modality. Bakan and Koestler illuminate the tenuous 
balance that exists between the agency-communion modality. 
Bakan (1966) enlightens us to the dangers of the agency feature 
when it is split from communion manifesting itself in human 
alienation and destruction. Similarly, Koestler (1979) 
reminds us of the dangers of excessive communal impulses, for 
which he feels there is little societal recall unlike the 
agency feature which is kept in check by the larger collective. 
There is also confusion when these two modalities are in 
conflict with each other pulling us in different directions. 
This creates ambivalence which frustrates, and, if continued, 
paralyzes us (Stinson, 1984). Therefore, the task is to 
discover the source of the problem, and develop new 
understandings of both dimensions which support and complement 
one another. 
Agency and Communion as Gender 
Characteristics inherent in Bakan's agency-communion 
impulse or Koestler's self-assertive-integrative impulse 
suggest a strong gender connection (Bakan, 1966, Macdonald & 
Macdonald, 1981). Agency and self-assertion represent the 
masculine impulse towards mastery and separation. Communion 
and the integrative feature represent the feminine impulse 
towards union for understanding of human connections. Since 
the agency or self-assertive characteristics are more valued in 
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society, the communal or integrative, characteristics fostered 
in females tend to be considered inferior. 
Bakan (1966) and Macdonald (1981) note that the current 
gender system of our society has been restrictive on the full 
development of humanity in both males and females. Both the 
agentic and communal modalities are deemed essential to each 
human being regardless of gender. 
There is a need for the development of the masculine and 
feminine qualities within each individual regardless of 
sex. The splitting of one from the other — the 
hierarchial order of the masculine domination and feminine 
subordination have denied each sex its full development and 
created alienation, subtle though it may be between the 
sexes. These roles have been functional, but for a sex 
gender system founded on sexual inequality and not for 
social survival or free human activity. (Bern, 1976, p. 47) 
According to Chodorow (1978) and Kanter (1977), the 
present child-rearing and institutional social patterns towards 
gender perpetuate the split of the agency factor from the 
communal factor resulting in alienation and underdeveloped 
human potential. Our continued pattern of allowing male 
children to be socialized through separation and control so 
they fit comfortably into the work force leaves our female 
children less competent in this area. Similarly, male children 
are denied the capacity for developing the full potential for 
love, which is more evolved in females. Ostensibly, the female 
is designated the role of nurturer trained in the expressive 
function of social survival; males are considered the providers 
trained in the instrumental functions to ensure social 
productivity. The gender trade-off is dehumanising. Macdonald 
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(1981) points out that by confining women to certain helping or 
nurturing roles, it denies males such roles and vice-versa for 
females. He states: 
For when women become by role and myth the only truly 
protecting, nurturant, tender and compassionate ones, men 
are denied the opportunity of growth through loving. And 
when women within this role myth are also the inferior ones 
the whole society is denied growth and love . . . whereas 
for males, the designated superiority of non-loving 
capacities makes full loving almost impossible as part of 
their repertoire. (1981, p. 301) 
According to Fromm (1941), human potential is maximized 
when an individual has the capacity to love not only himself, 
but also love outwardly. He suggests that the affirmation of 
human life, happiness, growth, and freedom is rooted in our 
capacity to love. Indeed, if love is a pivotal factor for 
human existence, denying it denies individuals their humanity. 
Since this characteristic is considered feminine, it is likely 
that half the population will not have adequately developed 
this dimension in themselves. The continued hierarchial, 
masculine value of mastery and control, the agency 
characteristic, is perhaps one of the more significant 
underlying causes for much of the alienation and aggression 
experienced in our world today. 
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Roots of the Malady 
The origin of gender differences is a speculative isssue. 
Simmons' (1984) study on gender issues and the work-family 
role, suggests, upon reviewing the biological, sociological, 
and anthropological gender literature, that the socialization 
factor is a more influential factor than the genetic factor. 
She states: 
Although biological determinists force us to look seriously 
at biological differences in the sexes and the influence of 
hormones on behavior, the wide range of behavior exhibited 
in our society by males and females in role conflict 
situations does not suggest genetically sex-linked behavior 
patterns. Researchers' experience with 
pseudo-hermaphrodites and other atypical gender identity 
versus gender role situations indicate the power of 
socialization over genetically specified gender. (Simmons, 
1984, p. 36) 
Two theoretical-sociological positions that explore the roots 
and development of this significant issue are those of Chodorow 
(1978) and Gilligan (1982). Both sociologists point out that 
theories of human development have failed to take into account 
the feminine perspective. 
Chodorow (1978) points out that sexual inequality and 
personality differences between the sexes are due largely to 
the fact that females are the universal primary caretakers 
during the formative years of infancy. As a consequence, the 
bonding and interaction during the early years is experienced 
differently in males and females resulting in basic relational 
differences. More specifically, males and females develop 
personalities which differ in respect to their perception of 
social relationships, independency, and interdependency, and 
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life of the self in relation to others. During the early parts 
of infancy, however, the mother-child relationship is one of 
unity, caring, and attachment. The infant is totally dependent 
on the mother for physical and psychological survival to such 
an extent that the identity of the mother is also the identity 
of the child. As the infant matures this unity and closeness 
changes for the male infant. This shift away from intimacy for 
the male infant takes place through the mother's nuances in 
tone, touch, and conversation. Gradually the male infant 
becomes increasingly aware of his "differentness" from his 
mother. Conversely, female infants become increasingly aware 
of their "sameness" with their mother. Thus, gender-role in 
female infants is not a major concern when compared to male 
infants. 
More specifically, Gilligan and Chodorow note that for 
male infants gender identity is integrally connected to 
separation from the mother replacing connection with 
individuation. 
For boys, separation and individuation are criticallly tied 
to gender identity since separation from the mother is 
essential to the development of masculinity. For girls and 
women, issues of femininity or feminine identity do not 
depend on the achievement of separation from the mother or 
on the process of individuation. Since masculinity is 
defined through separation, while femininity is defined 
through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by 
intimacy while female gender is threatened by separation. 
Thus males tend to have difficulty with relationship, while 
females tend to have problems with individuation. 
(Gilligan, 1982, p. 8) 
Thus, a young boy must come to devalue those feminine qualities 
of caring and nurturing in his mother. In so doing he denies 
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these feelings within himself. 
Masculine personality, then comes to be defined more in 
terms of denial of relation and connection (and denial of 
femininity), whereas feminine personality comes to include 
a fundamental definition of self in relationship. Thus 
relational abilities and preoccupations (with mother-child 
issues and female-male issues) have been extended in 
women's development and curtailed in men's . . . This 
points to boys' preparation for participation in 
non-relational spheres and to girls' greater potential in 
participation in relational spheres. It points also to 
different relational needs and fears in men and women. 
(Chodorow, 1978, pp. 169-170) 
Female identity and intimacy appear closely connected. In 
one of the many studies by Gilligan (1982), she asked women and 
men to describe themselves. None of the highly successful 
females referred to their professional or scholastic 
achievements in their personal descriptions, yet all included a 
relationship, implying their identity was integrally connected 
to their future connection as a wife, mother, or with a past 
lover — relationship appeared the significant goal. As might 
be expected, men's description of self was rooted in self 
detachment and separation from others. Males used agentic 
adjectives of separation such as logical, intelligent, and 
"achievement oriented" to describe themselves. 
Gilligan also points out that moral ideology is different 
between males and females. Male ethics revolves around the 
ethic of rights; the female, around the ethic of care. She 
states: 
The moral imperative that emerges repeatedly in interviews 
with women is an injunction to care, a responsibility to 
discern and alleviate the "real and recognizable trouble" 
of this world. For men, the moral imperative appears 
rather as an injunction to respect the rights of others and 
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thus to protect from interference the rights to life and 
self-fulfillment. (Gilligan, 1982, p. 100) 
The domination of male values in society appears to impact 
the moral reasoning and decision-making processes of men and 
women. Men are more detached. The male ethic of rights, or 
justice, tends to respect the autonomy of the individual and 
intervene less. Females, on the other hand, tend to live in 
response to the perceived needs of others and intervene more 
frequently. Females have more difficulty seeing the world 
objectively and as detached. They express greater self-doubt 
regarding their own opinions. As a result, decision making is 
more problematic in women. Virginia Woolf pointed this out 
when she stated: "As a result women come to question the 
normality of their feelings and to alter their judgments in 
deference to the opinion of others." (Woolf, p. 76 as cited by 
Gilligan, p. 16) Gilligan points out that the two factors of 
male values domination, and women's concern for others compound 
the decision-making process for women. 
Gilligan, extending the work of Chodorow, illuminates the 
misinterpretations possible when the masculine models of human 
development are imposed on the life cycle of the female. 
Problems in human development have been allocated as problems 
in women's development. Both Freud and Erickson recorded notes 
about the differences in male's and female's perceptions, yet 
they failed to account for them in their theories (Gilligan, 
1982). Similarly, Kohlberg claims universality in his theory 
of moral development despite the fact that no women were 
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included in his studies. Likewise, Piaget equates male 
development with child development. He notes, however, that 
the legal sense in girls is less developed than in boys. Yet 
Piaget's stages of moral development does not reflect this 
difference. 
Ideally, we need to develop the masculine and feminine 
qualities in each individual regardless of sex (Bern, 1976). 
This would help ensure the capacity for more intimacy or 
communion in our males, and the capacity for more individuation 
or agency in our females. Primary parenting by both parents 
would increase this possibility (Chodorow, 1978), and would 
more likely embody both the ethic of justice and the ethic of 
care, nurturing a compassionate but fair society in which to 
live. 
The ideals of human relationship . . . the vision that self 
and others will be treated as of equal worth, that despite 
differences in power, things will be fair; the vision that 
everyone will be responded to and included, that no one 
will be left alone or hurt. (Gilligan, 1982, p. 63) 
Chodorow's and Gilligan's empirical work and personal 
experiences indicate that male and female perspectives on the 
nature of relationship and the work place differ. In a society 
quick to judge and place value on certain differences the 
social question of gender equality is difficult and tenuous. 
At present, "culturally and politically, the public sphere 
dominates domestic, hence men dominate women" (Chodorow, 1978, 
p. 10). Simmons (1984) reminds us, however, that one 
perspective is not better than the other, just different. If 
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viewed in this light, it offers hope that we may see sexual 
differences not as hierarchical, but rather as different, 
heuristic lenses for understanding and being in the world. 
Ultimately, it would lead us to a better lived space in which 
humans could coexist more lovingly. This awareness within 
ourselves seems critical and of utmost importance in a world 
seemingly bent on self-destruction through the continued 
agentic behavioral patterns of manipulation, alienation, and 
the abuse of power. 
The schools do not differ from the family. They continue 
gender differentiation where the family left off. Macdonald & 
Macdonald (1981) point out that the curriculum reflects the 
dominant agency pattern as evidenced in our values, type of 
language, and the high priority awarded science and mathematics 
which takes precedence over artistic expression and activity. 
Macdonald & Macdonald contend the curriculum has been the 
training ground for our technical-industrial-urban society with 
a value nexus focused upon the agency modality. They call for 
the schools to reemphasize and embody the communal aspects of 
human potential: 
. . . to assert a sense of commonality and connection among 
all organisms, of openness and vision, of non-contractual 
cooperation, and removal of constraints on freedom. The 
critical concept is communal, the school as community 
whereby the central curriculum questions becomes "How shall 
we live together?" . . . "How shall we survive?" . . . "How 
can we foster freedom, justice, equality, and love?" 
(Macdonald & Macdonald, 1981, p. 303) 
Macdonald & Macdonald assert that change will necessitate 
a new consciousness in both our personal as well as our public 
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acts. It will necessitate a change in institutional structures 
and their operating practices. The antidote is not 
prescriptive through the engineering of a different technique, 
rather change must come through personal value, reflection, and 
action. It must focus on practical, alive activities in the 
curriculum, not biasing the technical any more than the 
political, ethical, and aesthetic qualities of everyday life. 
This enlargment and balancing of human potential will serve to 
offset the overemphasis on control and agency in the current 
curriculum. 
Agency and Communion in Movement 
Bakan points out that the initial experiences of control 
and mastery we experience are through the musculature of our 
bodies during infancy. Stinson (1984), reflecting on the work 
of Bakan as it relates to the body, maintained that this 
growing sense of bodily control and mastery enables us to feel 
more safe to engage in relationship outside of ourselves. 
Hence the significance of the role of the body in the early 
formulation of self and our capacity for meaningful 
relationship. Perception of the self and the capacity for 
relationship, however, continues throughout the life span. The 
growing body of literature on body concept and body image 
strongly suggest that a person's bodily feelings and thoughts 
influence other psychological and sociological dimensions of 
the self (Kollen, 1981). Consequently, the positive role of 
the body and its development in physical education are of 
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extreme importance in the development of capable, responsible, 
and caring individuals. 
Agency, Alienation and Sport 
Leaping from the micro-personal level to the 
macro-societal level, sub-cultures such as sports tend to 
reflect the larger culture's values (Fairs, 1968). 
Subsequently, the agency charactersistics we see in the larger 
society, such as self-aggrandizement, extremes of competition, 
mastery, and achievement are often mirrored in the sports 
arena. This is evidenced by the focus on winning, mastery, and 
our reliance on technique, with little attention to personal 
feelings or sensations. Several theorists have expressed 
concern at the increased alienation through the agency feature 
in the sports experience, whether at the competitive (Rigauer, 
1981r Morgan, 1982), recreational, or educational level 
(Kollen, 1981; Sadler, 1977; Suits, 1979; Nugent, 1982). 
Unfortunately, the agency ethos of highly competitive sports 
seems to permeate all other less competitive sporting levels. 
Rigauer (1981) discusses the exaggeration of the agency 
feature through his analogy that sport is an epiphenomenon of 
modern industrial production. He contends that sport and work 
are structurally analogous forms of behaviour. His intent is 
to liberate sports from its present "locked" ethos with work. 
He maintains that sport has all the features of capitalistic 
production, of which the two key elements are the achievement 
principle and rationalization. It is the achievement principle 
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that essentially governs the practice of modern sport; 
achievement engenders competition as the means by which 
disparate performances may be compared. Hence our fanatacism 
with records and statistics. Whereas rationalization occurs 
when phenomena are quantified with little regard for human 
emotions. Rigauer refers to a quote written in 1838 by Tegg 
noting that rationalization occurs "when a process ceases to 
take place according to feelings, talent, tradition, and 
experience but rather when every part of the process is 
thought-through and goal-directed" (1838, p. xvii). 
Rationalization and achievement together have serious 
consequences. The atomization of training, where decisions 
regarding training and competition are made by hierarchical 
social and business affiliates are alienating. The athlete has 
little input in decision making which is often accompanied by a 
general loss of freedom, spontaneity, and playfulness (Rigauer, 
1981). Excessive rationalization encourages antagonistic forms 
of competition and interpersonal relations in sports. 
Rationalization and achievment promote the quantifiable 
elements of sport at the expense of its qualitative elements. 
Furthermore, the athletes' freedom and creativity are limited 
by focusing on performance according to socially predetermined 
goals, not accommodating for contextual or individual 
irregularities? these are not tolerated. Cumulatively, these 
effects are very constrictive. 
Rigauer points out that if we continue to link sport with 
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work rather than the ethos of play we serve and perpetuate the 
values and ideals of capitalism and not humanism. Sport, to 
Rigauer, should be concerned with providing more democracy and 
unity within the realms of sport and work. He advocates the 
need for critical theory to demystify and raise the 
consciousness of the integral connection between sport and 
society. 
Morgan (1982) feels that Rigauer's thesis, that sport is 
essentially an instrument of capitalism, is untenable and too 
simplistic. He feels the situation is more complex, of which 
capitalism is but a contributory part. For Morgan, the 
critical issue revolves around the loss of freedom to create 
new cultural forms through sports. He favors the Neo-Marxist 
position of Horkheimer: 
It has often been said that sport should not become an aim, 
but should remain an instrument. To me the first idea 
seems right and the second wrong. As long as it is only an 
instrument, and consciously recognized as such, it may be 
used in the service of profit, politics, egotism or just as 
a pastime . . . All these ends, whether good or 
problematic, will destroy sport if they are allowed to 
dominate it totally, will prevent its being an expression 
of freedom. In this respect sport is like art, literature 
and philosophy, and all the springs of the productive 
imagination. To preserve its freedom, to allow it to make 
its own decisions and dictate its own regulations, in spite 
of all the powerful influences from outside, seems to me to 
be the historic task of all those who are seriously 
concerned with sport. (Horkheimer, cited by Morgan, 1982, 
p. 83) 
Nugent (1982) shares some of the same fears of Morgan and 
Rigauer, but in the context of the game. She points to the 
tenous position of games lying between the elements of 
Callois's continuum of paidia (play) and ludus (sport). Being 
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the midfielder between the two games plays a critical role in 
maintaining the integrity of both elements. She feels game is 
being subsumed by the sport milieu, and is losing some of the 
creative spontaneous elements of play. She contends, as do 
Morgan and Horkheimer, that the essential nature of human 
movement, be it sport or game, revolves around the notion of 
human freedom to create new spontaneous forms impartial to the 
ethos of society. She draws support for this position from 
Berger's notion of play as a form of human transcendence and 
Pieper's claim that leisure is the basis of human culture. 
Rigauer, Morgan, and Nugent all echo a similar theme, a 
return to the ethos and sanctuary of play. The failure of game 
for Nugent, and sport for Rigauer, Morgan, and Hockheimer, to 
maintain the roots of play in their original genesis and matrix 
of play will lead to a human space devoid of freedom and its 
capacity to create and transcend itself to more evolved levels 
of community. 
Agency in Physical Education 
Many of the alienating characteristics of agency 
identified in professional sports are also evidenced in other 
arenas of sport (Rigauer, 1981), the school being no exception 
(Kollen, 1983). Kollen points out that the fragmentation of 
physical education stems from our deeply embedded ideology 
which in practice reflects a masculine athletic-competitive 
image. This image limits integration in movement because it 
revolves around psychological rewards and status and not the 
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enjoyment of the movement experience itself. She points out 
that the problem is not specifically the 
masculine-athletic-competitive image per se, but the real 
problem is that there is an image at all. The 
masculine-athletic-competitive image is fragmentary. It pushes 
us to work harder, go further and more effortlessly; its 
emphasis is on the extrinsic elements of movement, not the 
feelings and sensations of movement. We become consumed trying 
to be the image, which inhibits us from being present in the 
moment with our bodies. Kollen (1983) calls for the profession 
to uncondition ourselves from the masculine-athletic 
competitive image and explore other avenues that allow our 
students to move freely, joyfully, and without fear. 
Sadler (1977) makes an interesting observation concerning 
the new emergent culture towards self-realization and sports. 
Many interscholastic athletes, particularly those from the 
upper middle class who have been brought up with the values of 
self-realization, are becoming disenchanted with the prevailing 
environment of sports. More specifically, athletes are 
becoming increasingly disenchanted by the inconsistencies and 
discrepancies between sport's ideology, that emphasizes 
positive human values and sport's personnel, who frequently 
purport to other less ethical modes of behaviour in order to 
maintain control and success. Therefore, it is logical that 
young persons, who value personal growth and freedom, will 
experience alienation if locked into school programs that have 
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institutionalized competition under the rubric and ethos of 
work and not play. 
Sadler identifies three alienating characteristics most 
typically experienced by youths today. Youths feel unfree; 
they feel powerless in their ability to be committed to the 
goals of their own personal development. Secondly, they feel 
unembodied, fragmented by being tugged in different directions. 
Lastly, they felt withdrawn, fearful of caring too much for 
anyone, and generally suspicious of the intentions of others. 
Sadler's (1977) thesis contends that the very act of 
creating diffuses alienation. Further, the qualities of 
freedom, embodiment, and friendship inherent in sport, are in 
direct contrast to the predominant agency ethos of work. He 
feels the three positive qualities of freedom, embodiment, and 
friendship within the context of sport, as playful human 
movement, are a viable antidote to the alienation dilemma. In 
essence, he calls for the more communal characteristics of 
creativity, intuition, spontaneity, and feeling, as opposed to 
the repression of them through the agency modality, presently 
manifested as alienation. 
Sadler's thesis is based on the empirical works of the 
psychologist Salvatore Maddi (1975) and psychiatrist Silvano 
Arieti (1976). Arieti contends that in the very act of 
creating a feeling of integration occurs that somehow 
transcends and unifies a previous state of fragmentation. 
Sadler elaborates further: 
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In the creative experience there is a synthesis of primary 
and secondary processes, a fusion of bodily and mental 
activities in a new tertiary process from which issues 
creative products. Creative endeavor is characterized by 
an individual's experience of integration that resolves a 
previous state of personal disjunction. (1977, p. 88) 
Many theorists have proposed different antidotes to the 
alienation factor of the agency modality. Rigauer (1981) calls 
for more political and social consciousness of the larger 
cultures impact on other sub-cultures such as sport, whereas 
Bell (1976), a liberal sociologist, calls for a modification of 
both cultural and social trends, and concurs with Rigauer in 
the development of a more responsible political structure and 
philosophy. Ostensibly these are macro-theoretical positions. 
Sadler, however, advocates a simpler solution: the use of 
personal creativity for sports and physical education as an 
antidote to youth alienation. This is similar to Morgan (1982) 
and Nugent's (1982) position that sport needs to maintain its 
connection with the ethic of play. The ethic of play is 
characterized by the elements of creativity, spontaneity, and 
intuition which is suppressed in the agency modality, yet 
fostered through communion. 
Play as Communion 
A man's exercise must be play, or it will do him little 
good. It may even, as we see regularly in the press, kill 
him . . . Exercise that is not play accentuates rather than 
heals the split between body and spirit. (Sheehan, 1978, p. 
71-100) 
Up to the seventeenth century, there was little separation 
between play, ritual, and the sacred (Nugent, 1982). There was 
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a link between play, game, sport, and dance on one hand, and 
festivity, celebration, ritual, the sacred, and community on 
the other. This was how community was held together. Nugent 
noted that the movement into the industrial and technological 
age caused a secularization of play, characteristic of the 
splitting of the agency feature from the communal feature. 
A splitting of play from the significant events in the life 
of a community, and a tendency to characterize play as 
frivolous and unnecessary to life. As the shift toward 
progress and production was made, play became an adjunct to 
the so-called real and serious matters of life within many 
cultures of Western civilisation. (Nugent, 1982, p. 46) 
Subsequently, play has not been openly advocated since it is 
essentially deemed frivolous and unproductive. 
Play is its own reward and is an end in itself. Play is 
intrinsically motivated and its enjoyment and expression seem 
to be the major motivation for why we play (Harris, 1978). 
All of our human strivings (work, science, art) can be 
reduced to the general category of desire known as 
"having": that category which establishes the self's (pour 
soi) basic relation to objects or things (en soi) as one in 
which the former seeks to possess, appropriate, dominate, 
own, or use the latter. Yet, according to Sartre, there 
remains one human enterprise which apparently cannot be 
subsumed under this possessive relationship. And that 
enterprise is play whose goal is not to possess the 
object(s) of its concern but to provide expressive outlet 
for the realization of the player's unique subjectivity. 
(Gerber, 1979, p. 70} 
Play is bracketed from the serious, necessary experiences 
of life. Play is breaking away from routine . . . Play is 
distinguished from fields of Religon, Art, and Inquiry 
because it does not include as part of its meaning, "an 
intent to achieve a desirable result with respect to some 
ultimate reality". Play is also distinguished from these 
acts by virtue of its spontaneous nature. (Kretchmar, 1971, 
p. 29)[emphasis added] 
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Play and sport appear to be comprised of the elements of 
spontaneous celebration, imagination, pretense, and creativity 
(Schmitz, 1979). The essence of play, however, is pivotal 
around the decision to play. This voluntary decision to play 
is the pivotal factor that allows sport its personal freedom, 
and distinguishes it from work. It is intrinsically sustained 
by finding the midpoint between the psychological states of 
boredom and anxiety (Harris, 1978). Ultimately the process of 
doing play is the essential element. Play has no other end but 
itself — pleasure and the experiential activity of creating. 
The significant aspect of play is that it is also an 
attitude that can be applied to the whole of life. By adopting 
a psychological state of play in life, it liberates us to 
express and create our own lives according to our personal 
voices. Further, it leads us to be more open and responsive 
toward our surroundings. It listens to the intrinsic 
dimensions of our souls. Subsequently, our actions are more 
alive, pleasurable, and have more meaning. 
The ethic of play is characterized by the elements of 
creativity, spontaneity, and intuition. These characteristics 
involve the "whole" of our being since they necessitate our 
having to respond to the complete figure-ground constellation. 
They involve using our primary and secondary processes; fusing 
our bodily and mental activities to create a new third entity. 
In this way play is integrative. 
The major concern of this study is that students are being 
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"turned off" from the joy and personal meaning in physical 
education. As Sadler (1977) states, youths feel unfree, 
powerless, and unembodied. Sadler contends that the notions 
of freedom, embodiment, and kinship, inherent in sport as play 
are three characteristics that can diffuse the present 
alienation being experienced in sport. More specifically, 
personal freedom is the platform for play, since play is 
entered into voluntarily. The very nature of creativity and 
spontaneity in play, allow movement to be personal and 
therefore embodied. Movement in play does not necessarily 
conform to an external standard; movement is unique and 
peculiarly our own. A significant difference between the ethic 
of play versus the ethic of work, is that play focuses on the 
process, not the product. 
Succinctly, sport as play allows for movement to be more 
alive and personal. It is also more integrated because the act 
of creating calls on us to respond to the "whole" situation, 
the complete figure-ground constellation. In this manner, 
sport as play is communal and offers possibilities to transcend 
the alienation frequently experienced in physical education. 
Before developing an alternative framework for integration 
and personal meaning to counteract alienation in physical 
education, it is appropriate to review the current status of 
physical education. This will provide a springboard for the 
alternative perspective. The purposes are to discern the 
present platform upon which physical education has predicated 
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its position and see to what extent it meets our needs for 
personal meaning and integration. 
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CHAPTER III 
MAJOR PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHYSICAL 
EDUCATION 
Movement has always been a means for development of 
understanding of oneself and one's world. This form of 
education is ancient, primitive, and native. It predates 
spoken language or art as a means by which humans 
transmitted their cultural and development language to 
coming generations. Physical education is the oldest 
means of learning known to humanity. (Oberteuffer, 1977, 
p. 148) 
New ideas emerge from "refashioned" old ideas, but in a 
different context, a process of evolutionary thought attained 
by acknowledging those who have gone before us. As Newton 
stated, "If I have seen further, it is by standing on the 
shoulders of giants" (Bartlett, 1980, p.84). It seems 
appropriate to acknowledge, in a study about new movement 
possibilities in physical education, the "giants" of our 
profession. It is from their thoughts that my vision has 
grown. For this reason, the initial section of this chapter 
will present an overview of the major philosophical and 
theoretical influences postulated by the "giants" in our 
profession, as seen from the eyes of Sherman (1965), Gerber 
(1966), and philosophers Metheny (1961, 1969) and Osterhoudt 
(1978, 1984). This will establish the platform from which 
physical education has predicated its existence and 
development and provide a springboard for the study. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first 
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section discusses the two philosophical models of man in 
physical education, "education of" and "education through" 
the physical (Williams, 1930). These models will be examined 
for their relative positions on five major concepts in 
physical education: (a) mind-body relationship, (b) body of 
knowledge, (c) subject matter, (d) objectives, and (e) 
methodology. The second section will provide a critique of 
the two philosophical models. This will provide a rationale 
for an alternative vision for physical education. 
Education "Of" and "Through" the Physical 
In the development of new movement theory, the most 
essential dilemma revolves around the interpretation of the 
mind-body relationship. Is mindful activity separate and 
distinct from physical activity? Is it the responsibility of 
the physical educator to develop minds as well as bodies? 
Are bodies subservient to the mind? Consequently, in the 
development of new movement theory, physical educators need 
to be familiar with the problems of metaphysics to enable 
them to understand, and therefore establish, more sound 
platforms for beliefs about their discipline. 
Before a discussion of the various positions postulated 
by the two models is undertaken, it is necessary to offer 
some background on Cartesian thought. This will primarily be 
done through the works of Descartes (1967), Osterhoudt (1978, 
1984), Kleinman (1970), and Meier (1975, 1979). The 
influence of Descartes1 philosophy has been enormous and 
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perhaps incalculable. It has affected our approach to 
science, education, and other fields for more than three 
hundred years. According to Kleinman, "it has dictated the 
directions by which entire disciplines steer their courses of 
action" (1970, p. 61). Its significance to physical 
education is irrefutable. It is for this reason that this 
concept will be discussed in more depth. 
It was Descartes' intention to develop a foundation of 
science that "would avoid the presupposition and inadequacy 
of scholasticism and possess the rigorous certainty of 
mathematics" (Meier, 1975, p. 52). Human reason was deemed 
the cornerstone of knowledge, nature, and the universe. 
Using the process of "radical doubt," Descartes proceeded to 
cast doubt on everything. He discarded all opinions and 
presuppositions that he was a being, and concluded that he 
was foremost a mentally conceived entity. From this anchor 
or starting point, using radical doubt and reason, he 
established that the essence of his nature was to be a being 
that thinks. Hence, essence precedes existence, and the 
adage "I think, therefore I am" evolved. Descartes states: 
I saw from the very fact that I thought of doubting the 
truth of other things, it is very evidently and certainly 
followed that I was; on the other hand if I had only 
ceased from thinking, even if all the rest of what I had 
ever imagined had really existed, I should have no reason 
for thinking that I existed. From that I knew that I was 
a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to 
think, and that for its existence there is no need of any 
place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that 
this "me", that is to say, the soul by which I and what I 
am is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy 
to know than is the latter, and even if body were not, 
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the soul would not cease to be what it is. (Descartes, 
1967, p. 101) 
Consequently, the two substances, mind and body 
(matter), exist independently of one another, but both depend 
on God. Matter does not possess attributes of thought, 
consciousness, or feeling. This distinction was applied to 
the whole of nature including animals and the human body 
(Meier, 1979). According to Descartes, behavior, i.e., the 
physiological account of our bodily aspects of sensations and 
motor movements, was explainable through the laws of physics 
and chemistry. In his sixth meditation, Descartes posited 
that movement was purely a mechanical act. 
I am aware in me of certain faculties, such as the power 
of changing location, of assuming diverse posture and the 
like which cannot be thought and therefore exist apart 
from such substance in which they reside. But evidently 
since the clear and distinct apprehension of these 
faculties involves the feature of extension, but not any 
intellection, they must belong to some substance which is 
corporeal, ie. extended and unthinking. (Descartes, 1958, 
p. 237) 
Thus, Descartes defined movement as physical, nonthinking, 
and corporeal, having no relationship with the world of 
cognition, sensing, or knowing. He concluded that the mind 
and body are two distinct substances. The body was viewed as 
an unthinking, extended, material substance, whereas the mind 
was a thinking, unextended, immaterial substance. Further, 
the body was an unconscious machine subject to the rigid laws 
of nature; the mind was a conscious and free substance, not 
accountable to the mechanical laws of nature (Meier, 1979). 
A criticism of Descartes' philosophy is that many facets 
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of our existence, particularly our intentional interactions 
with the world are denied or conveniently ignored. Secondly, 
there remains the frustrating question of how there can be 
interaction between a substance that is purely spiritual and 
a substance that is purely material. Descartes' solution of 
the pineal gland as where the two meet appears somewhat 
facile, archaic, and limiting. Thirdly, Descartes' 
philosophy does not account for the obvious intimate union 
suggested by the mind-body's mutual understandings of pain, 
hunger, and thirst (Meier, 1979). 
Mind-Body Relationship 
"Education of" the physical, with its emphasis on the 
3R's and the role of physical fitness to better serve the 
mind, clearly views the body as subservient to the mind, but 
acknowledges their mutual interdependence. This dualistic 
relationship of mind and body as separate entities is clearly 
captured in W.G. Anderson's statement of 1889: 
There is an intimate relationship between mind and body. 
Exercise develops the muscular system and affects the 
growth of nerves — by this means we can develop the 
brain substance itself, and thus put it in better 
condition for its mental education, (p. 229) 
Consequently, physical trainers took responsibility for the 
physical and left the care of the mental to the classroom 
teacher (Sherman, 1965). 
More specifically, dualism argues that the whole of life 
is exhausted by the sum of the parts that make it up. The 
whole is no more than the sum of its parts (Osterhoudt, 
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1984). Therefore, life's interpersonal and interdisciplinary 
relationships of knowledge and human encounters remain 
sterile and disparate, because it does not allow for the 
interconnectedness of thought and action. The body is 
construed as a concrete thing and movement is functional 
displacement of space in chronological time to fulfill an 
observable outcome. The body is essentially valued for its 
extrinsic merits (Osterhoudt, 1984). 
Conversely, education "through" the physical views the 
body from a monistic standpoint, dualism's conceptual 
opposite. Monism regards the mind and body as distinct 
participants in the organic union of life. They are not 
qualitatively opposed to one another, rather, they are 
analogous to two sides of a single coin. Osterhoudt stated, 
"Each is genuinely understood, appreciated, and experienced 
in-and-for-itself. . .insofar as it relates to the other, and 
insofar as it relates to the whole which is the unity of the 
two (Osterhoudt, 1984, p. 63). 
Monism, dualism's counterpart, bases itself on the 
organic thesis of life. It argues that the whole of life is 
not exhausted by the sum of the parts that make it up; that 
the whole is more than the sum of its parts. According to 
Osterhoudt, "one cannot be authentically engaged in the world 
if any of the integral parts is excluded" (1984, p. 63). 
Monism attempts to preserve the integrity of the mind-body 
relationship by acknowledging the necessary contribution of 
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each and the latent potency when the whole is realized in its 
entirety. The body is viewed more subjectively as a distinct 
mode of human expression. It promotes an experiential lived 
sense of movement and its inherent meaning (Kleinman, 1970). 
In retrospect, 1930 was an historical landmark for the 
full endorsement of the "new" holistic physical education. 
It was heralded by the new Journal of Health and Physical 
Education and the Research Quarterly, which promoted "oneness 
of mind and body", as the theme for their symposium launching 
these two new professional journals (Sherman, 1965). 
Williams wrote, "Modern physical education with its emphasis 
upon education through the physical is based upon the 
biologic unity of mind and body. This view sees life as a 
totality (1930, p. 74). Similarly, Nash wrote, "There is no 
such thing as physical activity without a mental counterpart 
or, on the other hand, a mental activity without a physical 
counterpart (1931, p. 20). 
Body of Knowledge 
"Education of" the physical was most evident from 1850 
to 1900. Educational philosophy in the late nineteenth 
century advocated democracy and equal access in education. 
Social conscience was awoken. Public schools were 
established so that all children would have an opportunity 
for education (Sherman, 1965). Educational belief at this 
time emphasized the value of facts and mental training. The 
child's mind was a blank tablet to be filled with the 
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"friendly" help of mental discipline. The educational 
process was something that was done to a child's mind to make 
the body healthy, strong, and supple (Metheny, 19'61). 
Physical activity found its way into this fact-centered 
program of mental training as something that was done to 
a child's body to make it stop wriggling, squirming, and 
interfering with the discipline of the mind. (Metheny, 
1961, p. 3) 
The rationale for this educational position was based on 
the facts supplied by the sciences of anatomy and physiology 
(Metheny, 1961). These biological facts about movement based 
on the human sciences are reflective of what Arnold (1979) 
labels "rational forms of enquiry", concerned with questions 
such as: What effect does movement have on the living 
organism? How is growth related to motor control? What 
factors influence mans potential for achievement in sport? 
In contrast, "education through" the physical based its 
advocacy on the wholistic nature of a child's learning as 
opposed to mental training. Psychologists recognized that 
the mind was only one dimension of the child, that the whole 
child went to school and learned by doing, gradually 
replacing the mental training of the 3R*s. Education was the 
outcome of something done by the learner and programs became 
child-centered rather than fact-centered (Metheny, 1961). 
In response to the psychological ethos of child-centered 
education, our professional ancestors developed "theories of 
play", exploring the unique concomitant values that play 
could contribute to education of the whole child, in the 
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common activities of running, throwing and kicking. Play was 
considered a unique form of doing through which the whole 
child could develop (Metheny, 1961). 
Subject Matter; Physical Training and Physical Education 
"Education of" the physical with its emphasis on 
physical fitness and strength was initially established 
through adoption of the German and Swedish systems of 
physical training. Hetherington stated that the aims were: 
Hygienic and educational; that the exercise must get 
organic reaction to meet the first aim; and that to meet 
the second, they must develop subjective motor control, 
alertness, will, and self-discipline. (1922, p. 338) 
The formal content of the program included four groups of 
exercises: (a) marching, (b) free standing exercises with or 
without hand apparatus, (c) apparatus work, and (d) class 
running and running games (Hetherington, 1922). 
Few schools, however, were equipped with the apparatus 
needed for the full development of German and Swedish 
gymnastics. As a result, physical training or physical 
culture essentially consisted of floor exercises conducted by 
the classroom teacher (Sherman, 1965). These exercises or 
calisthenics were intended to counteract the malaise of 
sedentary mental work of the classroom (Metheny, 1961). 
Military drills and gymnastic marching were the 
hallmarks of the German system, whereas the Swedish system 
followed a more specific gymnastic progression of movement 
sequences. Both systems, however, were always done to the 
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word of command and learned by imitation. One significant 
merit of both these European systems was their applicability 
and versatility to large numbers of pupils in relatively 
small places (Sherman, 1965). 
The values of drills and marching started to be 
questioned by Anderson (1889), Sargent (1914), Wood (1910), 
and others. It was maintained that children needed more 
freedom in their physical activity. Anderson in 1889, 
stated: 
Children love to romp and play — It is ludicrous to 
suppose that a boy or girl can arrive at eighteen years, 
with a good development and of sound and robust health, 
having had only military drill and Swedish gymnastics as 
a constant diet. (p. 17) 
Similarly, Wood and Cassidy in 1927 opened their classic 
text, The New Physical Education, with the following quote by 
Cabot: 
The worst of the systems of physical culture is that they 
are apt to become chronic and therefore useless and 
morbid like ascetic self-chastisement. A man was never 
meant to contract his muscles for the sake of exercise. 
Muscular contraction should be the physical experience, 
the outer end of a plan. We should move to get 
something, or kill something, in work as in sport, and 
with consciousness focused always on the end, never on 
means. (Wood and Cassidy, 1927, p. 1) 
The exponents of these two European systems seldom 
agreed with one another as to the merits of each to exercise. 
This dissension and the dissatisfaction of the European 
systems to meet the emerging needs of American society 
precipitated the emergence of the "new" physical education. 
The "new" physical education supported and complemented the 
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educational ethos of the time, i.e., a shift from 
fact-centered, educational programs to child-centered 
programs (Metheny, 1961). This shift was predicated on the 
new psychological theories of James and Thorndyke and the new 
concept of experience postulated by Dewey. Experience was 
learning by actually doing the things which have meaning for 
the learner (Wood, 1927). It capitalized on the inherent 
interest of the child. The learner was no longer a passive 
recipient, an empty vessel to be filled with information. By 
actively embodying and living the experience it was more 
likely that knowledge would be retained and acted upon. 
Dewey stated (cited in Wood, 1927): 
The genuine principle of interest is the principle of the 
reorganized identity of the fact to be learned or the 
action proposed with the growing self; that if it is in 
the direction of the agent's own growth, and is, 
therefore, imperiously demanded, if the agent is to be 
himself, (p. 58) 
Physical training in the form of common drills and 
exercise indoors gave way to a pluralistic American approach 
which emphasized free expressive activities inherent to 
children's natural movement. This was in stark contrast to 
the rigid, formal European systems. Sargent, in 1906, 
expressed the spirit of this shift as follows: 
What America most needs is the happy combination which 
the European nations are trying to effect, — the 
strength giving qualities of the German gymnasium, the 
active and energetic qualities of the English sports, the 
grace and suppleness acquired from the French 
calisthenics, and the beautiful poise and mechanical 
precision of the Swedish free movements, all regulated, 
systematized, and adapted to our peculiar needs and 
institutions. (1906, p. 18) 
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Wood and Cassidy (1927) used the following quote by Edward 0. 
Sisson to support their position that physical education 
should reflect American values. 
So we must lay it down as basic, that the American school 
must foster the child's natural tendency to be free. 
Nothing must be done to choke or suppress that noble 
instinct; nothing must be allowed to weaken his self 
respect or diminish his sense of personal worth. These 
elements are the very essence of Americanism, and 
American education must nourish and invigorate them. 
(Wood and Cassidy, 1927, p. 21) 
In 1927 the philosophical foundation of the "new" 
physical education or "education through" the physical was 
elaborated by Thomas Dennison Wood and Rosalind Cassidy. 
Their work evolved from a need in the profession for printed 
facts on the history, scientific basis, content, and methods 
of this program. Many subsequent texts were based on the 
principles set forth in this book. The child was viewed 
holistically, and physical education was as much method as it 
was subject (Wood and Cassidy, 1927). Furthermore, children 
were introduced to an array of activities and new skills 
based on their identified needs and interests that emphasized 
both social and moral values deemed essential for good 
citizenry. Wood and Cassidy stated: 
In curriculum making, the child's needs are first 
considered, next the objectives and aims growing out of 
these needs, and finally a translation of these ideas 
into terms of activity. 
It is necessary to have an out-of-door program of natural 
big brain-muscle activities, which shall be founded on 
the scientific knowledge of child characteristics and 
practical needsy it is important to correlate these 
exercises; when possible, with other school subjects. 
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This work is to be taught with the definite aim of 
developing social and moral qualities. (1927, p. 124, p. 
9) 
These new trends in physical education, bearing little 
resemblance to the German and Swedish systems, were 
summarized by Nixon and Cozens in 1934 when they wrote: 
In the past twenty five years there has developed an 
American system of physical education. This new system 
has its bases in the new knowledge of sociology, biology, 
and psychology. It abandoned the theory of formal 
discipline — it regards an interested attitude on the 
part of the learner as essential to progress, and it 
regards the teacher as a leader rather than a drill 
master. Our new physical education has no place for 
exercises done to commands. Instead, it undertakes to 
furnish activities which have meaning and significance, 
— which promote wholesome self-expression and offer 
desirable social training in a democracy, (p. 47) 
During the last fifty years, despite the holistic 
premise undergirding physical education, integrated movement 
has not taken place in practice (Osterhoudt, 1984;Kleinman, 
1970; Kollen, 1981). Since the 1960's, however, there has 
been a resurgence of interest in physical fitness due to 
several political and social factors: (a) the President's 
Council of Physical Fitness advocated by Presidents 
Eisenhower and Kennedy, (b) educational thrust for 
accountability for educational outcomes to be more effective 
and objective, and (c), a public consciousness about the 
physical, emotional, and social benefits of physical fitness 
to counteract today's stress in the workplace. 
Objectives 
The dualistic model, or education "of" the physical, 
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promoted the development of hygiene and a vigorous and strong 
physique, better able to serve the mental powers of the mind. 
In 1899 the American Association for the Advancement of 
Physical Education held in Boston resolved that the principal 
ends of muscular exercise in school work were not 
therapeutic, but educational and hygienic, and that exercise 
educated the body toward health and competence. Similarly 
Sargent in 1906 wrote: 
One of the most important objectives that the instructor 
in physical training had to accomplish, especially in 
elementary schools, is to give his pupils proper poise. 
This implies the training and strengthening of muscle 
from the sole of the foot to the crown on the head. 
(1906, p. 234) 
Gradually, the physical and moral objectives of the European 
systems gave way to the the "new" American physical 
education, which was more representative of "education 
through" the physical. The European objectives, however, 
were not totally obscured? they merely took a "back seat" in 
contrast to the larger goals of education of the whole child. 
A significant thrust for this shift in educational 
practice was partly a result of the U. S. Bureau of Education 
publication in 1918 of the Cardinal Principles of Secondary 
Education. These objectives were stated in terms of health, 
command of fundamental processes, worthy home membership, 
vocation, citizenship, worthy use of leisure, and ethical 
character. Gradually, these objectives became interwoven 
into the fabric of the school curriculum, and subsequently, 
physical education. 
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In 1922, Hetherington noted that physical education is a 
phase of education, and its objectives should be interpreted 
in terms of education as a whole. On a similar note, Wood 
and Cassidy stated: 
The main aims of physical education and general 
education, then, are the same: to give the child full, 
complete life each day. The aim of health, by 
physiological response to muscular exercise, is not 
enough for physical education. Health will come as a 
by-product, if the child is furnished situations in which 
to form acceptable mental, moral, and social responses 
under conditions and in ways which are wholesome and 
hygienic. (Wood and Cassidy, 1927, p. 69) 
Sherman (1965) noted similarity in purposes when 
reviewing the two traditional models in physical education, 
but that the "new" physical education differed in terms of 
its emphasis on education. This was epitomized in the phrase 
"education through" the physical. She noted that: 
It implied that the exercise and play experience in which 
vigor and skill were developed, offered many 
opportunities for the concomitant acquisition of 
knowledge that would be reflected in habits, attitudes, 
and personal conduct. (Sherman, 1965, p. 45) 
Thus, "education through" the physical had dualistic 
objectives, that of physical fitness and its concomitant 
values in other dimensions of the child's emotional, social, 
and ethical development although theoretically based on the 
monistic view of man. Sherman (1965) stated that physical 
education in practice gave "lip-service" to a fully embodied 
notion of mind-body unity. The mind and body, however, were 
brought in closer proximity to each other by the 1930's. 
In 1930, Williams, in the first issue of the new Journal 
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of Health and Physical Education, developed the theme of life 
education in terms of physical education. These new 
objectives emphasized the development of skill in moving, as 
well as the development of habits and attitudes desirable for 
education of the "whole" man in a democratic environment. 
There were, however, different biases as to the singular, 
most important objective. 
Gerber (1966) noted that the three prominant leaders of 
this era, Charles Harold McCloy, Jay B. Nash, and Jesse 
Feiring Williams all differed as to the primary objective in 
physical education. For example, Charles McCloy advocated 
the development of physical character of man as the most 
important objective. Jay B. Nash stressed the development of 
recreative skills and attitudes as his most important, 
whereas Jesse F. Williams advocated social values and skills 
useful for democratic living. 
This may have provided the roots of dissension amongst 
professionals as to the primary purpose and the future 
direction of physical education. It may inadvertently also 
have contributed to the professional body fragmentizing 
itself into six professional organizations in 1960. These 
separate organizations were able to maintain and develop 
their particular objectives and values, so preserving their 
individual integrity and autonomy. 
Methodology 
The introduction of new subject matter and the 
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formulation of new objectives initiated alternative methods 
of teaching. The European systems of physical training were 
led by classroom teachers sometimes under the supervision of 
a physical training specialist who serviced several schools. 
A series of daily lessons were prepared by the specialists 
which in turn were used by the classroom teachers (Sherman, 
1965). Learning by command and demonstration was the 
approved method of teaching new exercises. Consequently, 
classroom teachers had to personally master the exercise 
syllabus before presenting it to their students. Steelier's 
"Notes for Leaders" in 1896 offers insight into the specific 
delineated nature of teaching methods employed by the 
European systems: 
1. Try to master every exercise that you intend to teach. 
Practice as much as you can. 
2. Repeat all exercises; then alternate and combine them 
with new movements, gradually going from easy to 
difficult, from simple to complex movements. 
3. Arrange your order of exercises so that your scholars 
leave the gymnasium with the feeling of having been 
benefited. Do not waste your time on movements having 
little gymnastic value. 
4. Gradually bring your scholars to do all exercises with 
the utmost precision and correctness. 
5. Show the exercise you want done in its best form. A 
practical illustration is better than a long explanation. 
6. Whenever possible, all exercises should be executed 
left as well as right. (1896, p. 18) 
The part method was adopted in perfecting these European 
exercises by repetition of each movement within a subroutine. 
Each subroutine was subsequently combined into the continous 
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performance of the whole exercise routine. This methodology 
is consistent with the dualistic thesis that the relationship 
among the parts are discontinuous, and therefore, activities 
can be treated separately (Osterhoudt, 1984). 
Education "through" the physical, however, had its 
major roots and impetus in the new philosophical and 
psychological theories of learning postulated by Hall, 
Thorndike, and Dewey. Gradually these ideas found their way 
into the physical education literature. For example, Gulick 
in 1920 stressed Thorndike's Law of Readiness in his 
suggestions for teaching. He stated, "It is quite futile to 
try to teach children at one age what they will learn of 
themselves with great delight and rapidity a few years later 
(p. 177). Similarly, Williams reiterated some of Thorndike's 
principles in his discussion on "Some Practical Aspects of 
Method." He stated: 
To provide activity that has meaning and purpose behind 
it commends itself to thoughtful students of the subject, 
(a) Proceed from the known to the desired unknown. (b) 
Correlate with the child's studies in the classroom and 
proceed in harmony with the child's school and life 
experience. (c) Proceed in relation to the child's motor 
sense and kinesthesia. Thus involves presenting 
situations that are within the range of the child's motor 
experience. (d) The relation between motor control and 
mental control is close, and the development of each 
apparently should be carried on at the same time. (1927, 
p. 397) 
Methodology was not totally prescriptive with directions 
for daily use, rather it evolved according to the individual 
child and the learning environment. Wood and Cassidy stated: 
Procedure grows out of problems and the situation, which 
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arise with each class and group of children, and it is 
different in each class, depending on the interests, 
initiative, and originality of the children in each 
particular class, as well as on the intellegent and wise 
leadership of the teacher. (1927, p. vii) 
The "whole" method of movement using shorter more frequent 
periods was deemed the more effective way to teach. It 
reflected and was consistent with the monistic position that 
undergirded the "new" physical education at this time 
(Osterhoudt, 1984). Nixon and Cozens summarized some of the 
important findings that dealt with new research in teaching 
methodology at this time. 
The psychologists have discovered that by and large the 
"whole" method is preferable to the part method, and that 
frequent, fairly short periods of practice are better in 
the main than less frequent periods of long duration, and 
that general physical well-being is conducive to 
learning. (1934, p. 198) 
Summary Statement 
"Education of" the physical found its impetus in the 
late 1800's and early 1900's. This early model of physical 
training was essentially concerned with the development of 
organic health and fitness. The development of strength and 
maintenance of normal physiological functioning was primarily 
carried out through the employment of the European systems of 
physical training. The remedial correction of physical 
defects was also emphasized by the early leaders, many of 
whom were medical doctors. This position rested on the 
dualistic belief in a distinction between the mind and body, 
wherein the training of the mind was left to the 
academicians, and the body, the responsibility of the 
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physical educator. 
"Education through" the physical, or the "new" physical 
education, began in the early twentieth century. The aims of 
this period were shaped by the new psychological and 
philosophical theories of learning primarily espoused by 
Thorndyke and Dewey. Experience was deemed critical; the 
child was active and intrinsically involved in the lived 
moment. It sought more freedom and expression, which was the 
main criticism posited about the European systems of 
training. Physical education was a method as much as a 
subject. Activities were chosen more consonant with 
children's inherent movement patterns. It emphasized joy in 
learning, and took the form of natural activities. They 
included natural activities such as walking and running, free 
play, athletics, dramatic expression, and individual 
corrective exercises. The premise for this was that the 
whole child was to be educated, and that physical education 
had its own responsibility and unique contribution, no 
different from the rest of the school curriculum. 
Critique of the Two Traditional Models 
The critique of the two models will provide a rationale 
and subsequent springboard for the alternative perspective in 
physical education. A significant point to be made, however, 
is that the two predominant models of physical education are 
not mutually exclusive. Each model has a different point of 
emphasis predicated on different philosophical positions of 
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the mind-body relationship. Both have tenets and dimensions 
of one another. Proponents of "education through" the 
physical would not decry the objective aims of physical 
fitness and physical skills. Likewise, proponents of 
"education of" the physical would not claim that other 
concomitant values were not taking place. 
Education "Of" the Physical 
The dualistic, philosophical position that the mind and 
body are discrete entities as advanced in the model 
"education of" the physical, has its roots in Platonic and 
Cartesian thought. Both treat the body and mind as separate 
and the body as subservient to the mind. Physical activity's 
express purpose is simply the development of a healthy, 
strong, invigorated body better able to serve its master, the 
mind. 
One of the positive contributions of this model is the 
efficient promotion of organic health and well-being. The 
efficiency of this model is exemplified by the command 
approach in that it can accommodate large numbers of pupils 
in relatively small spaces, and that each exercise has a 
deliberate function as it relates to organic fitness 
(Sherman, 1965). Furthermore, this position has promoted the 
rational objective side of movement where questions of skill 
development and efficiency are foci of empiricistic inquiry. 
Overall, this model is essentially concerned with extrinsic, 
objective purposes that promote organic health and fitness 
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expediently and efficiently as possible. In this respect, it 
is successful. 
Serious limitations with this model appear, however, 
when viewed through a holistic lens. It views man 
dualistically, and in so doing, perceives the body as an 
object totally drained of its humanity. "It's a dead body, 
devoid of its vivifying, expressive, and intentional 
abilities and qualities" (Meier, 1975, p. 69). It 
fragmentizes man's existence; man's actions are perceived as 
depersonalized, largely comprehended through external 
quantification. Moreover, it does not accommodate the inner, 
subjective dimension of the personal meanings inherent to the 
movement experience. Each individual must interpret the 
movement experience in the lived moment of the present, 
through his own body, in his own terms. 
Education "Through" the Physical 
Education "through" the physical evolved as a means to 
remedy the narrow interpretation of the fitness model in the 
early twentieth century. A major consequence of this shift 
was the birth of the "new" physical education which was more 
representative of the American culture. This model has made 
a significant contribution to the body of knowledge about 
movement. It has fostered and attempted to nurture a more 
integrated, movement position. Philosophically, man is 
viewed as an integrated entity. Physical education was 
deemed more than simply physical. It also had contributions 
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to make to the development of the social, emotional, and 
ethical dimensions of the whole child. This monistic view 
affords the body the means for human expression, "a mode that 
promotes a lived sense of movement and an intrinsic respect 
for physical education" (Osterhoudt, 1984, p. 63). It 
endeavors to overcome the one-sided alienation of dualism, 
and in so doing, preserves the integrity of the whole 
organism. 
Since its acceptance into the larger educational 
fraternity, the profession appears to have "rested on its 
laurels." Metheny (1961) contended that the very use of the 
word "through" has attributed to our continual inability to 
establish for ourselves the credibility and respect our 
professional soul deserves. It has also emphasized the 
professional uncertainty and insecurity about the unique 
educational value inherent to our subject matter. Our 
continued reliance on concomitant values of physical activity 
perpetuates the notion of fragmentation, despite its 
philosophical guise of holism. The profession needs to 
acknowledge and explore the unique value of movement for its 
own sake, and desist in validating its position in 
referential and instrumental values. Metheny raised a 
significant question our profession needs to address if we 
are to have the credibility and significance we deserve. 
Does physical activity really have a legitimate form of 
education in its own right? Or is it merely a medium 
through which something identified as real education may 
be channeled. (1961, p. 4) 
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We need to move beyond our need to justify physical 
education for its spinoff values by examining the inherent 
value of movement, and what value these meanings may have for 
human beings. How do they contribute to our sense of our own 
uniqueness and significance? Why do we insist on batting a 
tennis ball back and forth across a net in the hot sun for 
hours? Why do we continually subject our bodies to pain, 
fatigue, and exhaustion in pursuit of a ball over a certain 
line? At face value, they seem ludicrous occupations for 
intelligent adults. The irony is that we pursue them 
voluntarily. We, as physical educators have found some of 
the most significant and" meaningful, episodic moments of our 
lives on the playing fields, where we meet ourselves, and are 
challenged. 
Until we attempt to understand the uniqueness and 
meaning inherent in movement, physical education will fail in 
its rightful claim as an essential expression of human 
existence. Since this is an ontological quest, Metheny 
(1961) suggested philosophical inquiry as a more appropriate 
means to understanding these phenomena, than our more 
familiar modes of empiricistic inquiry concerned with physics 
and physical fitness. 
Despite the significant contribution that education 
"through" the physical has made to the body of knowledge 
about the potential of movement to the self, it appears there 
has been inconsistency between thought and actual 
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implementation (Kleinman, 1976; Kollen, 1981; Meier, 1975; 
Osterhoudt, 1984). Kleinman stated: 
All education was "through the physical" and it was 
argued that all education was in fact physical education. 
While it is this point of view which has prevailed in 
professional physical education literature for some time 
now, it has not taken hold in practice. (1976, p. 37) 
Similarly Kollen stated: 
The lip-service given to the ideals of the profession 
does not filter down in practice. While speeches are 
made about the importance of physical movement to the 
individual, the day to day action does not carry this 
out. (Kollen, 1981, p. 5) 
Paradoxically, Kleinman (1976) suggests that the leaders 
of our field who intellectually endeavored to overcome the 
mind-body dualism inadvertently assented to, and supported 
conditions which resulted in an overintellectualization, 
overconceptualization of physical education. During the last 
twenty years, we have witnessed the establishment of a series 
of academic subdisciplines which incorporate the humanities 
and social, behavioral, and biological sciences. Kleinman 
states: 
Despite the fact that physical education predicates 
itself on the whole person of physical education, the 
subject matter of physical education appears focused on 
the social and behavioral sciences. We continue to 
perceive the whole person concept of physical education 
as a conglomeration of a range of human endeavors which 
may be divided into objective categories. (Kleinman, 
1976, p. 42) 
Kleinman cites a second reason for the lack of 
commitment towards the holistic model. He states that we 
have failed to deal with the individual nature of 
consciousness, more specifically, the primacy of the act 
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itself. Instead, our educational focus since the thirties 
has been on social concerns, or "associated learnings", 
dealing with the personality, not the experience of physical 
activity. We seem to have forgotten what the essence of our 
subject matter is about; the experiental act of moving in an 
external and personal dimension. 
Thus it becomes understandable when we see the bulk of 
the theoretical literature of that period devoted to 
claims of intrinsic ability of sport and physical 
education, to develop what was termed "associated 
learnings". The result was a redirection of the field 
away from activity and toward personality development. 
(Kleinman, 1976, p. 35) 
The Perpetuation of Dualism 
Modern physical education's reliance on empiristic 
dualism, according to Osterhoudt (1984), has been a more 
significant factor for why physical education has not been 
able to foster a more consistent, integrated, movement 
position. This has severely impeded its development. 
Essentially, this duality originates in the predominant 
cultural ethos, which determines society's regard for the 
mind-body relationship (Fairs, 1965), and the means for 
understanding knowledge, truth, and reality. Osterhoudt 
(1984) states that empiricism and dualism has pervaded the 
whole of our intellectual development. It has shaped the 
philosophical platform of modern intellectual history and 
undergirded the development of modern physical education as a 
consequence. Osterhoudt comments: 
The philosophical groundwork of modern (naturalistic) 
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physical education is based on the doctrines of dualism 
and empiricism, together empiristic dualism. Dualism has 
taught that the intellectual and physical aspects of our 
experience are qualitatively distinct substances. On 
first inspection, both dualism and empiricism give the 
impression of promoting a respectful regard for the body 
and its main expressions, including physical education, 
and they thus prove ultimately unfavorable to its 
practice. Dualism stands in the way of a balanced 
interpretation of humanity's intellectual and physical 
parts; empiricism fails to account for the balanced 
contributions of reason and sense to human consciousness. 
The one-sided philosophical basis of modern physical 
education is therefore opposed to an authentically human 
practice of physical education, and is in the greatest 
need of reformulation. (Osterhoudt, 1984, p. 62) 
Osterhoudt's excellent summary of our dilemma clearly 
illuminates one of the more significant factors for why 
holistic physical education has not gained more momentum in 
practice. He also states that no one since Rousseau has 
succeeded in adding humanistic fulfillment to the monistic 
premise. As a result, the development of modern physical 
education remains incomplete. "It remains incomplete 
precisely because it has adopted a basis that forestalls its 
completion, empiristic dualism" (Osterhoudt, 1984, p. 64). 
One of the implications of Cartesian thought is that 
phenomena are frequently viewed out of context. When an 
experience is viewed out of context, meaning is lost. Allen 
& Thomas (1977) suggest that there has been a split between 
experience and behavior? the inner is split from the outer. 
This split eludes meaning, for both dimensions of the 
phenomenon are vital. "Without inner experience, outer 
behavior loses its meaning, and without outer behavior, inner 
experience loses its substance" (Allen & Thomas, 1977, p. 
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135). Consequently, meaning of phenomena need to be 
discerned in the total context of both the experience and and 
the behavior. 
The pervasiveness of dualism in Western society, 
education, and physical education still continues. It 
remains for the most part abstract and philosophical. Meier 
(1975) suggested that our empiricistic and dualistic 
approaches may be in fundamental error. He posited that a 
monistic approach which accounts for both consciousness and 
corporeality may be more productive, rather than perpetuating 
the intrinsic paradox of mind and body the behavior. 
Historically, physical education has focused on the 
outer observable outcomes of physical activity. Both models, 
"education of" and "education through" the physical, have 
made little attempt to understand the nature of the inner 
experience of movement. Further, even "the research on 
self-concept in physical activity has split the the 
experience from the behavior and has not explored the human 
being in movement in a total sense; meaning, feeling, and 
experiencing have not been sources of data" (Allen & Thomas, 
1977, p. 135). We have not made adequate attempts to 
understand movement in its fullest sense. Meaning in 
movement can only be found when both the experiential and 
behavioral dimensions of physical activity are mutually 
acknowledged. Our continual reluctance to attend to this 
dilemma will result in movement and our profession being 
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robbed of the integrity it rightfully deserves. 
Aliveness and Immediacy in Movement 
In the usual holistic terms, the modern physical 
education theorist describes man as a unity of body and mind, 
more commonly referred to as a psychosomatic unity. The body 
represents the physical aspect of our existence and the mind, 
the affective, or psychological dimension. According to 
Kirkegaard, this is a negative unity, a passive sort of 
existence as opposed to the more dynamic classical concept of 
body-mind unity (Kleinman, 1975). Kleinman contends that the 
classic concept of the body-soul (mind) unity is an immediate 
relationship of self. It is the self of the immediate man. 
This immediate sense of the body-mind unity implies a more 
dynamic dialectic. It acknowledges the intrinsic, emotional 
dimension of the movement as a source of meaning valid for 
its own merit. In an existential sense, Studer prefers to 
interpret the "immediacy" of the moment as process, not as a 
fixed entity. "I experience the now of moving as a unity of 
succession, continuously unfolding and revealing deeper 
levels of self-knowledge" (Studer, 1977, p. 160). 
Conclusion 
Both models, education "of" and education "through" the 
physical, do not go far enough in developing the unique, 
inherent, educational value of movement. This is fostered by 
the acknowledgement of the subjective dimensions of the 
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movement experience. Education "through" the physical has, 
however, made significant inroads toward setting the stage 
for a deeper awareness and development of the possibilities 
of the intrinsic aspect of movement. The main criticism is 
that neither model has validated the theoretical notion that 
movement is valid for its own sake. It does not need to be 
justified in otherness, such as external instrumental 
benefits "of" fitness, or in concomitant psychological values 
as a result of moving "through" physical activities. For too 
long we have had to validate our existence in the curriculum 
based on our contributions to external referants. What we 
have not attended to, is the development of a theoretical 
model that substantiates the unique inherent value of 
movement in its own right. A child moves for the same reason 
that a child paints or sings.. We move because it satisfies 
our human need to use our abilities, to experience ourselves 
as significant, creative, and therefore personalized beings 
in an impersonal world. 
If we earnestly believe in holistic movement, our 
continual acceptance of empiricistic dualism as the 
philosophical basis for modern physical education can only 
result in our continued stagnation and frustration. We must 
be on our guard, however; we must not make the mistake our 
predecessors have made, and value the intrinsic more highly 
than the extrinsic. Both are valid and complementary. It is 
not a case of either-or, both are deemed essential for 
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discerning personal meanings. As Allen & Thomas (1977) point 
out, the inner loses its substance without the outer, and 
similarly, the outer loses its meaning without the inner 
experience. 
Rationale for an Alternative Model 
An analysis of our corporeality and meaning in movement 
cannot be achieved by recourse solely for objective, 
empiricistic thought. Our continual reduction of the subject 
to object only perpetuates our fragmentation. Examined 
experience must no longer be treated as unrelated or 
independent. The intrinsic dimension of humanity is 
acknowledged as as valid and contextually relevant to the 
"whole" of the movement experience. It recognizes that we 
are both rational and irrational. Slusher reminds us of the 
irrational, mystical dimension of sports: 
Most men recognize that this world is not all reasonable, 
that methods using completely rational thought have not 
worked in education, nor in solving the daily problems of 
living. Men in sport often recognize that there is 
something beyond "having the horses." And only the 
foolish would assume the something is restricted to 
achieving. Man is not all rational. He plays and lives 
with emotion. (Slusher, 1967, p. 86) 
According to Allen and Thomas (1977), the subjective 
nature of humanity cannot satisfactorily be discerned using 
empiricisitic thinking, since we are extricably meshed and 
connected with both the outer and inner dimensions of 
reality. Consequently, humans need to be seen in the full 
context of their situation. Empiricistic thinking still 
78 
dominates our thought and is causing us to seek "abstract and 
absolute answers to highly complex experiences, with the 
result that meaning laden encounters are distilled to a 
condition of artificial purity" (Allen & Thomas, 1977, p. 
136). They contend that the humanist's concern with sport 
and movement does not lend itself to analysis, for the ground 
is as important as the figure, because figure arises out of 
ground. This reaffirms Kleinman's point made earlier that 
phenomena cannot be studied outside the total context and 
still maintain the integrity of the original phenomena. The 
complete experiential-behavioral relationship needs to be 
studied to afford a deeper understanding of the human 
experience. 
The controversy between whether or not data about a 
person offer real understanding of that person still 
continues. Data about a person assume a study of man as an 
objective being with quantitative characteristics, and that 
these data will explain behavior. If humanity is only 
studied objectively we negate our humanity. In the 
behavioral sciences, humans play a dual role: as an explorer 
and as an object to be explored. In modern science, the 
individual as an observer has been re-introduced onto the 
scene as participant-observer. Nature and humanity are seen 
as interactive agencies, and the environment surrounding both 
the subject and the researcher is of crucial significance 
(Kleinman, 1976). Humanity cannot be totally separated from 
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the environment; humanity is inextricably immersed in it. 
Since empirical science with its bias towards 
measurement, time, and other conditions is grounded in human 
nature, it appears improbable that this would be a 
satisfactory mode of understanding human nature. "Man as a 
scientist cannot, with his peculiar methods and techniques, 
draw a self-portrait of the scientist as a man" (Allen & 
Thomas, 1977, p. 136). Empiricism does not allow for the 
qualitative idiosyncracies of the individual. These 
idiosyncracies can only be known when qualitative questions 
are asked of individuals that are sympathetic to the 
contextual integrity of a given situation, where the 
qualitative and quantitative aspects of a phenomenon are 
reciprocally revered. 
In their discussion of the qualities and limitations of 
the scientific method, Allen and Thomas (1977) state it is a 
fallacy to assume all sciences and scientific methods are 
similar. They reference Oppenheimer's idea that the language 
and tools of one science are not applicable to another (Allen 
and Thomas, 1977). For example, biology and chemistry with 
their differing purposes use different techniques. 
Consequently, it is a folly to study man with inappropriate 
methods. Allen and Thomas, after Polanyi, state that if we 
are to study man as he is, a new kind of knowledge needs to 
be formulated, one that is primarily personal rather then 
technical. Kleinman (1976), influenced by the physicist 
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Heisenberg, warns us that maybe new laws and even new 
language are necessary in the search for understanding of a 
new phenomena in which man is the subject: 
In an attempt to examine movement, our researchers have 
adopted the "tried and true" methods of physiology. But 
understanding movement skill ability and its acquisition, 
is incomplete to say the least, and incorrect to say the 
most, without regard for the living subject and 
recognition of his purpose and posture toward the 
environment. This, of necessity, calls for a psychology 
of movement; one which is not based on the principles of 
physiology and physics but, in dealings with the lived 
moment, must accept the challenge of developing 
principles of its own. (Kleinman, 1970, p. 61) 
In the development of new movement theory, Nixon and 
Ulrich (1972) state that theory should be continuallly 
concerned with reexamining itself to maintain its validity 
and appropriateness to meet a culture's changing needs. As a 
consequence, theory is mutuable and not static, and should be 
concerned with asking new and additional questions to various 
phenomena. They state: 
Theory and knowledge are sensitive to the times and must 
be reexamined continually to assure their vitality — 
there is no right way. Just as the weaver can take the 
same threads and create a multitude of products, each 
different from the other in terms of color, design, 
texture, and function, so the physical educator can take 
his knowledge and concoct theory which is empathetic 
(sic) with specific points of view and which is a 
reflection of the era and to a direction for posterity. 
(1972, p. 25) 
Ulrich (1977) also reminds us that in the development of 
new theory, the old approaches adopted by physical education 
may no longer be appropriate. New approaches and visions are 
needed offering new possibilities for the body and physical 
activity. Ulrich draws an analogy between physical education 
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and wine. The traditional tenets of the body and physical 
activity, like the grape, will continue to be what physical 
education and wine are about, but the manner we "package" 
movement appears in need of attention if it is to stay vital 
and worthy. 
The old wine bottles will not suffice for today's world. 
They crack with the heat of dissent, they chip with the 
tempo of the times, they have eroded under the pressure 
of too much dirt. How can we revise our bottling process 
so that it is real and relevant. (Ulrich, 1977, p. 43) 
Rumblings of a Change 
It appears that the initial rumblings of the holistic 
movement of the 1930's are once again receiving attention. 
History repeatedly affirms the lapse that occurs when 
innovative ideas are not embodied and implemented by the 
larger cultural ethos. For the last fifty years, the 
profession has predicated itself on the holistic dimension of 
humanity, but as Kleinman, (1976), Kollen, (1981) Meier, 
(1975), and Osterhoudt (1984) indicate, this has not occurred 
in practice. The holistic notion of humanity appears to be 
gaining momentum once again, as a consequence of the impact 
of several fairly recent phenomena; (a) new views of science, 
(b) convergence of the human sciences, and (c) the influence 
of Eastern thought. This movement draws its support from a 
diverse range of disciplines and professions which on the 
surface would appear to have little in common but their 
vision, and new consciousness appears to be their unifying 
thread. The holistic notion seeks to offer scientific 
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recourse through alternative lenses of being and thinking, 
that acknowledges the unity of man, not only with himself, 
but man's larger unity with nature. The rationale for this 
position is based on the assumption that individuals are 
experiential-behavioral entities. Humanity and nature can no 
longer be studied as discrete entities, but rather as 
interactive agencies, each impacting one another. The old 
empiricistic methods have proven unsatisfactory in offering 
understanding of the human condition. Consciousness about 
this possibility affords us hope in our society, seemingly 
targeted toward self-destruction. 
We are in the midst of a knowledge revolution that shows 
signs of a breakthrough; that researchers in the human 
sciences are moving independently in converging lines 
towards common targets. They are discarding traditional 
models of the cosmos and ourselves . . of the nature of 
nature, and the nature of human nature . . and reaching 
for new ones; that they have been spurred on by recent 
work on the brain hemispheres, on molecular biology and 
biochemistry, on the genetic code, on primatology and 
ethnology, on biofeedback and altered states of 
consciousness, on medicine and psychotherapies, on 
archaeology and astronomy, on the evolutionary process, 
on the structure of language and the nature of meaning, 
on leadership and power, and on the governance of peoples 
and nations. (Lerner, in Ferguson, 1980, p. 12) 
According to Max Lerner, a cataclysmic change is 
rumbling amongst Western academicians and professionals in 
diverse fields on how we view the world. The world is no 
longer fixed and immutable since Einstein1s theory of 
relativity shook the predicates of Newtonian physics. The 
old mechanical rules were not universal when reduced to 
subatomic levels of matter. The individual could no longer 
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be separate and objective in observing the universe. This 
has led us to a new view in physics: the role of the 
participant-observer. Nature and humanity must be seen as 
interactive agencies, not separate from each other. There 
now appear other ways of viewing and understanding the laws 
of the universe. We have shifted from a clockwork paradigm 
to an uncertainty paradigm, from the absolute to the 
relative. 
The Newtonian paradigm is no longer the single way of 
knowing, yet we are still "trapped" in this reductionist 
view. The rationale for this statement is based on the 
following: 
1) Einstein's theory of relativity eroded the principle 
that nature was absolute rather than relative. 
2) The role of the observer can no longer be excluded 
from the nature of the inquiry, since Einstein has shown 
that there is an interaction effect between humans and 
nature. 
3) Certain unresolved phenomena cannot be explained using 
cause-effect lenses, e.g., psychic and peak experiences 
in movement. 
4) The subjective dimensions of our innermost feelings 
and intents have rarely been satisfactorily explained 
using the reductionist mode (Eisner, 1978). 
The increasing interest in Eastern philosophy has made a 
significant impact on Western thought. Eastern thought is 
particularly relevant to physical education, since much of 
its philosophy is experiential rather than analytical 
(Thomas, 1983). It is essentially concerned with the 
integration of the mind-body relationship, and promotes 
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consciousness about the inner and outer man as it relates to 
his unification. Herrigel's little book Zen and the Art of 
Archery in the fifties heralded this era, and was quickly 
followed by others such as, Inner Game of Tennis (Galwey, 
1974), Golf in the Kingdom (Murphy, 1972), and Zen of Running 
(Sheehan, 1978). The application of Eastern thought to 
Western activities has promoted not only a renewed regard for 
the body, but the body is the means wherein we can mesh the 
extrinsic-intrinsic, rational-irrational aspects of ourselves 
into a unified whole. 
As a consequence of increasing knowlege of Eastern 
philosophy, the practice of meditation as a centering process 
has been more widely endorsed to counteract the fragmentation 
in our lives (Canic, 1986; Linden, 1986; Schmidt, 1986). 
Further, attempts have been made to show the relationship 
between meditation and performance, especially in sporting 
activities. Many professional "ball" teams employ 
derivatives of this approach as a means to accessing a more 
centered, unified state that seems to increase the 
possibility for achieving excellence in sport. 
Juxtapositions from empirical and humanistic sciences, 
and Eastern and Western thought, appear to be converging 
towards common targets that are discarding traditional models 
of the universe and ourselves. Since educational thought is 
based on this traditional model of humanity, it becomes 
timely to pursue the possible implications of this 
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cataclysmic shift from an educational and physical education 
perspective. One of the purposes of this study is to herald 
this new consciousness, and develop a theoretical framework 
that allows for the experiential, more subjective, lived 
aspects of physical activity. Merleau-Ponty1s philosophy of 
the body subject will provide the theoretical base for the 
alternative model. The model will then be examined for how 
lived movement satisfies our two major impulses deemed 
necessary for personal wholeness (Chapter Two). The first 
impulse is a sense of our individual agency by recognising 
our aloneness and autonomy. This is in contrast to the 
second impulse, a sense of communion, i.e., our need to feel 




A THEORETICAL PLATFORM FOR WHOLENESS IN PHYSICAL EDUCATION 
Physical education is not education "of" the physical nor 
is it education "through" the physical: It is education 
of the person . . . man as an integrated, unified entity 
is consonant with the notion that education is of the 
whole man. Enunciating and elaborating a theory of an 
integrated, unified person is a challenge that should 
rank as a very high priority with philosophers of 
physical education. (Ross, 1986, p. 23) 
Up to now, physical education theory has rested on the 
empiricistic-dualistic thesis of man (Osterhoudt, 1984), 
i.e., the Cartesian perspective that the body is separate 
from the mind. Williams (1930) attempted to counteract the 
empiricistic-dualistic position by postulating that physical 
education was education "through" physical activities, based 
on the biologic unity of mind and body. He gave no 
explanation or theoretical base for his monistic position 
except for a passing reference to the then emerging 
philosophy of behaviorism (Ross, 1986). Our reliance on 
empiricistic-dualism is perhaps the singular, most 
significant fact that has impeded physical education from 
nurturing and embodying a more integrated position in 
practice (Kleinman, 1975; Meier, 1975,1979; Osterhoudt, 
1984). An alternative theoretical base is needed that allows 
for the subjective notions of physical activity; one that 
facilitates both the experiential (inner) and behavioral 
(outer) dimensions of the movement experience. 
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In this chapter a theoretical base will be presented 
that nurtures a more integrated position of the body in 
physical education. This perspective will then be discussed 
as it pertains to the main premise of this study, i.e., 
coming to terms with our paradoxical needs for autonomy and 
connection with others in the quest for personal wholeness. 
Three phenomenological notions will be used for this purpose. 
More specifically they are, (a) body-subject as agency (b), 
body-subject as communion, and (c), preflective knowing and 
wholeness. Consequently, this chapter will highlight how 
movement facilitates our quest for wholeness through personal 
agency, autonomy, and authenticity, against the need for 
communion and with our fellow being. It will illustrate how 
the two aspects of agency and communion are connected. 
Body as Subject 
Concepts inherent in the body-subject are rooted in 
existential theory and phenomenology. The body-subject is an 
optimistic point of view and relatively holistic, reflecting 
a non-reductionist perspective endeavoring to understand the 
nature of elusive, intense, and personally meaningful 
phenomena (Progen & DeSensi, 1984). The main impetus for 
this view is primarily derived from the thoughts of the 
French philosopher Merleau-Ponty as interpreted by Kwant 
(1963, 1966), Bannan (1967), Smith (1962), and Edie (1964). 
Merleau-Ponty directed most of his work to resolving the 
Cartesian problem of how we as humans can experience 
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ourselves as incarnate. He adopted a rigorous phemenological 
analysis of our being-in-the-world using the phenomenology of 
the body. From this it could be postulated that the 
body-subject provides access through bodily experience to the 
authentic self, knowledge, personal meaning, and wholeness. 
The main existential-phenomenological assumption 
undergirding the notion of the body-subject is that 
consciousness is not separate from the body; it is an 
"embodied consciousness" (Schrag, 1979). Consciousness flows 
through the body in a reciprocal dialogue with the world. 
The body is viewed as our vehicle for our being-in-the-world. 
Existence precedes thought and provides the point of 
departure for our body-subject's encounters with the 
environment. 
Existence as lived bodily experience is our fundamental 
and essential route through the world. It is on the level of 
bodily existence that all thought has its root (Bannan, 
1967). As a consequence, the body is not the point where we 
end, but rather where we begin our process of understanding. 
This is in contrast to Cartesian principles where thought 
precedes existence, and consciousness is deemed separate from 
the body and the responsibility of the mind. 
It should be noted that one of the major inhibiting 
factors for the larger acceptance of the integrated position 
is that our philosophical language is pervasively dualistic. 
We are forced to speak in dualistic language for which words 
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are inappropriate. Kwant (1963) states that new words are 
needed to express the single reality. 
The concept of the body-subject or the "lived body" 
(Schrag, 1979) accommodates the notion that the human being 
must have experiences in order to have thought. These 
experiences do not occur disembodied; they resonate from and 
through the body itself. We are in the world as an embodied 
presence: we are "embodied experiencers" (Schrag, 1979). As 
Meier (1979) states: 
[My body] is the locus of a dialectical relationship with 
the world and the fabric into which all objects are 
woven; and, finally, it is the center of openness, 
intentionality, and meaning-producing acts. (p. 195) 
Experience, to Merleau-Ponty, is fundamentally a relationship 
with. He states: 
To be a consciousness or rather to be an experience is to 
hold inner communion with the world, the body and other 
people, to be with them instead of being beside them. 
(1962, p. 96) 
For Merleau-Ponty, the body transcends the dichotomy of 
the Cartesian mind-body split. Individuals are considered to 
be incarnate subjects; a unity, not a union of physical, 
mental, and psychological parts. We cannot infer that the 
body belongs to either the material or the physical realm. 
It belongs to both, not as their union, for a union is always 
a meeting of opposites, but as a single reality which is both 
physical and mental. 
The Fundamental Character of Subjectivity 
The fundamental character of the body-subject is its 
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capacity for relationship to the world through dialogue. 
"Something has subjective character by virtue of the fact it 
has a dialectical relationship to the reality around it, 
changing it into its own environment, and giving it a meaning 
for itself" (Kwant, 1963, p. 18). Merleau-Ponty uaes the 
dialectic to explain how meanings arise from our 
relationships and interactions with ideas, things, and 
persons. It is dialectical in that the revelation of truth 
is a dynamic process which is never concluded and which is in 
constant motion. Dialectical reasoning attempts to offer a 
more encompassing means of knowing, in contrast to the 
predominant mode of mechanistic thinking perpetuated and 
postulated by Descartes. It should be noted that 
subjectivity is not exclusively contained in consciousness, 
since the body-subject also exists primordially, prior to 
conscious thought. Subsequently, consciousness is only 
marginal to subjectivity. 
Merleau-Ponty differentiates between causal process and 
dialectical relationship. In causal actions, realities 
influence each other in such a way that the one is not the 
co-cause of the influence of the other. In dialectical 
relationship everything refers to everything; the total 
process cannot be broken down into independent actions. One 
cause does not simply act on the other, it also affects the 
others causality which in turn may affect itself as well. 
Thus it changes it into its own environment and gives it 
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meaning for itself (Kwant, 1963). 
The relationship of the body-subject with its 
environment is dialectical. Kwant makes the point, however, 
that this alone is not sufficient to constitute subjectivity. 
The gestalt or the totality of the situation needs to be 
grasped if integrity of the subject is to be maintained. The 
gestalt cannot be understood as isolated parts. The whole 
needs to be seen at once within the totality of a situation. 
For example, all the chapters of a novel reveal little 
meaning if taken independently. Taken as a whole, however,. 
each chapter has meaning for the other and concommitantly 
they constitute a larger whole of meanings, but they exist 
for the subject. Thus, subjectivity is contingent not only 
on the dialectical relationship, but also must be viewed in 
its total context, its gestalt. 
It is not by causality of stimuli and reflexes that 
behavior can be explained ... or understood . . . but 
rather that there is a certain ambiguity in the corporeal 
nature; we can see that there is interaction at the 
various levels . . . physical, psychological, etc., . . . 
but we can only assign meaning to the global activity as 
a whole. If we attempt to localize and sectionalize the 
various activities which manifest themselves at the 
bodily level, we lose the signification of the action 
itself ... we lose sight of the structure of behaviour 
itself. (Barral, 1965, p. 94) 
According to Merleau-Ponty (Kwant, 1963), where a 
dialectic occurs there is the whole of meanings. Every 
gestalt is a whole of meanings. The subject is inside the 
situation and thus forms part of the dialectic or circular 
causality, two terms which Merleau-Ponty uses 
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interchangeably. The subject holds a premium position in the 
circular causality for it is "the heart of the whole of 
meanings and centers everything around itself as 
meaning-for-itself . . .the subject at the same time is both 
a part of the whole of the dialectical relationship and its 
center" (Kwant, 1963, p. 20). Consequently, the self is able 
to rise above itself precisely because it is situated at the 
center and has access to being through our preconscious and 
conscious intentions. 
Meaning for the body-subject is not absolute, because it 
is through the reciprocal-other that meaning arises. The 
subject is changed as a result of this encounter. This 
process always takes a forward, futuristic direction. Humans 
cannot reverse moments in time. Once an encounter has 
emerged, a new synthesis or meaning stands in its whole for 
that moment, unable to go back on itself. Meanings are 
continually evolving through the dialectic. "The perceiving 
subject undergoes a continued birth; at each instant it is 
something new. Every incarnate subject is like an open book 
in which we do not know what will be written" (Edie, 1964, p. 
6). Thus, subjectivity is not absolute in light of the 
body-subject's continual rebirthing of itself through its 
symbiotic dialectic with its surroundings. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the body is the condition for 
objects, for without objects there is no subject (Edie, 
1964). Merleau-Ponty justifies his conception of the body as 
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a subject rather than an object by his appeal to our 
intentional theory of consciousness (Bannan, 1967). 
Merleau-Ponty states (cited in Bannan, 1967), "what prevents 
its (the body) . . . ever being an object, ever being 
"completely constituted" is that it is that by which there 
are objects (p. 64). Not only is the body held not to be an 
object, but the very reason for its not being an object lies 
in its being the source or condition for objects. This 
relationship is dialectic rather than causal: subject-object 
are connected because of their differences and their 
symbiotic need for each other. The object that is 
essentially a structure for consciousness could not exist in 
the absence of that consciousness. (Bannan, 1967). 
Similarly, consciousness which is essentially consciousness 
of something, would cease to exist if devoid of its object. 
According to Bannan, "they are joined in their opposition, 
opposed in their mutual dependence" (Bannan, 1967, p. 64). 
Marcel (1967) utilized two phrases which symbolize the 
difference between the objective and subjective views of the 
body. In the objective mode, it can be said, "I have a 
body". In the subjective mode, it can be said, "I am my 
body". This implies that my body is myself. "My body is who 
I am. I exist in the world as embodied" (Schrag, 1979, p. 
131) 
The body is in the world as an active entity. We 
orientate ourselves in the world through our intentional 
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existence. Merleau-Ponty states (cited in Thompson, 1968), 
"intentional threads run out from my body into the world" (p. 
40). The body does not exist as one of the passive elements 
of a causal connection. It is only from an intentional 
standpoint that we can understand whether, and to what 
extent, things around the body have any interest or meaning 
for us. Thus, we actively seeks out things and situations 
that have personal significance. Kwant comments: 
The body does not simply undergo the influence of things 
in a purely passive way, but it situates itself while it 
undergoes the influence, so that it is active in 
undergoing it. (1963, p. 33-34) [emphasis added] 
Subjectivity is "permeated with intentions" (Kwant, 
1963), rather questioning orientations. The fact that in 
certain situations the body may or may not feel at ease 
exemplifies that we are always questioning ourselves. Kwant 
infers from Merleau-Ponty that these conscious intentions are 
not the only ones; there are also preconscious intentions 
whose origins are unknown to the conscious mind, e.g., sexual 
meaning, colors, etc. These preconscious intentions, this 
bodily subjectivity, remains elusive to the conscious mind 
precisely because it is embedded in the body primordially. 
Preconscious Subjectivity of the Body 
The notion of primordial or preconscious existence is a 
key tenet in Merleau-Ponty's study on the subjectivity of 
existence. Consciousness and the body are described as 
inexorably inseparable, i.e., consciousness is primordially 
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embodied in the world (Kwant, 1963). It is the deepest level 
of subjectivity, and we are unable to penetrate this realm 
through reflective thinking. As a consequence, it is 
impossible for us to influence this dialogue by our 
conscious, free will. When existence becomes conscious 
through reflection, however, we are able to arrive at greater 
clarity and meaning. Kwant notes that this primordial level 
underlies our conscious level. He states: 
Below me, therefore, as conscious subject, there is 
another subject that is preconscious and prepersonal. 
This subject is the body itself, for all forms of meaning 
arising on this level appear to be connected with the 
structure of the body. (1963, p. 26) 
Merleau-Ponty1s phenomenology of perception is not 
phenomenological in the usual sense. Phenomenology examines 
experience using conscious reflection, where experience is 
bracketed or suspended, and reflected upon from a distance in 
order to focus back on experience with more clarity. 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is an inquiry into preconscious 
subjectivity, and how this facilitates deeper understandings, 
not only of ourselves but the nature of our co-existence with 
nature and others. 
Marcel (1960), in his phenomenology of the body-subject, 
also acknowledges the existence of the difference between 
primordial and reflective consciousness. He refers to 
reflective consciousness as our primary reflective mode and 
primordial consciousness as our secondary reflective mode. 
He maintains that there are problems and mysteries in life. 
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and in the clarification of a problem, abstract thought or 
reflective consciousness (primary reflection) is more 
appropriate. Conversely, Marcel (1960) also argues that 
mysteries can only be understood by way of primordial 
reflection (secondary reflection). Marcel states that the 
phenomenological body is, as it is experienced, an example of 
a problem which has at its inner core a mystery. He 
maintains that it is precisely because the body contains a 
mystery that secondary reflection is needed. 
The primary characteristic of secondary reflection 
(primordial reflection) is that it maintains the unity of the 
self-object. It counteracts the loss which transpires in 
primary reflection's splitting of the subject (self) from the 
object. Marcel states: 
Roughly, we can say that where primary reflection tends 
to dissolve the unity of experience which is first put 
before it, the function of secondary reflection is 
essentially recuperative, it reconquers that unity. 
(1960, p. 102-103) 
According to Marcel, the objective modes of thought conceive 
the self as being distinct and separate from the concrete 
world. Secondary reflection does not seek to explain or 
determine causal relationships. It attempts to restore the 
unity of our experience at a level that is understandable. 
The ultimate aim of secondary reflection is to renew, enrich, 
and open up ourselves to new possibilities of relationships 
with our world. 
Although preconscious intentions belong to subjectivity, 
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subjectivity at this level remains impersonal. Merleau-Ponty 
refers to this as "anonymous existence" (Kwant, 1963). On 
this level, subjectivity is not a conscious subject, and does 
not have a name. He refers to it as "natural I." The 
"natural I" understands the world before and better than the 
conscious "I." The preconscious is attuned to the world and 
has its own logic. Kwant gives the following physical 
example (here encountered while descending stairs) to express 
this preconscious mode of being: 
When, for example, I think that I have reached the bottom 
of the stairs while I am still actually descending, my 
body finds the answer to the unusual situation even 
before I, as conscious existence, am able to raise the 
problem. (1963, p. 28) 
The primordial level of the body operates with its own 
integrity, able to discern knowledge and personal meaning 
prior to reflective analysis. The body discerns personal 
meaning at the primordial and reflective level not as 
separate entities, rather through a process of symbiotic 
interweavings. The significant point Merleau-Ponty wanted to 
explicate is that meaning is discernible at the primordial 
level which supports and facilitates consciousness and 
personal meaning in our everyday existence. 
Conclusion 
Our existence is our individual style with which we 
relate to our environment; it is how we make our unique mark 
on the world. To exist is to be related with or have a 
relationship with others in the outer world. For 
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Merleau-Ponty, existence is essentially a dialectical 
communion with ideas, and persons emanating from our 
corporeal interior, guided by our primordial and conscious 
intentions. Merleau-Ponty's goal is to get back to the 
nature of the lived experience itself as a way to offset the 
limitations inherent in mechanistic and intellectual thought. 
He wanted to explicate the way we are toward our world. He 
sought to unravel the layers of living experience through 
which we are primordially connected with our world and how 
living experience facilitates deeper understandings, not only 
of ourselves, but the nature of our co-existence with others. 
Merleau-Ponty primarily attempted to bring the 
preobjective or primordial existence to reflective awareness. 
He postulated that primordial meanings are our primal contact 
with the world; they are basic to, and underlie, our human 
existence prior to our reflective consciousness. He felt 
that the primordial dimension of man's existence had been 
obscured and largely ignored. This, in part, is due to the 
enormous impact of Descartes on scientific thinking, and the 
nature of man's relationship with himself and the world. It 
attempted to offset dualistic interpretations of us in our 
world, offering an alternative view. Our bodies and our 
consciousness are integrally embodied as a unity at a 
prereflective level, prior to reflective consciousness. 
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Body Subject as Agency 
The subject body is thus an expression of the existing 
holistic person: a person who is an action potential of 
his integrated state and a person whose totality at any 
one moment affects all of his acts, including perception. 
The subject body cannot be separated into component parts 
which hve precise and distinct locations and functions. 
(Kelly, 1970, p. 96) 
Meanings that arise from the moving body-subject "stand 
out", relate to, and are a part of our individual existence 
as a result of our embodied movement situations (Arnold, 
1979). These movements are unique, irreplaceable, and 
distinctly our own. There is a reverence for the vital 
dynamic action of the lived moment as it is actually 
happening, enabling us to be more "present" in the moment. 
It emphasizes ecstacy and authenticity, and facilitates 
transcendence to deeper, more actualized levels of our 
possibilities and capabilities (Arnold, 1979). It should be 
noted that these meanings are not exclusive in any way to the 
body subject, rather that this model specifically promotes 
these ideals as the rationale for its position. 
The notion of embodiment by the body-subject is 
important to the self for two reasons. Firstly, it is the 
sine qua non of our existence and therefore of our 
consciousness. Secondly, it is our mode of experiencing the 
world, and thus a prerequisite for discovering who we are 
(Arnold, 1979). 
Embodiment infers that we experience our bodies as 
peculiarly and uniquely our own. The body both expresses us 
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and is who we are. As Marcel states, " I am my body." Our 
bodies are indissolubly linked to who we are (Schrag, 1979). 
We are embodied experiencers. "The lived body is not an 
object which man possesses, rather it is man and man is his 
body. Man's mode of insertion into the world is his body; it 
is his foundation in existence" (Meier, 1979, p. 194). 
Although the lived body is positive and dynamic and 
necessitates us to be consciously engaged and doing 
something, it is not confined to physical activity. It is, 
however, more completely and more poignantly felt in movement 
and sports, since these activities elicit a more intense 
awareness of our bodies. 
Movement Voices? The Body-Subject as Personal Agency 
As we concretely live our actions, we come to know them 
as our own, since action and the self are synonymous for the 
body subject. Hence, the more the body is experienced, the 
more the self is realized, and conversely, the less the body 
is experienced, the less the self is developed. 
Consequently, there seems to be a close correlation between 
self-identity and body awareness from a phenomenological 
perspective. 
The less the body is experienced, the more it becomes an 
appearance; the less reality it has, the more it must be 
undressed or dressed up; the less it is one's own known 
body, the further it moves from anything to do with one's 
own self. (Peterson, in Ravizza, 1977a, p. 102) 
The lived body also signifies a mode of orientation 
rather than a conceptualized entity (Schrag, 1979). It' is 
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through our sense experiences that the world is exposed to 
us. Since we are always present as our bodies, it is as our 
body that we can experience the world—smell it, hold it, 
touch it, and perceive it (Gerber, 1979). It is through the 
orientation of our lived body that personal meanings of our 
primordial body are disclosed and expanded upon by our 
reflective consciousness. 
The body concretely and subjectively lived and 
experienced is different from the body objectively known. 
For instance when I throw a ball, I experience the lived 
moment of the action; the roundness and hardness of the ball; 
the feel of the movement; I experience myself. The body 
subject allows the experience to be more personal and 
therefore more meaningful. 
To the phenomenologist, to understand the body is to see 
the body not in terms of kinesiological analysis but in 
the awareness and meaning of movement. It's to be open 
to gestures and action; it's the grasping of being and 
acting and living in our world. Thus movement becomes 
significant not by a knowledge about the body, but 
through an awareness of the self. (Kleinman, 1979, p. 
178) [emphasis addedJ 
This is in contrast to the objective body. The objective 
body abstracts the data in an attempt to understand it in 
terms of its generality. In so doing, information applies to 
everyone, but characterizes no one in particular. Movement 
gradually becomes divorced of its humanity and individuality; 
it appears sterile. It has a tendency to alienate us from 
embodying the movements for and as ourselves. The movement 
is no longer our own and we are no longer the movement. 
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Thus the body concretely lived needs to be consistently 
contrasted with the body objectively known (Schrag, 1979). 
Both yield different data, each valid in its own right. If 
either is taken exclusively, however, movement loses its 
integrity. For without the inner, movement loses it 
substance, and without the outer, movement loses its form 
(Allen & Thomas, 1977). 
The Mover as his own Agent 
The notion of individual agency is a key notion to the 
body subject and existential thought. Arnold, in Meaning and 
Movement, Sport, and Physical Education (1979) develops the 
self as "agent" as one of his central ideas; subsequently, 
his influence is evident in this next section. Experiences 
of the body as ourselves in movement are crucial to our self 
identification and personal agency. It signifies to the 
mover that we are strong, powerful, and capable of 
accomplishing more challenging tasks. "To be able to feel 
good about one's physical performance is to feel good about 
oneself - and the converse is also true" (Gerber, 1979, p. 
186). The following testimony by a gymnast testifies to 
sports capacity to affirm the self. 
You start to feel the tremendous friction caused by the 
unbelievable speed at which you travel round the bar. 
Your hands are aching, the bar tears and rips at them. 
You must hold on. They burn now; your hands are trying 
to shed an unwanted annoyance. But you must hold on . . 
. The ceiling trades places with the floor, then floor 
with the ceiling. And then abruptly and seemingly 
miraculously, you find yourself standing on your feet. 
You feel you have transgressed into one exciting world 
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and back again. You feel wonderful. You cannot name 
what that feeling is, but it does not matter. As long as 
it is there you keep returning to that world. (McDonnell, 
1967, p. 6) 
Similarly, expression is integral to the human condition. 
"Nothing is more expressive than the human body, our hands 
and fingers, our dancing feet, our eyes, our voice, in joy 
and sorrow" (O'Neill, 1974, p. 114). The body emanates its 
inner secrets for public display. 
Movement is itself a language in which man's highest and 
most fundamental inspirations are expressed. . .each 
phase of movement, every small transference of weight, 
every single gesture of any part of the body reveals some 
feature of our inner life. (Laban, 1966, p. 45) 
It is through the body that we express our existence as 
peculiarly our own; our individual "logo." The body emanates 
its inner secrets for public display. 
Existence, as a giver of meaning, manifests itself in all 
human phenomena, in the gestures of our hands, the 
mimicry of our face, the smile of a child, the creation 
of the artist, speech and work . . . The body is this 
power of expression. It gives rise to meaning; it makes 
meaning arise on different levels. (Kwant, 1963, p. 57) 
One particular inter-collegiate basketball player I taught, 
reflected on his joyous experience of creative dance, a 
medium in which he had struggled to feel comfortable, as 
follows: 
I think in our last dance everything really came out of 
me. I mean I put all I had into it. The dance came from 
the inside of me. (Higgins, 1981) [emphasis added] 
It is through our expressive gestures and actions of our 
lived body that we unfold broader personal meanings of our 
primordial authentic self. This affirms our uniquness and 
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personal agency, as a self, who is both strong and capable. 
Coming to terms with our aloneness is a key tenet to 
personal agency and our authentic self. To be in sports, is 
to be basically alone (Harper, 1979). Being alone, however, 
is not dependent upon physical isolation. We can be alone, 
and with ourself amidst a room full of people. "Being alone 
is, in a sense, a oneness; a singularity; a unity within 
one's self" (Harper, 1979, p. 126). It is within this 
wholeness or total state that we can truly understand and 
embrace that "one is." 
Whether he is hurling a javelin, soaring off a ski-jump, 
performing a double back flip off a diving board, or 
screaming towards earth in a free fall sky dive, man is 
alone. He is beyond the world of public determinations; 
of official identities; of functions; of self deceptions 
and of everydayness. And in the solitary state of 
oneness, man can meet himself. (Harper, 1979, p. 127) 
Personal success or failure depends solely on the 
athlete, even though he/she may be in the company of others 
(Harper, 1979). This is not a contradiction, for within the 
communal sports arena the athlete stands alone. In sports we 
cannot shirk being alone; we cannot defer this private state 
in preference to a safer public state. By choosing to play 
we are condemned to solitude; we are condemned to facing 
ourselves (Harper, 1979). 
The occasions are many; the feeling is real. It is for 
man himself, in the end, to realize himself as man, to 
shake himself loose from his death grip on the 
averageness of the everyday, and to "be". In the 
aloneness of sport man is potentially able to realize 
that he is - that he is unique - that there is no other 
person like him in the world. He is, and that in itself 
is important. (Harper, 1979, p. 127) 
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Freedom in and through choices and decisions is a key 
tenet of personal agency. It is a freedom, not only for the 
manifestation of our preconscious and conscious intentions, 
but also the freedom to become more of a self. As Arnold 
(1979) illuminates, this freedom towards change may be 
conceived rationally or irrationally, good or bad. It is 
precisely because of this freedom to choose, however, that we 
as individuals differentiate ourselves from the Heideggerian 
"THEY"; that our agency, autonomy, and our authentic selves 
may be disclosed to ourselves. 
My personal human identity is at least partially a 
product of my free will to free myself. . .And it is in 
entering such a world (sport) that man may know himself 
symbolically as a powerful agent in being since, in that 
world, he literally uses externally controlling 
necessities. . .to serve his own purpose. (Fraleigh, 
1973, p. 114) 
Our self-hood emerges over time in the process of 
choosing and deciding. More specifically, Macquarrie 
comments: 
A self is not given ready made at the beginning. What is 
given is a field of possibility, and as the existent 
(body subject) projects himself into this possibility, 
rather than that one, he begins to determine who he shall 
be. (1973, p. 145) 
Movement and sport abound with opportunities for choices and 
decisions. Decision making in the lived movement is a 
decision "against" something, as well as a decision "for" 
something. Deciding one route rather than another in the 
moment thrusts us as individuals forward by commitment to the 
decisions we choose. There is no time for armchair 
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deliberation: in sports we need to be unequivocal and 
instantly decide one way or another. Whether to go for the 
catch? Make the volley? Go for the foul? In so doing we 
put ourselves on the line, at that instant. Action in sports 
is concrete and immediate, and in deliberating and being 
accountable for our choices, we may discover, not only who we 
are, but who we could be. 
. . .  T o  t h e  a g e n t  t h e  f u l l  c o n t e n t  o f  t h e  c o m m i t m e n t  i s  
not grasped at the outset. It is only as the action 
unfolds and we become embroiled in it, that we discover 
there is no easy going back. What is more the action is 
real. . . the tackle involves one having to make it. 
There is no shirking or deferring of responsibility. It 
is the self, the agent, who has to decide and do. 
(Arnold, 1979, p. 39) 
Slusher was one of the first sports philosophers to 
recognize the concept of freedom in sports, as it related to 
the authentic self. In his classic text, Man, Sport, and 
Existence (Slusher, 1967), he elaborated on the 
inseparability of freedom and sports. Sport is freely chosen 
and freely engaged in. It allows for creativity and 
spontaneity within the context of the rules. Slusher feels 
that an awareness of individual freedom is the cornerstone to 
sport, and that this awareness is the basis for our 
authenticity and our self-realization. He states: 
Deny freedom and sport is denied any meaningful place in 
the realm of existence ... As the sport event unfolds, 
each situation presents itself with a number of potential 
choices . . . Choice is a foundation of awareness . . . 
the performer develops through it and, in the process, 
sport develops because of it. (1967, p. 118) 
Lived movements from the body-subject position are 
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irreplaceable, unique, and distinctly are own; we have a 
sense of our own individual worth. They affirm our 
uniqueness and our individual agency in the world. There is 
a reverence for the embodiment of the joy and spontaneity of 
the moment, of sensations and feelings inherent to the moving 
body. Furthermore, our individual worth that evolves through 
experiencing and mastering the agency of our bodies provides 
a more centered position from which we may go forth and 
encounter others more openly and lovingly, not defensively. 
Body Subject as Communion 
One of the truths of our time is this hunger deep in 
people all over the planet for coming into relationship 
with each other. Human consciousness is crossing a 
threshold as mighty as the one from the Middle Ages to 
the Renaissance. People are hungering and thirsting 
after experience that feels true to them on the inside, 
after so much hard work mapping the outer spaces of the 
physical world. They are gaining courage to ask for what 
they need: living interconnections, a sense of individual 
worth, shared opportunities. (Richards, in Ferguson, p. 
60, 1982) 
Voices on Communion 
M.C. Richards' quote symbolizes our increasing need for 
deeper more vital connections in our communal relationships 
with others and ourselves. She points out that we appear to 
be embarking on a new level of consciousness that seeks more 
consistency and resonance between our inner more intuitive 
and outer more rational realms of understanding and the faith 
and courage to search for this truth. This view acknowledges 
the less developed primordial dimensions of our psyche 
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alongside the more developed outer dimensions of our ordinary 
consciousness. 
Contact with the world is a given and irreducible fact 
of human existence. We do not find ourselves through thought 
alone to prove our being; the other is a necessary condition 
for our self-realization. "A self is a becoming, it is a 
coming to be, it becomes itself independently, yet obligated. 
An other is a necessary condition for this process to take 
place" (Kleinman, 1975, p. 45). 
It is a significant fact that we are not sufficient to 
ourselves, that life is not meaningful to us unless it is 
serving an end beyond ourselves, unless it is of value to 
someone else. (Heschel, 1965, p. 57) 
The true human condition unfolds and is nurtured by 
lived experiences and authentic interconnections with 
"others." To be is to be related with, to have connections 
with others outside the self. Heidegger (1962) states that 
by virtue of being in the world, humans encounter others. 
Thus, one's being must be described as being-with. One 
cannot avoid the other, for as Buber says, even a denial of 
the other, implies an implicit recognition of the others' 
existence. 
For Heidegger, humans interpret themselves through the 
other. Authenticity is lost, however, when we submerge 
ourselves in the average identity of the impersonal other, 
relinquishing ourselves of our responsibility and self-hood, 
taking refuge in the collective, the "they". Paradoxically, 
authenticity and our uniqueness are nurtured in the context 
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of the other, by recognizing that one is essentially like the 
"they", in that we experience the same anxieties and our 
mortality, yet one is singularly different. Authentic 
existence does not pivot around the exceptional condition of 
the subject, rather it is an existential modification through 
others (Arnold, 1979). 
Experience, according to Merleau-Ponty, is 
fundamentally a relationship with (Kwant, 1963). 
Merleau-Ponty attempted to elucidate being as an experience 
which entails a communion with. He thought that getting back 
to the lived experience offered a means to precede the error 
of mechanistic and intellectual thought. Edie (1964) states: 
.. My consciousness is turned primarily toward the world, 
turned toward things, it is above all a relationship to 
the world. (Edie, 1964, p. 116) 
Merleau-Ponty described personal interaction as a 
"coupling" of two conscious bodies, a mutuality, rather than 
an external manipulation between a person's consciousness on 
another's body (Kretchmar, 1971). This opens the self as one 
is present with another; in so doing there is reciprocity, 
not manipulation. Kretchmar states: 
. . . perception of other persons occurs through this 
personal interaction. One experiences the Other 
affecting himself. Reciprocally, one can witness his own 
actions affecting the Other's behavior. Thus, the Other 
is perceived through reciprocal interaction rather than 
objectification of and by the other. (1971, p.40) 
According to Whitford (1982), Merleau-Ponty's notion of 
relation is a positive way of being in the world as opposed 
to Sartre's position. Sartre felt that relation was 
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essentially a negative reciprocity. We meet the other as an 
object, for we have no access to the other's consciousness. 
We meet the other as a "tool", as an object (Kretchmar, 
1971). Interaction therefore is essentially alienating and 
hostile. 
According to Buber (1970), humans enter into 
relationship with persons or things in either an I-It or an 
I-Thou mode. The I-It mode is the fundamental mode, wherein 
the world appears dichotomous. One in which others stand 
separate from the "I". It is with this mode that we gather 
data, whereas within the I-Thou humans know no objects, no 
distancing from others, no separate I. It is here that true 
communion takes place, however fleeting: it remains a 
powerful, profound, and meaningful, human experience. 
Marcel (1960), like Buber, indicated that humans 
encounter others in two basic ways. We can co-exist, where 
the interaction appears superficial and somewhat mechanical, 
more representative of the body-object. Or, we can achieve 
togetherness with an other by being wholly "present" with our 
colleague (Kelly, 1970). In this mode of existence, more of 
our spirit is released to ourselves. 
When somebody's presence does make itself felt, it can 
refresh my inner being; it reveals me to myself? it makes 
me more fully myself than I should be were I not exposed 
to this impact. (Kelly, 1970, p. 69) 
Movement Voices on Communion 
The very nature of sports necessitates an encounter with 
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" an other. "Man of sport, by definition of the activity, must 
relate to the object" (Slusher, 1967, p. 7). The object can 
assume many forms, either animate or inanimate "others", or 
both simultaneously. It may take the form of another person 
on the opposing team; it may be a teammate. Inanimate 
objects may include inertial forces such as gravity and wind, 
or simply the landscape such as mountains, rapids, and waves. 
It cannot be explained satisfactorily to anyone who never 
has stood on a mountain top commanding a view of a 
hundred miles of winter, felt the wind whip through his 
clothes, quaked at the thought of the plunge ahead and 
then shackled himself to a pair of hickory boards and let 
fly down the hill. (Swenson, 1948, p. 19) 
Slusher (1967), Kleinman (1975), and Kretchmar (1975) 
maintain that meaning is never activated when the individual 
divorces self from others. It is one's ability to connect 
that makes personal meaning possible. Through dialectical 
experiential encounters, meanings become correlated with 
those of others who share the experience. Consequently, we 
are constantly remaking ourselves and each other; we are 
never quite the same as we were prior to the encounter with 
an other. 
Exploration of the nature of the other, which constitutes 
a necessity and essential part of the dialectic, has been 
for the most part, avoided or perhaps taken for granted . 
. . It is the "other" which signifies people and things 
which are essential to the nature of human relationships. 
I am contending here that it is these human 
relationships, man's dialectic with people and things, 
which provide an avenue for man to become a self . . . 
and essential ingredient of kinesis (movement toward 
self) is encounter. (Kleinman, 1975, p. 46) 
Besides the body being existentially and immediately 
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apprehended as one's own (self-referential), the lived body 
is also experienced in a communal context. This communal 
context adds another experience of the body. Some of our 
closest human encounters arise from the "battlefront of the 
contest." 
Meier (1975) contends that the competitive struggle in 
sport fosters an authentic and unique communication which he 
refers to as a "loving struggle." This interpersonal 
intimacy wherein powerful positive and negatives highs and 
lows are shared reveal our true selves and foster greater 
authenticity. Pertaining to teamwork, Meier discusses the 
"kinship of the rope" as symbolic of the trust and closeness 
that binds mountain climbers together. Sports abounds with 
kinship possibilities which have a propensity for 
communication not easily found and which are lasting and 
irreplaceable. Sayre (1964), in his book Four Against 
Everest, testifies to the kinship in mountain climbing: 
The companionship provided by climbing together is almost 
universally valued by mountaineers. The friendships 
established are lasting and irreplaceable . . . For the 
deepest friendships spring from sharing failure as well 
as success, danger as well as safety . . . Men are made 
for the close warmth of friendship tested in danger and 
adversity. It is not impossible without this testing, 
but it is much more difficult. (1964, p. 214) 
Similarly, Kleinman states: 
The bodily person in touch with the other is much more 
complete and fulfilling. The sensual experiences of 
having been there in sport also provides for a unique way 
of knowing of self and other. It achieves at times a 
level of communication not easily reached or often found. 
(1975, p. 49) 
113 
Lived body as Experiential Unity 
The sensuous experience of our athletic energy as a 
dynamic alive form has often been characterized as a sense of 
intimate relation to others and to the world (Fetters, 1977). 
The lived body is more open and receptive to feelings, 
sensuality, spontaneity, and the joy of the moving body. As 
a consequence, the lived body is more capable of increased 
intimacy with others. 
Sport, because of its intensity, is able to nurture this 
intimacy. It allows the sensuous body to immerse itself in 
activity and become lost in the medium (other). A surfer 
attests to this as follows: "I sought harmony and found it 
when I joined together with a curling wave" (Arnold, 1979, p. 
51). This intensity enchances the intimacy of the body with 
the other. To such an extent, there is frequently no 
distinction between the participant and his medium, between 
subject and object. As Lee states: 
The power to give yourself wholly to an end, to lose 
yourself in the work at hand, not to know whether you are 
building the house or the house is building you, whether 
you are carrying the ball or are merely the one in the 
mud at the bottom of the heap . . . makes drudgery 
accepted. (1922, p. 275) 
A Pentathloner beautifully expressed his experiential unity 
as follows: "I flow down the mountain. In time with the 
moment. In pace with the universe. Watching from inside and 
out. Unity and all" (Jones, 1970, p. 52). 
Sport offers numerous oppurtunities for this experience 
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of oneness as a sensual dialogue (Fetters, 1977) which 
Kleinman (1975) refers to as "sensual dialectic." Athletes 
have described this unity as a total immersion in the 
sensuous qualities of their medium, characterized by feelings 
of effortlessness, revealing an absence of opposition, only 
extreme harmony. Ravizza (1977) recalls this following 
description of playing basketball at the age of thirteen: 
I never played basketball like that before; there was 
such an incredible feeling of control, strength, flow, 
and inner power as I drove to the basket, I knew I could 
do anything I wanted on the court. Nothing was resisting 
me as I moved effortlessly in toward the basket again and 
again. There was no distinction between myself, the 
ball, and the basket . . . we all were together, (p. 61) 
The experiential unity that Ravizza speaks of is profound 
and deeply engrained. Moments of experiential unity allow us 
glimpses into eternity where everything is whole. These 
moments are so powerful that our lives are often not the 
same. The awe of the moment affirms that there is indeed 
another reality besides the here and now, but it is only 
discernable upon reflection after the event. In these 
moments we transcend ourselves by extending the previous 
limits of our experience. They are deeply satisfying, so we 
continue to pursue them. 
The experiential fusion that takes place during these 
intense moments in sport transcend thought and action. There 
appears no distinction between the mind and bodily action. 
Mind and body are acting in unison, to such an extent that 
one does not know who is the subject and who is the object. 
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As a consequence dualism is dissolved. All that is, is 
unity. 
Sport offers many varying levels of communal human 
intensity. The sensuous experiences of oneness are consonant 
with the I-Thou encounter as espoused by Martin Buber. 
Buber's (1970) work on I-Thou, however, is perhaps the most 
profound, prolific, and insightful work that has been 
developed regarding the communal and spiritual aspect of 
movement. Several movement theorists have referenced the 
Jewish philosopher-theologian Buber in their studies on the 
qualitative aspects of encounter in sports (Arnold, 1979; 
DeSensi, 1980; Gerber, 1979; Kretchmar, 1975; Thomas, 1983). 
The mere fact of two persons creating tests for one another 
in order to excel in a superior fashion reveals little or 
nothing of the human quality of the exchange (Kretchmar, 
1975). Buber highlights the subjective, qualitative 
possibilities of human encounters through his treatise on 
I-Thou. Gerber states the following on Buber's work: 
In I-Thou he theorizes that man finds himself, man 
becomes, man is, only in relation to his Thou. Through 
relation, through the encounter of the I with the Thou, 
through the dialogue, man finds himself, his meaning and 
his roots. (1979, p. 129) 
Buber (1970) contended that all life was encounter. 
Every relationship, or encounter in life, whether animate or 
inanimate, i.e., man and man, man and nature, or man and 
object is either an I-It relationship or an I-Thou 
relationship. Within the I-Thou encounter, the individual 
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lives as a subject among subjects, fusing the subject-object 
dichotomy into a mysterious subject "twoness" (Kretchmar, 
1975). "A person must responsibly maintain his own unique 
perspective in venturing 'out' toward the other" (Kretchmar, 
1975, p. 23). Each affirms the other as unique and 
individual. One cannot pre-determine how and when an I-Thou 
will occur. Rather, Kretchmar (1975) specifically states its 
occurrence is by "will" and "grace," which he also used as 
the title in his article (1975) on Buber. He states that an 
I-Thou is a direct and a spontaneous meeting, wherein each 
party affirms the other. He notes that pre-established 
biases of the other inhibit the flow and grace of an 
authentic I-Thou. Kretchmar states: 
One confirms the other without condition, in the abscence 
of pre-ordained criteria of friendship and without 
manipulative intent. An openness to surprise and mystery 
prevails . . . Yet confirmation of the other does not 
necessarily entail ideological agreement. I-Thou is not 
synonymous with sentimental concord. Even hatred is 
thought, by Buber, to be much closer to I-Thou than 
superficial friendship or other benign but apathetic 
relationships. The very ability to enter into intimate 
relationship is counted as man's greatest asset. (1975, 
p. 20) 
Most of life takes place in an I-It mode. Within this 
mode, the individual lives as a subject among objects, 
wherein individuals tend to manipulate and objectify others 
as a means to their own ends. The I-It mode is necessary to 
life, for it is a means of securing knowledge and sustaining 
life. Despite its objectivity, Buber recognized the 
importance of I-It relationships for effective, responsible 
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living. Progen & DeSensi state: 
Lacking the relation characteristic of the I-Thou 
encounter, the I-It encounter is a subject-object 
relationship. Buber (1970) indicates that we cannot live 
without the I-It world, but if individuals live with the 
I-It world alone, authentic human life cannot be 
achieved. (1984, p. 81) 
Slusher (1967) notes that the subjective aspects of 
sports are often neglected. He states that the nurturance of 
relationship or "personal meeting" is essential to 
maintaining and developing our humanity. Sport, according to 
Slusher, provides a unique arena that goes beyond the usual 
interpretation of teamwork and competition. It is within 
this context that the individual athlete achieves 
authenticity and humanness and is able to develop his 
existence to its fullest. Ultimately, he acknowledges that 
the I-It relationship is the more frequent encounter in 
sports, and it is probably unrealistic to expect mutuality 
and "meeting" amongst athletes in today's materialistic 
society. 
The nature of the I-Thou is elusive and ineffable. In 
fact, DeSensi (1980) points out that it may not be possible 
to express the essence of elusive and rare subjective 
phenomena outside the context of the relationship. A 
significant point to be made is that qualitative, subjective 
encounters are not specifically limited to the I-Thou mode 
entirely. Although never as intense or as powerful, the I-It 
mode encounter can be qualitatively enhanced, having 
experienced an I-Thou or having been sensitized to the 
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possibility. By acknowledging our fellowbeing more 
subjectively and lovingly, the possibilities of an I-Thou 
encounter are considerably increased. In so doing, we 
transcend the every day into a more vital, alive, and loving 
world wherein each individual is affirmed and feels more 
authentic. Affirmation is endemic, and seeks to foster 
affirmation in others making for a more human caring universe 
in which we may exist. 
The significant point is that individual intentionality 
determines the integrity of the encounter. Consequently, the 
manner in which competition is presented to students is 
critical in shaping their belief system about contesting with 
their fellow being. One can choose to affirm or negate the 
"other." In choosing the latter, we perpetuate the larger 
society's sense of alienation, apathy and, powerlessness 
previously documented by Fromm (1941), Heidegger (1962), and 
May (1967). The adage "Winning is not all" alludes to more 
implicit, communal possibilities of sports. It offers a more 
positive outlook for the human condition since it is 
characterized by affirmation and reverence for each other, 
rather than that of alienation and negation. 
Prereflective Knowing and Wholeness 
Merleau-Ponty1s aim was to bring the preobjective or 
preflective world to reflective awareness since he felt that 
our original contact with the world had been obscured or 
ignored by traditional philosophy. He was essentially 
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interested in the relationship between preflective experience 
and conceptualization of the experience. It is important to 
note, however, that the source of meaning cannot be 
identified with consciousness. Meaning, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, is situated in the body at both a primordial 
and reflective level. 
That the body is a subject, a meaning-giving existence, 
is deduced by Merleau-Ponty from the fact that there are 
many forms of meaning, which, on the one hand, do not 
have the character of a reality existing independently of 
us but, on the other, do not result from a free and 
conscious giving of meaning. It follows, therefore, that 
man must already be a meaning-giving existence on the 
preconscious and not-yet-made level, on the level of 
bodily existence. (Kwant, 1963, p. 21) 
The body is access to the self even at this obscure 
level. The body has its own inner logic prior to reflection 
on movement. The more the body is experienced, the more the 
self is realized and, conversely, the less the body is 
experienced the less the self is developed. Consequently, 
there appears to be a close correlation between self-identity 
and body awareness from a phenomenological perspective. 
Movement Voices on Prereflection 
Several movement theorists have discussed the 
significance of prereflective and reflective meanings 
inherent in movement. More specifically, some theorists have 
posited that movement is dynamic and whole at the 
prereflective level. Furthermore, the body is access to all 
being and knowing; we move in order to know. This being the 
case, it infers that movement is of major importance in our 
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lives and is valid in its own right. Metheny (1961) always 
maintained that if the profession was to maintain its 
integrity and position in society, we needed to validate 
movement for its own sake, not in other concomitants of 
social, emotional, and psychological values. 
Fetters (1977) discusses the prereflective notion of 
movement which she refers to as the nondiscursive symbol. 
She recognizes the prereflective and reflective realms of 
consciousness as essential sources of meaning. Prereflective 
knowing, however, offers a single intuitive grasp of the 
total body's awareness of force, time, space, and flow used 
in movement. This is in contrast to the reflective dimension 
of the body where meanings are built up in a logically 
discursive fashion. Rather, the "whole" of the experience is 
grasped in an instant prior to any reflection. The body 
feels rather than knows. Meaning is grasped in the direct 
experiential engagement of the action itself. This is where 
movement is virginal and whole, unadulterated before the 
reductionist analysis of reflection. 
Metheny (1965) posits an alternative view concerning how 
we understand the body. Her work is based on Cassirer's and 
Langer's work on symbolic transformation. She contends that 
the body transforms sensory experiences into abstractions 
which are ideas of the senses since this is how the human 
mind operates. Fetters (1977) contends, however, that these 
abstractions or ideas about the movement are not necessarily 
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representative of the discursive reflective mode of knowing. 
Rather, the body grasps the movement intuitively and 
immediately since they are inextricably "bound up with the 
sensuous experience of the body as a dynamic rhythmic form" 
(p. 256). She does not feel that movements are transformed 
into abstractions, or an idea of the movement. She states 
that movement is grasped in the lived experiential moment as 
it is happening and that reflection after the movement allows 
movement to be understood in the total context of both the 
behavior and the experience. 
Studer (1977) acknowledges that significance exists at 
the prereflective stage, but that it is implicit and 
incomplete until reflection consolidates the meanings into 
our thoughtful consciousness. Therefore, Studer maintains 
that experiences are significant only on reflection, not in 
action. Similarly, Metheny suggests that the sport 
experience is too immediate and reactive to contemplate it as 
it is happening. It needs reflection for the total meaning 
of the experience. 
In the moment of commitment to the values he attached to 
his own human actions, no competitor has time to 
rationalize about his own feelings and his own 
motivations. In that moment of all-out action he must 
experience himself as he is, in all the complexity of his 
own feelings about himself, his gods, and other men who 
claim the right to share the universe of his existence. 
(Metheny, 1979, p. 233) 
Kleinman (1970) concurs with Fetters in that meanings 
take place at the prereflective level of the body prior to 
the Cartesian cogito of reflection. Further, Kleinman states 
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that conscious perception does not account for sensations of 
pain,or sound, or appetites of hunger, or thirst. 
Consequently, they significantly challenge the dualistic 
premise of the body. Kleinman alludes to a more intimate 
union of the body and believes that significance does exist 
at this prereflective level. He writes: 
The subject is inextricably involved in the world long 
before reflection about it begins. The human being is 
thus condemned to existence and meaning on a much more 
fundamental level than that of reflection. And it is 
this level of existence which stands a chance of being 
revealed by direct, non-reflective description. That, I 
suggest is where the significance of the act lies. (1970, 
p. 74) 
In her 1966 farsighted study the Phenomenology of Dance, 
Maxine Sheets attempted to intuit the primordial and original 
lived experience of dance. She suspended her bias and sought 
her original or prereflective contact as a dancer. She 
differentiates between reflective consciousness and 
prereflective consciousness based on Husserl's theory. She 
feels the prereflective state of consciousness is vital, for 
this is the core or inner spark from which dance, as a 
creative and performing art, sprung. Although she recognises 
the significance of the prereflective consciousness, she also 
recognises that consciousness is always consciousness of 
somethings "Every consciousness intends an object" (Sheets, 
1966, p. 12). She clarifies her views when she notes that 
"in lived experience, nothing is objectively constituted; 
neither consciousness itself nor the object of consciousness 
exist as given." Thus, she acknowledges the vital interplay 
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between the prereflective and reflective levels of 
consciousness encountered through the dialectic in the search 
for meaning, in particular the prereflective mode. 
Kaelin (1979). supports Sheets position that significance 
and meaning exist at the prereflective level of bodily 
existence. According to Langer, as Kaelin points out, a 
dancer abstracts his/her bodily movements in terms of space, 
time and force into dynamic images which appear only to the 
reflective consciousness. Kaelin takes exception to this 
viewpoint when he comments: 
To suggest that a dancer first understands a feeling, and 
then translates it into kinesthetic imagery, is to 
suggest that a dancer dances before dancing. Since the 
counters (she says elements) of the dance medium are 
movements, the dancer must already have made the 
movements in order to have gained his or her "idea". 
(Kaelin, 1979, p. 175) 
He states that Langer's theory lacked a working, 
experiential schema of the body, a body which understands 
before the mind is operational. 
According to Schutz (cited in Yamaguchi, 1983) 
experiences in their prereflective mode are without meaning. 
In prereflective bodily movement the individual is only aware 
of a stream of consciousness, a series of undifferentiated, 
nondiscrete events. Schutz identifies this stream or flow of 
consciousness as duration or personal time as opposed to 
spatial or cosmic time to explain the prereflective and 
reflective modes of being. Consciousness of this stream 
emerges by the act of reflection. Only in the past are 
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experiences meaningful. Schutz states that "we apprehend not 
by living through them but by an act of attention" 
(Yamaguchi, 1983, p. 27). 
Thomas (1983) contends that the body provides a source 
of information before the conscious mind attends to the 
action. From an experiential, feeling stance she states: 
Before anyone tells you or before you think about it, you 
as your body experience yourself as a moving being . . . 
There is no way you can know what static balance is or 
whether you are capable of static balance unless you 
experience a sitation that demands it. Your body tells 
you what it is to achieve it or not achieve it. It is 
not an experience requiring reflection or evalution as it 
occurs as part of the on-going experience. (1983, p. 136) 
Essentially, the prereflective level contains the unity 
and "feel" of the movement before the cognitive processes 
begin to analyze what is going on. When bouncing a ball, we 
instinctively know its roundness, its softness or hardness, 
the angle of a rebound. This happens even before we have an 
opportunity to reflect (Thomas, 1983). Sensations are an 
integral, implicit part of why we engage in sport and 
movement for hours on end in the gym or hot sun. This is 
where the joy and meaning emerge to transport our mundane 
ordinary lives to heightened levels of self-awareness. 
Although Fetter's, Kaelin's, and Sheet's discussions 
focus on the aesthetic experience in movement, they state 
that meaning in sport is experienced through the direct 
presentation of the sensuous dynamics of the moving body. 
Sport is aesthetic in that we express ourselves through our 
bodily actions, and we articulate our subjective lived 
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moments, transforming sensuous primordial perceptions into 
personal meaning. These existential meanings are lived in 
the body and are not abstractions. They exist in their 
totality in an embodied personally significant way. Fetters, 
Kaelin, Sheets, and Thomas contend, contrary to Metheny, 
Schutz, and Studer, that prereflective meanings are valuable 
in their own right and are personally significant. 
Pre-reflective consciousness of these meanings comes 
through a total body awareness of the varying qualities 
of force, time, space and flow. These are existential 
meanings, not metaphysical concepts. They are lived in 
the body, apprehended in a personally embodied way. They 
are not abstract and intangible but concretely familiar 
and immediately felt as somatic and sensuous realities. 
I submit that these meanings found in the sensuous 
perception of one's body as a dynamic rhythmic form are 
valuable in their own right. (Fetters, 1977, p. 256) 
[emphasis added] 
It should be noted here that the prereflective and 
reflective meanings are essential to understanding movement. 
They are symbiotic. The prereflective unfolds the inner 
subjective sense, i.e., the feel of the movement. The 
reflective offers objective insights as to what the movement 
looks like, i.e. its form, and has a tendency to be more 
analytical. Together they represent the inner and outer 
dimensions of the movement experience. Neither are mutually 
exclusive on their own, they are inherently interwoven. 
Fetters suggests that the sensuous experience of the 
moving body as a dynamic form at the prereflective stage can 
be characterized as the intimate union between the body and 
the world. This is consistent with Merleau-Ponty's position 
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(Kwant, 1963) that the prereflective stage enjoys a natural 
unity. The lived body exists at that moment in a unified 
stage prior to analytic reflection. Thus, the prereflective 
dimension endeavors to keep the integrity of the unity in 
movement. The significant point of this discussion is that 
some theorists are beginning to recognize that movement is 
dynamic, meaningful, and whole at this prereflective level. 
The notion of meaning being prereflectively grasped at 
such a primordial level of our bodily existence offers 
physical educators a theoretical base that movement is 
inherently valuable in its own right since the body is access 
to all knowledge and meaning. We move in order to know. The 
body is access to all being and all knowing. Consequently, 
movement is how we know the world and ourselves. This infers 
that movement is of major significance in our lives and it is 
valid in its own right. 
Concluding Statement 
The idea of the body-subject or the lived body allows us 
to find a connection between our agentic and commununal 
impulses. The theoretical base of the lived body or 
body-subject is offered as an alternative perspective in 
physical education in lieu of the dualistic Cartesian thought 
more prevalent in physical education today. Cartesian doubt 
destroys our lived unity by removing ourselves from 
experiences, by placing the philosophical position on 
thought processes, rather than experienced processes. Marcel 
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(1960) contends that Descartes has overlooked the fact that 
humans are always a self in a situation, with their unique 
frame of reference. No two people perceive new information 
in the same way, given their unique contextual background of 
previous experiences. Further, human affectivity, our 
feelings about a situation are ignored. Hence, the "I" or 
the self is no longer an actual living, existing human, 
rather the self is detached and represents an abstract, 
theoretical self. This alienates us further from ourselves. 
A consequence is that the abstracted self no longer 
intermingles with the world, or with its own body; the self 
and the body are reduced to the status of things, not as 
vibrant, alive creators of ourselves. 
The last chapter presents the alternative perspective 
outlining the premises, characteristics, and ways to enhance 
personal performance. It will also illustrate the integral 
role of communion with others in the quest for personal 
meaning and wholeness in physical education. 
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CHAPTER V 
LIVED BODY AS AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR WHOLENESS IN PHYSICAL 
EDUCATION 
In the attempt to explain movement, our researchers have 
adopted the "tried and the true" methods of physiology. 
But understanding movement skill ability, and its 
acquisition, is incomplete to say the least, and 
incorrect to say the most without regard for the living 
subject and recognition of his purpose and posture toward 
the environment. This, of necessity, calls for a 
psychology of movement; one which is not based upon the 
principles of physiology and physics but, in dealing with 
lived movement, must accept the challenge of developing 
principles of its own. (Kleinman, 1970, p. 61) 
The lived body is offered as an alternative theoretical 
base for physical education. It allows and accommodates for 
the primordial, subconscious, more mystical dimensions of the 
human psyche, more in keeping with new models of our 
universe. The purpose of this alternative perspective, 
however, is in the personal meaning it has in practice, not 
its rationale justifying its position. My major concern is 
that physical education appears to be alienating many 
students from the joy and personal meaning inherent in 
movement. The lived body is developed as a means to 
counteract the alienation dilemma, where students feel 
unembodied, unfree, and unconnected. Rather, the lived body 
specifically promotes personal wholeness, lived experiential 
unity, joy and spontaneity, and lastly, a new inner and outer 
morality. The lived body significantly challenges and 
counteracts the present alienation experienced by students in 
physical education. Movements are more lifelike and 
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individual. As a consequence, meaning is more personal, 
therefore more profound, because movements do not have to be 
replicated to a external standard. Lowen captures the 
essence of the lived body when he states: 
The alive body is characterized by a life of its own. It 
has a mobility independent of ego control which is 
manifested by the spontantaneity of its gestures and the 
vivacity of its expression. It hums, it vibrates, it 
glows. It is charged with feeling. (1967, p. 209) 
It is of major significance to this study and an 
important point that movement is revered both as an art and a 
science. The artistic and technical aspects of movement are 
mutually symbiotic. The artistic accesses the intrinsic, 
sensual feel of the movement and provides the substance or 
essence. The technical accesses the extrinsic, more 
definitive, developmental aspect of movement. Together they 
facilitate holistic human movement and give movement its 
integrity. Too frequently the sensual aspect of the movement 
experience is passed over in pursuit of the technical 
dimension of skill acquisition. At present, our cultural 
ethos places considerable emphasis on technique. It is 
deemed the means not only to learning, but even the solution 
to many complex human relationship problems. Little societal 
value is placed on the sensual and emotional dimensions of 
the human experience. Failure to embody the inner, sensual 
experience alongside the outer, technical dimensions of the 
movement experience results in sterile, non life-like, 
depersonalized movement. It is these types of movement 
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experiences that Kollen (1981) alluded to that were 
alientating many students from enjoying and developing 
physical skill in physical education. One particular finding 
in Kollen' s study indicated that students were unable to 
recall any examples of integrated movement within physical 
education, but they were all able to report such experiences 
outside physical education. 
General Characteristics of the Lived Body 
The essential nature of the body-subject or lived body, 
is that life is in the lived moment. There is a reverence 
for the vital dynamic action of the lived moment as it is 
actually happening. During these moments, life is authentic, 
real, and peculiarly one's very own. It emphasizes ecstacy 
and authenticicty, and facilitates transcendence to deeper, 
more actualized levels of our possibilities and capabilities. 
The lived body is most basically an expression of 
being-toward the world. The body accesses our world and is 
our instrument of communication with the world around us. 
The aim of the lived body is not knowledge of the body, 
rather, the goal is self-awareness and self-understanding. 
Lived movement allows one to see into one's own being. This 
awareness, however, is hidden in process. If the final 
outcome is the only concern, many pertinent insights inherent 
to the moving body are lost. Experiencing rather than 
conceptualising about the experience is deemed the key to 
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accessing self-awareness. 
The body-subject attempts to explain the body as an 
experiencing subject, not a recipient of objective data. The 
body or self is inextricably embedded in the world and cannot 
be detached from experiences. The examination of the 
experiential base of movement is characteristic of the 
existential-psychological perspective. It advocates starting 
with experiential knowledge rather than systems or abstract 
concepts deduced a-priori. Hence, personal subjective 
knowledge is emphasised, upon which abstract data may be 
subsequently accommodated through the means of reflection. 
Humans are not subject to systems, but free to choose 
based on our their free will. The body is active rather than 
passive. The body does not undergo the influence of 
experiences in a passive way, it situates itself through 
intentionality. We orientate ourselves through our 
intentional existence. It is only from an intentional 
standpoint that we can understand whether, and to what 
extent, things around the body have any interest or meaning 
for us. Consequently, we actively seek out things and 
experiences that have personal significance and meaning. 
The lived body transcends the opposition of the mind and 
body. The body-subject is a single entity which is at the 
same time, both material and spiritual. The body is no 
longer an object in the world, it is a point of view of the 
world. As Descartes states (cited in Edie), "the soul is not 
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merely in the body like a pilot in his ship, it is wholly 
intermingled with the body" (1964, p. 5). 
The lived body argues strongly for the irrational side 
of humanity, and suggests that many phenomena, in particular 
feelings, do not fit predetermined patterns. By accepting 
the interplay of the irrational alongside the rational ways 
of knowing, humans are more able to respond naturally and 
spontaneously to fundamental life situations. This array of 
more vital, personal, experiences ensures that learning 
remains more alive and more meaningful. 
The following premises have evolved from the study. 
These form the main platform for the alternative perspective 
in physical education. 
Premises of the Lived Body 
1. Movement facilitates awareness of self and others. 
2. Roots of the mind are already established in the body. 
3. Prereflective unity and meaning exist in the body 
prior to consciousness. 
4. Lived body is not an isolated phenomena, it is 
intentionally related to the world. It emerges in one's 
primordial experience of being. 
5. Intentionality guides our actions and helps shape 
personal meaning. 
6. Meaning and feeling are inherently related to 
behavior. 
7. Meaning and behavior in experiential movement have 
gestalt characteristics. 
8. Reality of personal experiences cannot be explained by 
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analysis and abstraction of sensory data, it requires 
meaningful integration and reflection on lived 
experience. 
9. Lived body is access to the agentic and communal 
aspect of personal wholeness. 
Specific Elements of the Lived Body 
Personal Wholeness 
The main premise of this study is that personal 
wholeness is contingent on coming to terms with two symbiotic 
yet paradoxical impulses—the need to express our self-hood 
(agency), and our need to feel connected (communion). The 
lived body specifically promotes and integrates these two 
dimensions of the psyche through the dialectical encounter. 
The self as agent is a key tenet in the lived body, since 
action and the self are synonymous for the body-subject. The 
more the body is experienced, the more the self is realized, 
and so the converse is true. Consequently, from a 
phemenological perspective, there is a close correlation 
between self-identity and body awareness. 
Movement also satisfies our need for communion or 
connection with others. Being a self through sports demands 
a literal being in touch with the other. Sport is alive with 
possibilities for relating to the other, not through an 
intellectual dialectic, rather a sensual dialectic (Kleinman, 
1975). Sarano expresses this idea beautifully: "The 
universal body; my true body is the world, woven of 
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relationships between men of flesh" (cited in Thomas," 1983, 
p. 128). 
This sensual engagement evolves meaning and a level of 
communication not often found in more sedentatry modes. 
Alive exchanges in sport tend to be more authentic because 
there is little time to reflect on behavior, decisions have 
to be made in the moment. Further, the environment of 
focused attention abounds with extreme moments of elation and 
disappointment. Cumulatively, sports moments are revelations 
of the self acting in an alive and authentic manner, and are 
characterized by a curious permanence. 
Buber (1970) points out that all life is encounter. 
Every relationship in life, whether animate or inanimate, is 
either an I-It or an I-Thou. This is in contrast to 
alienation by the exaggeration of the agency feature, where 
the other is perceived instrumentally and objectively; 
consonant of the I-It mode. Communion is made possible when 
a Thou meets another Thou: "the other is viewed as a subject 
with whom I experience a co-presence in such a manner that 
our individual freedoms are mutually acknowledged" (Gerber, 
1979, p. 159). 
To Buber, the I-Thou is not only a human phenomena, for 
inherent in the I-Thou is the relation with the eternal Thou; 
connection with the eternal deity, "every particular Thou is 
a glimpse through to the eternal Thou; by means of every 
particular Thou, the primary word addresses the Eternal Thou 
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(Buber, 1958, p. 75). The eternal Thou is the "presence" of 
something far greater than ourselves. It is not limited to 
'ourselves, however, for we are but a part. The eternal rests 
in the space "in-between" two Thous; it is spirit that forms 
the cement to connect my Thou with your Thou. Hence, peak 
moments in sport are deeply satisfying and often considered 
"spiritual." They transcend our everyday lives by allowing 
us glimpses into eternity by unfolding and revealing new 
visions of ourselves. 
These two impulses, agency and communion, foster a sense 
of our autonomy and individual competency, yet also enable us 
to feel connected with our world. Dewey (1963) points out 
that if we eliminate the social, communal factor, we are left 
with only an abstraction? similarly, if we eliminate the 
individual, agentic factor from society, we are left with 
only an inert and lifeless mass. Both the agentic and 
communal elements are deemed essential for personal and 
societal well being. 
Lived Body as Experiential Unity 
The lived body fosters experiential unity by its very 
regard for the sensuality and intimacy between the outer 
world and our inner world of experiencing. This unity is 
evident at two levels of the body — the preflective and the 
reflective level. At both these levels of the body there 
appears no opposition between the subject and object, just 
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experiential fusion of oneness. The experience of oneness 
dissolves the dualism inherent in other models of physical 
education. The phenomena of oneness and unity is a chief 
characteristic of the lived body. Figure 1 illustrates this 
concept. 
subject inity object 
Figure 1 
The experiential fusion that takes place during 
preflective and reflective movement experiences transcends 
thought and action. In actional movement, thought does not 
precede movement. Its concern is with the process of the 
unfolding of activity as sequential flow, "the agent thinks 
and chooses as he performs." Furthermore, "choices that are 
made arise from and are an ongoing part of the action itself 
as it unfolds to actualize the possibility of the project" 
(Arnold, 1979, p. 19). There appears no distinction between 
the mind and bodily action. Mind and body are acting in 
unison, to such an extent one does not know who is the 
subject and who is the object. 
• • • the hand that guides the brush has already caught 
and executed what floated before the mind at the same 








Figure 1. Discrete and Non-discrete Meaning Sources 
(Adapted from Thomas, 1983, p. 42) 
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pupil no longer knows which of the two — the mind or 
hand — was responsible for the work. (Herrigel, 1971, p. 
46) 
Thus, our corporeality is an entity with two faces without 
clear and precise marks of demarcation, the distinction 
between the subjective and objective poles are blurred in the 
experienced lived body. 
Arnold (1979) differentiates between preflective and 
reflective modes by stating that unity at the preflective 
level of the body is non-discrete, whereas reflective unity 
of the body is discrete (see Figure 2). Non-discrete, 
preflective unity provides information without reflective 
thinking. The body itself becomes a source of knowledge. 
Upon walking outside, the body tells you whether it is humid 
or dry. It does not require reflection for knowledge. 
Similarly, when movement in sports become automatic, 
execution takes place without reflection. Thomas (1983) 
points out that preflective knowledge is a relatively new 
phenomena in Western philosophy. It does, however, have a 
long tradition in Eastern philosophy. Prereflection is the 
root for eastern metaphysical beliefs about the monistic 
liason between the mind and the body. 
Discrete peak moments of reflective unity in sports are 
more consonant with an I-Thou experience; they stand out as 
deep, meaningful, episodic moments forever etched on our 
memory. But they only take on meaning after the event, 
through the process of reflection. According to Martens 
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(1978), the sports peak experience, in contrast to Maslow's 
peak experience, is the highest human experience. Discrete 
experiences of unity are frequently regarded as the most 
supreme moments of our human lives. They require a total 
embodiment and integration of mind, body, and spirit, whereas 
Maslow's peak experience does not necessarily involve all 
dimensions of the mind-body-spirit triad. Consequently, 
unity experienced in intense moments in sport may be the most 
powerful and profound human experience available to humanity. 
[In peak moments in sport] the person both exists and 
finds his essence. They satisfy him so he returns. One 
competes in order to self actualize and find out who one 
is. In actional (lived) movement the self finds unity 
and once found "being" is attained. It may last for but 
a moment, but in that moment meaning is constituted and 
never to be forgotten. (Arnold, 1979, p. 41) 
Despite experiential unity at the discrete level of the 
body, unity also exists at the preflective level as 
non-discrete. The notion of meaning and unity being 
prereflectively grasped at such a primordial level of the 
body offers physical educators a theoretical base that 
movement is inherently valuable, and does not have to be 
justified in other emotional and social educational 
referrants. 
Lived Body as Spontaneity and Joy 
Today we find that joy, just old fashioned happiness is 
one of the most essential elements of life. It is one of 
the aims of education. It is one of the criteria by 
which education is judged. We are coming also to 
recognize the close inter-relationships of those elements 
which we call mind and body. (Nash, 1930, p. 22) 
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Nash recognized the significance of joy inherent to the 
moving body. Yet joy as an inclusion in the curriculum is 
the exception rather than the rule, given the present ethos 
of accountability in education. The level of personal joy is 
commensurate with the level to which we fulfill our potential 
as unique individuals (May, 1967). Joy results when we use 
our powers. Joy, rather than happiness, is the goal of life, 
for joy is the emotion which results from our fulfilling our 
nature as human beings. 
Relating this to a movement context, the essence of 
preflective experiential bodily flow is joy. This is the 
natural condition of the human organism. Spontaneous 
movement is basic to this level of consciousness and 
existence. The body exists in it purest state. It is pure 
self resonating at the core of its primordial existence 
releasing joy and pleasure. According to Pahey (1977), this 
is the "passionate body" — alive, positive, pulsating in its 
purest most authentic state. For it is human passion that 
enhances our energy which charges our activities with gusto 
and dynamism. This is aliveness. 
In this state of joy and passion the moving body seems to 
dance as the person realizes how good it feels to 
cooperate with instinctual nature — ones spontaneity 
senses a unique emergence of self. One is alive when one 
moves, but totally alive when the movements are 
spontaneous, vital, alive, and free rather than frozen, 
immobile, and unresponsive. (Fahey, 1977, p. 112) 
It is interesting to note that Buber (1970) also 
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recognized that the highest relationship of man to man or man 
to experience is spontaneous and direct, and a prior plan 
inhibits this spontaneity. Spontaneity is the capacity to 
respond to the total picture, i.e. the figure-ground 
configuration. According to Rollo May (1967), spontaneity is 
the active "I" becoming part of the figure-ground. "In a 
good portrait the background is always an integral part of 
the portrait; so an act of a mature human being is an 
integral part of the self in relation to the world around it" 
(May, 1967, p. 98). Hence, spontaneity is very different 
from egocentricity and effervescence, or simply letting one's 
feelings out regardless of the situation. Spontaneity is the 
acting and responding to a specific situation in the present 
moment. These moments are never the same. Consequently, 
spontaneity is characterized by originality and uniqueness. 
Our primordial, spontaneous, movement meanings are 
fundamental to and underlie our very existence. Our 
authentic selves are realized through our spontaneous 
movements. They are fun and pleasurable — the run on the 
beach, the sudden leap for joy. They constitute what it 
truly means to feel alive — "the value it contains is 
immanent in the action. It is not subject to theorizing" 
(Arnold, 1979, p. 28). Thus, our true selves are actualized 
in our spontaneous movements. 
To me my spontaneous movements are meaningful. On an 
ordinary routine day in the stream of experience they are 
on reflection like shafts of sunlight that express and 
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reveal my innermost self. I catch myself out in new, 
un-thought-out and exciting antics. Spontaneity in 
movement seems to me to be profoundly human. To suppress 
and deny it is to curb what it is there in the depth of 
our beings. Without their comings and goings I doubt if 
I should ever know myself fully as an animate organism. 
(Arnold, 1979, p. 28). 
Fahey (1977) contends that persons who do not or will 
not allow themselves to experience the joy and spontaneity of 
the authentic self, deny their inner reality from becoming an 
outer reality. This split of the inner from the outer 
perpetuates the fragmentation in dualism. Furthermore, this 
split is fundamental to and indicative of some human 
relations problems. The repression of feelings and needs are 
the frequent precursors of later physical and mental 
disorders, since the body encodes both positive and negative 
emotions (Reich, 1973). 
. . . spontaneity is a function of the "elan vital", and 
is found in its most flourishing state amongst children, 
weakened in middle age and progressively blunted in those 
who suffer from mental disorders. (Porot, cited in 
Arnold, 1979, p. 27) 
In humanistic psychology, which is concerned with "being" and 
"becoming", spontaneity and creativity are regarded as 
powerful liberating processes in the self-actualization 
process (Arnold, 1979). Consequently, spontaneity inherent 
to the lived body maintains our aliveness and humanity, and 
seems to have an indirect relationship with our physical and 
mental well being. 
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New Inner and Outer Morality 
Fahey (1977) contends that the alive, passionate body 
leads to a new inner morality where the body is valued and 
revered. The body is acknowledged as having its own inner, 
primordial wisdom and logic placating the ego for the body. 
Further, it is characterized by an inner sense of passionate 
appreciation for the unique insights that allow us to see 
into our own being. The cornerstone to this new perspective 
is the intrinsic motivation of experiencing the joy and 
pleasure of experiential movement. It is grounded in an 
inner sense of passion which sustains itself. The initial 
step toward understanding and desiring integration is 
accepting and placing value on these bodily feelings as 
worthy, pleasurable, and valid in and of themselves. This is 
a prerequisite for understanding and releasing the 
experiential joy inherent in human movement. 
During intense moments of fusion between action and 
thought, subject and object, profound joy is experienced. By 
necessity, it requires the internal focusing of attention and 
merging of thought and action on a severely restricted field. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1983) posits that within this intense 
contraction, a grand expansion, "an opening out to the basic 
concerns of the human condition" takes place 
(Csikzentmihalyi, 1983, p. 373). As one climber said "In 
this miniature, that one thing (climbing) is a complexity as 
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great as the whole" (p. 373). 
Within these physical-emotional contractions, deep, 
episodic insights may emerge. They open us to the 
transcendent dimensions of ourselves and our world around us. 
They are steeped in awe, and as Heschel (1965) reminds us, it 
is awe that precedes faith to bring about personal change. 
Hence these deep flow experiences of unity frequently provide 
springboards for new personal visions. Oneness experiences 
exude from this awe and majesty. They open us up, and, 
according to Csikszentmihalyi, new cultural forms may emerge 
which lead to new forms of morality. Herzog's testimony 
captures the significance of these moments: 
In overstepping our limitations, in touching the extreme 
boundaries of man's world, we have come to know something 
of its true splendour. In my worst moments of anguish I 
seemed to discover the deep significance of existence 
which till then I had been unaware. (Herzog, 1953, p. 12) 
These transcendent moments are deeply personal and sometimes 
spiritual. As a direct consequence, our personal landscapes 
for being and living are often changed. They frequently lead 
us to interpret, fuse, and embody them into our everyday 
lives. In so doing new outer forms of morality may reveal 
themselves. 
Csikzentmihalyi references the work of Huizinga (1939) 
to support his thesis. Huizinga points out that one of the 
significant purposes of play is that it facilitates 
experimental ways of living, from which new ones may emerge. 
As Huizinga states, "For many years the conviction has grown 
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upon me that civilization arises and unfolds in and as play" 
(Huizinga, [1939], 1950, p. 1). The arts, science, law, 
religions, and government — all have their historical 
genesis in playful activity. Once successfully embodied as 
enjoyable and suitable, these pilot schemes may become 
accepted and institutionalized into the larger culture. 
Consequently, lived experiences of oneness or deep flow 
experiences are like "laboratories" in which new cultural 
forms and values may be acted out. In their wake, new 
evolutionary forms of living and morality may evolve. 
Intense embodied movement situations go far beyond the 
immediacy of the joy and pleasure of the moment. Our 
perceptual world opens our attitude into seeing the world 
with new lenses filled with awe and wonderment. We 
internalize the properties and characteristics of these 
transcendent moments and attempt to generalize them into our 
outer world. This inner-outer awareness is dialectical and 
self sustaining, since we constantly search for deeper levels 
of self-understanding. 
Enhancing Human Performance From Within 
As Slusher reminds us, most physical educators and 
coaches recognize that success in sports is more than just 
"having the horses." There is an element of mystery within 
the subjective, lived dimension of the body which appears to 
access and allow for more powerful moments of unity to 
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"happen." Technique does not access this level or dimension 
of the body. As a consequence, many professional athletes 
and coaches are adopting the affective aspects of inner game 
theory into their training programs. Inner game theory, 
according to Wertz (1977) is a mixture of Zen, Yoga and 
common sports psychology. It should be noted that the lived 
body specifically promotes the intrinsic dimensions of 
movement, yet it also acknowledges the vital role played by 
the more objective intervention techniques. Both are deemed 
essential to the learning process (Gallwey, 1974; Leonard, 
1975; Murphy & White, 1978; Ravizza, 1979). 
We seem to have overlooked the importance of the 
affective dimensions of movement. Ravizza (1979) posits that 
the subjective approach is not only complementary, but also a 
means of further improving performance. Up until now 
athletes have had a solitary struggle to reach the 
integration of mind-body-spirit necessary for zenith moments 
with their body. Our techniques have become so sophisticated 
that they push the body to its ulitimate level of 
performance, wherein the athlete is primarily viewed as an 
object. It is hardly surprising to observe the increased 
levels of drugs, and blood doping, that is referenced in the 
media today. The Len Bias tragedy (Sports Illustrated, June, 
1986) symbolizes too well the present state of professional 
sports. The stress is enormous. Attention to the subjective 
dimensions of athletes feelings and flow as valid and 
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integral to performance, offers a means to counteract the 
alienation that takes place when athletes perceive themselves 
as objects in the giant machinery of professional sports. 
The structure of sport, by the very nature of its rules, 
facilitates complete focusing, or centering with the task at 
hand. The paradoxical nature of the rules in sport restrict 
the participant in order to liberate him. More specifically: 
Each player must keep within prescribed confines, but in 
such a way that his activities continue to be 
appropriate. The sonnet's tight demands make the poet 
call on his reserves; a similar result is produced when a 
player carries out his role. That role both enriches and 
limits. It lifts him up into a context of traditions, 
obligations, and ideals thereby transforming him. (Weiss, 
1969, p. 161) 
The lived body focuses on self-knowledge; being able to 
peer into one's own being. It requires consciousness of the 
process of participation and skill acguistion, as well as 
developing awareness of the knowledge and insights to be 
gained about ourselves, others and nature of the sports 
experience itself (Ravizza, 1979). The significant point in 
the development of the affective dimensions of the body is 
that athletes do not have to do anything different with their 
movement. It simply requires bringing consciousness to 
movement and developing bodily feelings and sensations during 
these movements. It focuses on experiencing the movement as 
opposed to doing the movement. 
By focusing on the process and not solely the product, 
we become more aware of the subjective dimensions. This 
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awareness opens us up and reveals new human dimensions. 
Lowen (1970) suggests the following about the significance of 
awareness. 
Self-awareness is a function of feeling. It is the 
summation of all body sensations at one time. Through 
his self-awareness a person knows who he is. He is aware 
of what is going on in every part of his body; in other 
words, he is in touch with himself. For example, he 
senses all other spontaneous or involuntary body 
movements. But he is also aware of the muscular tensions 
that restrict his movements, for these too create 
sensations . . . Not being in touch with his body from 
within, it feels strange and awkward to him, which makes 
him feel self-conscious in his expression and movement, 
(p. 57) 
Hence, awareness is an integrated perspective. It is not 
thinking about movement, but rather an intuitive feeling of 
both figure and ground, which Ravizza (1979) likened to the 
non-judgemental awareness of a child. This awareness 
contributes to enhanced performance in two ways. The first 
is the development of a philosophical platform, and the 
second is essentially experiential, as the athlete optimally 
grasps the lived moment. 
The philosophical position grounds athletes as they 
begin to develop a deeper personal understanding of the 
meaning and significance of the "whole" movement experience. 
This meaning helps to sustain many athletes through the 
arduous training schedules demanded of athletes. Ravizza 
(1979) cites the case of the swimming captain at the 
University of Southern California who related that his peak 
experiences made all the training and effort worthwhile and 
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meaningful; they sustained him. Subsequently our personal 
connections with a sport seems to prevent burnout, 
particularly in younger athletes with less emotional maturity 
to deal with the ardous demands of competition. 
Secondly, awareness also facilitates performance by 
helping athletes become more totally involved in their 
movement as it is actually happening. Too frequently the 
focus is on the end result of the encounter, not the joy from 
moving. By focusing on the internal bodily feelings the 
athletes are able to "listen" to their bodies, better able to 
coach themselves. Skilled, highly sensitized athletes 
instinctually know when to move, as the following gymnast 
testifies: "It just feels right ... my body knows" 
(Ravizza, 1979). Consequently, the athlete is more in 
control of both the inner and outer forces of the moving 
body. For instance, athletes are keenly aware when too much 
tension is present in certain muscle groups, and sensitive to 
subtle changes in flow experiences, not only of themselves, 
but also the changing flow within the contest; they are 
"tuned in." This new inner morality, where the body is 
valued, characterizes the existential-phemenological 
perspective of the lived body. 
As noted, when athletes are operating at their peak, 
they are totally absorbed in the activity. Gerber (1979a) 
states that in order to achieve this oneness state we cannot 
be conscious of the elements of our acts, it requires an 
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element of thoughtlessness, more focused towards an inner 
goal. Conry (1977) refers to thoughtlessness as a process of 
disengagement of the self from the ego. The self ultimately 
endeavours to turn one's mind inward toward the pure embodied 
consciousness, divorced from the social ego. The trick is to 
turn inward without falling into the trap of objectifying 
oneself through thinking about the act. 
. . . to get yourself back into this state of being in 
the world by simply loosing your mind and coming to your 
senses (experiencing the joy and passion of the body). 
You can be reborn into a centered state which manifests 
itself in the unified actualization of the joy and 
passion found in being one with your body. Not with your 
body as an instrument or object but as a work of art 
continuously in process — a continuous, on-going, 
life-giving creation and presentation of your self to the 
world; a communion of human components with spontaneous 
joy and passion as the cement. (Ravizza, 1977a, p. 118) 
[emphasis added] 
In order for the process of body unity to occur, and a 
new inner morality, where the body is valued, a mind-body 
state that ordinarily places the ego before the body must be 
reversed. Humans need to let go of the ego, i.e., the 
rational before the sensual. Any conscious, volitional 
effort becomes subordinated to an opening up, letting go, and 
giving oneself to the wisdom of the body. The body as object 
perpetuates the stronghold position of the ego. Kollen 
(1983) illustrates simply and poignantly through some of her 
own thoughts whilst running, how egotistical intrusions 
inhibit us from being into movement more integrally. 
You are jogging and, for a second, things are perfect. 
All of a sudden something intrudes . . . The thought 
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comes in, "I should be running faster if I want to 
improve". I wonder how far I've gone and begin to 
estimate and calculate. 1 see some people up ahead. I 
don't want them to think I'm slow. I speed up and 
quickly become exhausted, and run around a corner so I 
can stop. I think, "wowl" I'm running well today. Why 
can't I do this all the time. (p. 91) 
As soon as these intrusions come in we are no longer present 
in the movement. The personal joy "evaporates" and whole 
movement becomes fragmented. Usurping the role of the ego 
for the natural integrity and wisdom of the body is a key 
tenet in inner game theory. According to Wertz (1977), some 
distinct inherent force, power, or what Herrigel (1971) 
calls "It" takes over, to create the perfect shot. The body 
has replaced the ego-mind. 
Many articles and books have been written on means to 
access our inner game potential (Murphy, 1972; Galwey, 1974; 
Ravizza, 1979; Herrigel, 1952, 1974). It is not within the 
bounds of this study to offer a full treatise on techniques 
presently employed; however, an overview of the major ideas 
inherent to inner game theory will be presented which may be 
subsequently studied in more depth. 
Quieting the mind 
Essentially quieting the mind involves one's 
consciousness to be less consumed with thinking, wishing, or 
the regretting of a previous movement decision. All these 
actions inhibit us from being "present" in the movement. 
Ideally, good shots emerge when the mind is as still as 
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possible. Within a Zen context, Herrigel states: 
What stands in your way is that you have too much willful 
will . . .(let) go of yourself, leaving yourself and 
everything yours behind you so decisively that nothing 
more is left of you but purposeless tension (1971, p. 
51-52). 
Ravizza suggests one way to suspend our usual 
perspective is to modify the familar variables of time, 
space, flow and force. One or all may be changed. Simply 
slowing down the movement, or closing off some of the sense 
perceptors such as the eyes, allow for more kinesthetic feel 
within movement. 
Centering on the Task 
Concentration is not sufficient. Centering requires 
focusing ones's full attention on the movement experience as 
it is actually happening, like a camera zooming in at close 
range on its subject. The mind cannot be on the past or 
future but focused on the direct experience. 
The first thing you have to do is to learn the trick of 
undivided attention or concentration. By these terms, I 
mean something quite different from what is ordinarily 
meant. One "concentrates" on writing a chapter in a 
book, or on solving problem (sic) in mathematics; but 
this is a complicated process of dividing one's 
attention, giving it to one detail after another, 
judging, balancing, making decisions. The kind of 
concentration I mean is putting the attention on one 
object, or one uncomplicated thought, such as joy, or 
peace and holding it there steadily. It isn't thinking; 
it is inhibiting thought, except for one thought, or one 
object of thought (Criswell, in Ravizza, 1977a, p. 104) 
Similarly, in action the athlete: 
. . . no longer thinks of his shoes to which and hour ago 
he gave such attention, he "forgets" the stick that 
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supports him ... He "ignores his body" which he 
trained. For only by forgetting, in a sense his plans 
and his body, will be able to devote himself to the 
laborious task that has to be performed. What there 
still is, psychologically speaking, is only the mountain: 
he is absorbed in its structure, his thoughts are 
completely given to it. (Van Den Berg, 1962, p. 107) 
Thus, the present moment is where athletes optimally act, and 
the more centered they are with themselves, the more 
integrated the action. "The present moment is the door to the 
deeper levels of the sport experience" (Ravizza, 1979, p. 
73). 
A centered position is a balanced, stable position. 
From this place a person moves, directs his energy and flows 
with the movement experience. It provides an anchor from 
which to move to the outside from a place of strength and not 
a scattered position within. The natural athlete is one who 
unconsciously is tuned into this tenuous inner-outer 
equilibrium point called one's center. Finding one's center 
is important, for it enables us to live and experience our 
bodies from a constant space, which in our tumultuous world 
appears as a comforting haven in which to feel safe and more 
secure (Ravizza, 1979). 
Entering into the Experience 
During this phase athletes do not have to force their 
movement; they simply allow themselves to merge with the 
action. It requires limited effort. Ravizza (1979) in his 
research on peak experience, indicated that athletes 
154 
frequently "allowed the movement to move them" (p. 73). 
There was no distinction between the self or the movement. 
He references a female gymnast who reflected this technique 
prior to her routine. The gymnast would stare at the 
apparatus, and gather herself and the apparatus into her 
center, and when she felt at harmony with herself and the 
environment, only then, would she initiate her movement. The 
"It" or force takes over, allowing harmony to "happen." 
Thus, inner game theory seriously challenges some of the 
more conventional methods of skill acquisition. Conventional 
methodology posits that individuals who take up an activity 
are to conform to a specific rigid model. For example, one 
hits a backhand or serve to an external standard. Physical 
educators need to recognize that we cannot control students' 
energy for movement. By attempting to control students' 
movements by conforming to external standard, we alienate the 
student from embodying the movement as his or her own. As a 
consequence, movement is sterile and depersonalized. Our 
role as facilitator is to tap into our students' intrinsic 
motivation inherent in natural playful movement. Ironically, 
this was the central tenet of the new physical education 
movement fifty years ago. Wood and Cassidy were advocating 
this position as early as the 1920"s in their classic text. 
The New Physical Education. They stated that: 
A rational program of physical education activities must 
be grounded in the original nature of the human being, 
and it must provide satisfying expression in vigorous 
155 
action for the wholesome, natural instincts and impulses 
of children and youth. (1922, p. vii) 
According to inner game theory, there is an individual 
adjustment to skill, rather than the player to the game 
(Ravizza, 1979). Thus, inner game theory allows for 
individual differences and accepts the premise that movement 
belongs to the individual, and that movement is personal. 
Similarly, Metheny (1968) refers to human movement as the 
catalyst that links our inner and outer worlds towards more 
self understanding. Human embodiment, then, is the external 
manifestation of our inner intentions; it mirrors and 
manifests our inner and outer reality. 
The underlying assumption of the lived body is that 
athletes are total human beings with cognitive and affective 
dimensions. The cognitive and affective aspects reflect the 
inner and outer dimensions of movement. Thus, the extent of 
success in sports is contingent on how well the inner and 
outer forces are simultaneously gathered. The moment in 
which the inner and outer unite, a powerful centering force 
results. It is during these moments we experience life at 
its most intense point. 
Inner and Outer 
Inner Game theory acknowledges the tenuous balance 
between the inner and outer dimensions of the movement 
experience. This presupposes that humans must be in touch 
with and accept the constant interplay of two essential yet 
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contradictory human energies, the active and irrational, 
alongside the passive and more rational; they are both 
mutually complementary. Fahey (1977) contends that the more 
we can accept the irrational dimension of our being, the more 
likely we will be able to respond naturally and spontaneously 
to the whole constellation of movement and life's situations. 
This is the alive body. 
You can be reborn into a new centered state which 
manifests itself in the unified actualization of the joy 
and passion found in being one with your body. Not with 
your body as an instrument or object but as a work of art 
continuously in process — a continuous, on-going, 
life-giving creation and presentation of your self to the 
world; a communion of human components with spontaneous 
joy and passion as the cement. (Fahey, 1977, p. 118) 
Our inner, spontaneous, experiential movements are 
pleasurable and oriented to growth. Other, more regulatory 
movements may have pleasurable elements, but they are not 
about growth, rather they are about maintenance. By 
repressing the inner, spontaneous emotions, we block the 
natural flow of the body energy. This leads to diminished 
energy and a loss of feeling in the body; we no longer feel 
ourselves as vital and as potent, and our self-identity is 
diminished accordingly. 
Outer, more reflective movements reveal the form and 
definition of our behavior and are more consonant with the 
social sytems emphasis on control, rationality, and holding 
back. Human beings need to be able to slide along the 
experiential-behavioral continuum with ease, able to respond 
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freely and openly, yet responsibly. This signifies a 
positive balance outlook for living. There is flow, ease, 
and consistency between our experiential more spontaneous 
nature and our behavioral more rational nature. 
Concomitantly, they support and complement self-identity. 
They help us center ourselves. As individuals we are more 
able to embrace our lived moments with enthusiasm and 
passion, yet we also acknowledge the personal responsibility 
of our actions. 
Inner-Outer as a Continuum 
The enemy of whole vision, according to William Blake, 
is our outer reasoning powers divorced from our inner 
imagination (Ferguson, 1982). Our half minds are continually 
making rules and moral judgments, smothering human 
spontaneity, feeling, and art. As Jaspers (1951) also states 
the greatest mistake in philosophy is the separation of 
thought and action. Western thought seems to abide in 
dualism, a vestige of Newtonian and Cartesian thought. 
The lived body in contrast views the body as having 
inner and outer poles, which exist as one entity. This 
particular view closely resembles tenets of Zen and Eastern 
philosophy. A recurring theme in Eastern philosopy is that 
within unity there is polarity, yet interlocking harmony 
(Thomas, 1983). The body, in its subjective, prereflective 
and reflective state, is viewed as embodied with 
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consciousness and access to the world; there is no 
distinction between mind and body. Similarly/ Zen and the 
lived body feel the body is the source of experience and 
self-awareness, where a type of "oneness" is conceivable. 
Their difference, however, is that Zen views the body as 
access to spiritual enlightenment, whereas in the lived body 
the major focus is on self-awareness and consciousness. 
Consequently, both view polarity as a myth, since the inner 
and outer dimensions of the psyche are simply polar entities 
of the same phenomena. 
Myth of Polarity 
Fahey (1975) suggests that the mind-body dualism is a 
myth of polarity. He states that polar refers to something 
that has parts, ends, or extremities that are related and 
joined to form a single whole. Further, he asserts that 
polar extremes are inseparable opposites, similar to two 
sides of a coin. Transposing this perspective to the lived 
world, it appears that much ambiguity exists, which can be 
symbolized by the concept "oneness of opposites." Fahey 
states: 
. . . The supposedly explicit polar opposition of mind 
and body conceals an implicit unity of the integrated 
self-body, or person. So it is then that we have a polar 
and mutually sustaining relationship between two entities 
considered to be opposed or basically opposite. In 
reality, as experienced they are the ying and yang of 
mind-body in perpetual interplay. (1975, p. 62) 
According to Merleau-Ponty, ambiguity lies at the heart 
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of human existence, for rational thought only leads to 
paradox (Wilber, 1983). He points out that the body is the 
condition for objects, and the reason the body is not an 
object lies in its being the condition for objects. This 
relationship is dialectical. The body and objects are bound 
together because of their differences and opposed in their 
mutual dependence. This ambiguity, Merleau-Ponty believes, 
lies at the heart of human existence (Whitford, 1982). 
Everything we live or think always has several meanings 
because the many parts of a phenomenon are not isolated, 
rather the parts permeate and interpenetrate each other. 
Ambiguity therefore discloses the intimacy of our 
relationships in our existence, and is not necessarily 
negative or limiting. 
Harman (1961), a futurist, hypothesizes that there will 
be a relaxing of the subjective-objective dichotomy 
(Kleinman, 1976). Harman states that there is a increasing 
number of scientists with recognized scientific training that 
are paying more attention to the potential of the intrinsic, 
more unconscious aspects of the body as potential "keys" to 
self-realization. Scientists are also seeing loose parallels 
between the tenets of ancient mysticism and theories in new 
physics. In the search for the grand unification theory, 
physicists are turning to ancient wisdoms as possible 
insights for this breakthrough because they are finding that 
theories are frequently contained and hidden within a simple 
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capsule of an ancient wisdoms. 
Insight into the potential of our mystical primordial 
state of our being, paralleled by scientific training, offers 
humanity exciting possibilities for unfolding more of the 
essential core of our inner existence. For instance, the 
"new" physics led by Suzuki (1959), Capra (1982), and others 
is perhaps the intellectual pioneer in diffusing the 
subject-object dichotomy. The observer can no longer be 
separate and objective in observing the universe. This has 
led to a new view in physics: the role of the 
participant-observer. Nature and humanity need to be seen as 
interactive agencies, for each affects the other. The 
universe is relative and interconnected, not disparate and 
absolute. The old Newtonian and Cartesian laws of reduction 
and objectivity upon which much of our knowledge of our world 
is based are no longer valid. 
Physical education still continues to base its rationale 
on Newtonian and Cartesian dualistic thinking that is 
absolute. This is no longer appropriate, given the huge 
knowledge explosion of science. Physics in particular has 
illuminated the amazing interconnectedness of all living 
matter, human or other. In so doing, it acknowledges 
primordial knowing and the instinctive communicative elements 
which connect seemingly disparate living forms. We are only 
just beginning to see the possible implications and 
ramifications of this knowledge shift from absolute existence 
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to relative existence in everyday life and our physical 
education curriculum. 
Concluding Statement 
My major concern is that physical education appears to 
be turning students off, rather than on to the joy and 
spontaneity inherent in the lived body. The lived body has a 
passionate regard for life. Every moment is revered as vital 
and alive. This passion is probably the fundamental reason 
why most of us are in physical education today. 
Instinctually we remember the joy of our childhood days . . . 
running down a hill as fast, yet as safely as we could . . . 
being on the edge with one's body. These moments are 
exhilarating. The profession seems to have forgotten the 
personal power and significance of these lived moments. Our 
pedagogy appears to focus on the more objective domains of 
movement . . . what the movement looks like, techniques to 
improve performance, critical observation techniques etc. 
Subsequently, sensations, feelings, and harmony in movement 
have not been accorded much significance. The lived body is 
offered as a means to depolarize and heal the the split 
between the inner qualitative, and the outer more technical 
dimensions of movement. It is time that we as physical 
educators finally recognize the responsibility we have to our 
students. We need to recognize that the goal of physical 
education is not only technical skill but also personal 
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meaning. If students find personal meaning in movement, it 
is more likely they will reach not only more 
self-understanding and self-awareness, but also develop more 
joy and reverence for their bodies, and subsequently 
themselves. 
The problem in sport occurs when there is a neglect of 
the qualitative, perceptual experience in favor of an 
exclusive emphasis on technical achievement and winning. An 
athlete's experience of the body continually shifts and 
flows between consciousness of the quality of the sensory 
experience and a concern with the technical dimensions. Both 
are integral to the movement experience; they are not 
mutually exclusive, but symbiotically entwined. Our 
continual reliance on the Cartesian dualistic model only 
serves to perpetuate the split in movement. 
We need to re-examine the fundamental principles so 
thoroughly accepted by our psychology and motor-learning 
researchers. It has been contended in this paper that the 
physical and biological laws of Newtonian and Cartesian 
thought do not apply when endeavouring to understand the 
nature of lived experiential movement. Another theoretical 
base is needed. The lived or subject body based on the 
Merleau-Ponty's works is offered as an alternative 
theoretical base. This perspective mirrors and is more 
consonant with the new physics paradigm, from which the lived 
body draws much of its rationale. 
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The lived body views the body as one entity. It 
recognizes the integral connections between the self and the 
world. The main support for its position rests on the fact 
that the body is primordially embedded in the world prior to 
conscious thought, yet it also acknowledges the paradoxical, 
yet symbiotic, dialectical nature in which the subject exists 
with the other in the quest for meaning and wholeness. 
Personal meaning for the lived body arises from 
subject-object interaction through lived human experience? 
hence the "other" (object) is deemed a vital and critical 
element in understanding our humanity. Furthermore, 
wholeness exists when the "other" is met as a subject, not an 
object. By meeting the other as a subject the subject-object 
dichotomy is dissolved, revealing universal harmony and 
unity. 
Inherent in the lived body are the celebratory elements 
of joy and spontaneity of being alive. By being more present 
in the moment, movement reveals not only the joy of the body 
but the joy of life. The body is the means to embrace and 
celebrate life. Ironically life starts with the body and 
ends in the body. In between our genesis and exodus we can 
either choose to celebrate or denigrate life. The lived body 
offers the key to the celebration of life and each other. 
Meaning in the lived body lies in the space "in-between" two 
subjects, when a Thou meets another's Thou. This is the "It" 
that Herrigel refers to in Zen, or the force that seems to 
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"happen" in experiential peak moments in sport. There is no 
distinction between inner and outer, subject and object, just 
unity and harmony. It is during these moments that we feel a 
sense of true communion with an entity beyond ourselves. It 
is during these moments that we experience what it truly 
means to feel embodied and whole. Our personal quest for 
wholeness is momentarily complete, as we meet with the 
eternal Thou; for in the whole is the sacred. This is where 
the true meaning and significance of physical education lies 
. . . anything less is dehumanizing. 
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